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Gabrielle Jackson [5]Gabrielle Benette Jackson [4]
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Gabrielle Jackson
State University of New York, Stony Brook
  1. Gilbert Ryle’s Adverbialism.Gabrielle Benette Jackson - 2020 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 28 (2):318-335.
    Gilbert Ryle famously wrote that practical knowledge (knowing how) is distinct from propositional knowledge (knowing that). This claim continues to have broad philosophical appeal, and yet there are many unsettled questions surrounding Ryle’s basic proposal. In this article, I return to his original work in order to perform some intellectual archeology. I offer an interpretation of Ryle’s concept of action that I call ‘adverbialism’. Actions are constituted by bodily behaviours performed in a certain mode, style or manner. I present various (...)
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  2.  91
    "Gilbert Ryle and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Critique of Descartes".Gabrielle Jackson - 2010 - In Kascha Semonovitch and Neal DeRoo (ed.), Merleau-Ponty at the Limits of Art, Religion and Perception. New York: continuum. pp. 63-78.
    Gilbert Ryle and Maurice Merleau-Ponty each attempted to articulate a non-mechanistic concept of the body by stressing the importance of skill: skillful behavior constituting cognition in Ryle’s work, and the skill body constituting perception in Merleau-Ponty’s work. In this chapter, I turn to their cautions and insights. By drawing out the relation between these two seemingly unrelated theorists, I hope to show that together Ryle and Merleau-Ponty have much to offer philosophy today.
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  3. Maurice Merleau‐Ponty's Concept of Motor Intentionality: Unifying Two Kinds of Bodily Agency.Gabrielle Benette Jackson - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (2):763-779.
    I develop an interpretation of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's concept of motor intentionality, one that emerges out of a reading of his presentation of a now classic case study in neuropathology—patient Johann Schneider—in Phenomenology of Perception. I begin with Merleau-Ponty's prescriptions for how we should use the pathological as a guide to the normal, a method I call triangulation. I then turn to his presentation of Schneider's unusual case. I argue that we should treat all of Schneider's behaviors as pathological, not only (...)
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  4. Seeing What is Not Seen.Gabrielle Jackson - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (3):503-519.
    This paper connects ideas from twentieth century Gestalt psychology, experiments in vision science, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception. I propose that when we engage in simple sensorimotor tasks whose successful completion is open, our behavior may be motivated by practical perceptual awareness alone, responding to invariant features of the perceptual field that are invisible to other forms of perceptual awareness. On this view, we see more than we think we see, as evidenced by our skillful bodily behavior.
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  5.  44
    Neurophilosophy and Its Discontents.Gabrielle Jackson - 2014 - The Institute Letter 2014 (Summer):5-6.
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  6.  69
    Skillful Action in Peripersonal Space.Gabrielle Benette Jackson - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2):313-334.
    In this article, I link the empirical hypothesis that neural representations of sensory stimulation near the body involve a unique motor component to the idea that the perceptual field is structured by skillful bodily activity. The neurophenomenological view that emerges is illuminating in its own right, though it may also have practical consequences. I argue that recent experiments attempting to alter the scope of these near space sensorimotor representations are actually equivocal in what they show. I propose resolving this ambiguity (...)
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  7.  50
    Skill and the Critique of Descartes in Gilbert Ryle and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.Gabrielle Jackson - 2010 - In Kascha Semonovitch Neal DeRoo (ed.), Merleau-Ponty at the Limits of Art, Religion, and Perception. Continuum. pp. 63.
    The mechanistic concept of the body, as inherited from René Descartes, has generated considerable trouble in philosophy—including, at least in part, the mind-body problem itself. Still, the corps mécanique remains perhaps the most prevalent though least examined assumption in recent philosophy of mind. I discuss two notable exceptions. Gilbert Ryle and Maurice Merleau-Ponty rejected this assumption for surprisingly similar reasons. Writing at about the same time, though in different languages and in very different circles, they each attempted to articulate a (...)
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  8.  24
    “Review of Does Perception Have Content? Edited by Berit Brogaard". [REVIEW]Gabrielle Jackson - 2015 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 1:online.
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  9.  26
    Starting with Merleau-Ponty, by Katherine J. Morris. New York: Continuum, 2012. 216 Pp. ISBN 978-1-84706-281-9 $24. [REVIEW]Gabrielle Benette Jackson - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (S3):e8-e12.
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