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Gilad Nir
Friedrich Schiller Universität, Jena
  1.  60
    Are Rules of Inference Superfluous? Wittgenstein Vs. Frege and Russell.Gilad Nir - 2021 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):45-61.
    In Tractatus 5.132 Wittgenstein argues that inferential justification depends solely on the understanding of the premises and conclusion, and is not mediated by any further act. On this basis he argues that Frege’s and Russell’s rules of inference are “senseless” and “superfluous”. This line of argument is puzzling, since it is unclear that there could be any viable account of inference according to which no such mediation takes place. I show that Wittgenstein’s rejection of rules of inference can be motivated (...)
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  2.  80
    Heidegger on the Unity of Metaphysics and the Method of Being and Time.Gilad Nir - 2021 - Review of Metaphysics 74 (3):361-396.
    The fundamental error of the metaphysical tradition, according to Heidegger, is the subordination of general ontology to the ontology of a special, exemplary entity (God, the soul, etc.). But Being and Time itself treats one kind of entity as exemplary, namely Dasein. Does this mean that Heidegger fails to free himself from the kind of metaphysics that he sought to criticize? To show how he avoids this charge I propose to examine the parallels between the methodology of Being and Time (...)
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  3.  47
    Toward a Resolute Reading of Being and Time: Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and the Dilemma Between Inconsistency and Ineffability.Gilad Nir - forthcoming - Southern Journal of Philosophy.
    Both Heidegger and Wittgenstein consider the possibility of a philosophical inquiry of an absolutely universal scope—an inquiry into the being of all beings, in Heidegger’s case, and into the logical form of everything that can be meaningfully said, in Wittgenstein’s. Moreover, they both raise the worry that the theoretical language by means of which we speak of particular beings and assert particular facts is not suited to this task. And yet their own philosophical work seems to include many assertions of (...)
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