The usage of scholarly journal articles in the academe is now gaining attention to cope with the ever dynamic and evolving teaching and learning processes. However, the use implies possible potential usage only because what is measured is the number of views and downloads of the articles. This paper explored how the teacher education faculty and students utilized scholarly journal articles in the teaching and learning of professional education courses. The study also determined the challenges in using these primary sources (...) and documented ways of overcoming them. Data were organized and analyzed using a thematic narrative technique of Riesman as the analytical framework. The inquiry was participated by six faculty and six students from the College of Education at a state university in Northern Mindanao in the first semester of the school year 2019-2020. The necessary protocol was followed, and ethical considerations were secured before the conduct of the study. An informed consent form was presented to each participant before they signed it, signifying that they are not forced to participate in the study. The faculty had a focus group discussion, while the students had a face-to-face interview with the researchers. Emerging themes revealed that scholarly journal articles were utilized by exposing learners to varied writings, enriching course content and learning, exposing them to process learning, preparing learners for classroom engagement, guiding learners to produce outputs, and allowing learners to acquire updates. The inquiry reported challenges in terms of the capability of the learners, interest and perception of learners, and the journal itself and its contents. Documented ways of overcoming these challenges include time management, frequency of use, selection criteria, and checking the author's background. (shrink)

In this panel, we explore the future of value sensitive design (VSD). The stakes are high. Many in public and private sectors and in civil society are gradually realizing that taking our values seriously implies that we have to ensure that values effectively inform the design of technology which, in turn, shapes people’s lives. Value sensitive design offers a highly developed set of theory, tools, and methods to systematically do so.

Daisy Isabel Saravia Chumbimune nació en Lima (Perú). Es magíster en Literatura Peruana y Latinoamericana de la Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos. Se ha especializado en Estudios Culturales; en específico, en la literatura asiática. Tiene conocimientos intermedios de los idiomas inglés y japonés. Ejerce la investigación y la docencia en la Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, en la Universidad Tecnológica del Perú y en la Universidad Privada del Norte. Sus dos tesis para la obtención del grado académico (...) de licenciada y magíster se titulan Migración china y orientalismo modernista (2015) y Los exóticos del crimen: prensa, literatura y crónica policial sobre la inmigración china (2017). Asimismo, tiene ensayos que ha publicado en capítulos de libros y revistas, y cuenta con participación en ponencias. Entre sus trabajos, se resaltan “Variedades y el espectáculo sensacionalista de la otredad” (2017), “Adiós a la China de la fantasía: Orientalismo modernista e inmigración china en la revista Variedades” (2018) y “Arte y cultura de la inmigración china” (2018). (shrink)

This paper discusses the history of the confusion and controversies over whether the definition of consequence presented in the 11-page 1936 Tarski consequence-definition paper is based on a monistic fixed-universe framework?like Begriffsschrift and Principia Mathematica. Monistic fixed-universe frameworks, common in pre-WWII logic, keep the range of the individual variables fixed as the class of all individuals. The contrary alternative is that the definition is predicated on a pluralistic multiple-universe framework?like the 1931 Gödel incompleteness paper. A pluralistic multiple-universe framework recognizes multiple (...) universes of discourse serving as different ranges of the individual variables in different interpretations?as in post-WWII model theory. In the early 1960s, many logicians?mistakenly, as we show?held the ?contrary alternative? that Tarski 1936 had already adopted a Gödel-type, pluralistic, multiple-universe framework. We explain that Tarski had not yet shifted out of the monistic, Frege?Russell, fixed-universe paradigm. We further argue that between his Principia-influenced pre-WWII Warsaw period and his model-theoretic post-WWII Berkeley period, Tarski's philosophy underwent many other radical changes. (shrink)

Bertrand Russell once pointed out that modern science doesn’t deal with causal laws and that assuming otherwise is not only wrong but such thinking is erroneously thought to do no harm. However, looking into the scientific practice of simulation or experimentation reveals a general causal comprehension of physical processes. In this paper I trace causal experiences to the existence of innate causal capacity by which we organize sensory information. This capacity, I argue, is something we have got in virtue of (...) natural selection as can be seen from experiments with intelligent animals like crows and chimpanzees. So understanding the empirical world is impossible without the use of causal categories. The reason why Russell believed that modern science does not refer to causal laws is, I think, because he argued that the laws of mathematical physics give us a non-causal description of reality. In contrast to such a claim I hold that theoretical laws are prescriptive rules of description rather than descriptions themselves. (shrink)

This paper argues that two widely accepted principles about the indicative conditional jointly presuppose the falsity of one of the most prominent arguments against epistemological iteration principles. The first principle about the indicative conditional, which has close ties both to the Ramsey test and the “or‐to‐if” inference, says that knowing a material conditional suffices for knowing the corresponding indicative. The second principle says that conditional contradictions cannot be true when their antecedents are epistemically possible. Taken together, these principles entail that (...) it is impossible to be in a certain kind of epistemic state: namely, a state of ignorance about which of two partially overlapping bodies of knowledge corresponds to one's actual one. However, some of the more popular “margin for error” style arguments against epistemological iteration principles suggest that such states are not only possible, but commonplace. I argue that the tension between these views runs deep, arising just as much for non‐factive attitudes like belief, presupposition, and certainty. I also argue that this is worse news for those who accept the principles about the indicative conditional than it is for those who reject epistemological iteration principles. (shrink)