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  1. (1 other version)Enough is Enough: Austin on Knowing.Guy Longworth - 2017 - In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), Interpreting J. L. Austin: Critical Essays. Cambridge University Press. pp. 186–205.
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  2. Surveying the facts.Guy Longworth - 2018 - In Tamara Dobler & John Collins (eds.), The Philosophy of Charles Travis: Language, Thought, and Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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  3. Ignorance of Linguistics: A Note on Michael Devitt’s Ignorance of Language.Guy Longworth - 2009 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):21-34.
    Michael Devitt has argued that Chomsky, along with many other Linguists and philosophers, is ignorant of the true nature of Generative Linguistics. In particular, Devitt argues that Chomsky and others wrongly believe the proper object of linguistic inquiry to be speakers' competences, rather than the languages that speakers are competent with. In return, some commentators on Devitt's work have returned the accusation, arguing that it is Devitt who is ignorant about Linguistics. In this note, I consider whether there might be (...)
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  4. (1 other version)A Plea for Understanding.Guy Longworth - 2009 - In Sarah Sawyer (ed.), New waves in philosophy of language. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
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  5. J. L. Austin.Guy Longworth - 2011 - In B. Lee (ed.), Philosophy of Language: The Key Thinkers. Continuum.
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  6. (1 other version)Prospects for a truth-conditional account of standing meaning.Guy Longworth - 2012 - In Richard Schantz (ed.), Prospects for Meaning. Walter de Gruyter.
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  7. Conflicting Grammatical Appearances.Guy Longworth - 2007 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):403-426.
    I explore one apparent source of conflict between our naïve view of grammatical properties and the best available scientific view of grammatical properties. That source is the modal dependence of the range of naïve, or manifest, grammatical properties that is available to a speaker upon the configurations and operations of their internal systems—that is, upon scientific grammatical properties. Modal dependence underwrites the possibility of conflicting grammatical appearances. In response to that possibility, I outline a compatibilist strategy, according to which the (...)
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