According to the interpretational theory of logical validity (IR), logical validity is preservation of truth in all interpretations compatible with the intended meaning of logical expressions. IR suffers from a seemingly defeating objection, the so-called cardinality problem: any instance of the statement ‘There are n things’ is true under all interpretations, since it can be written down using only logical expressions that are not to be reinterpreted; yet ‘There are n things’ is not logically true. I argue that the cardinality (...) problem is indeed a serious problem for IR, when understood in terms of ‘asymmetry of information’. I then argue that IR can be rehabilitated by making quantifiers context-sensitive: what we do not reinterpret is the Kaplanian character of a quantifier, rather than its content. ‘There are n things’ is false in a context where fewer than n things are relevant, so it is not logically true in IR. I finally discuss some objections and ramifications of my account: I discuss how to make space for the possibility of an explicitly absolutely general quantifier in my framework, how terms can be logical even though context-sensitive, and how to recapture classical logic within my framework. (shrink)

Some philosophers argue that a theory of logical validity should not interpret its own language, because a Russellian argument shows that self-applicability is inconsistent with the ability to capture all the interpretations of its own language. First, I set up a formal system to examine the Russellian argument. I then defend the need for self-applicability. I argue that self-applicability seems to be implied by generality, and that the Russellian argument rests on a test for meaning that is biased against self-applicability. (...) I propose an alternative test which is unproblematic for self-applicability. I conclude that self-applicability can be vindicated and the Russellian argument can be resisted. (shrink)

Obligations can be affected by knowledge. Several approaches exist to formalize knowledge-based obligations, but no formalism has been developed yet to capture the dynamic interaction between knowledge and obligations. We introduce the dynamic extension of an existing logic for knowledge-based obligations here. We motivate the logic by analyzing several scenarios and by showing how it can capture in an original manner several fundamental deontic notions such as absolute, prima facie and all-things-considered obligations. Finally, in the dynamic epistemic logic tradition, we (...) provide reduction axioms for the dynamic operator of the new logic. (shrink)

In the substitutional framework, validity is truth under all substitutions of the nonlogical vocabulary. I develop a theory where □ is interpreted as substitutional validity. I show how to prove soundness and completeness for common modal calculi using this definition.