4 found
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  1. Rights, Wronging, and Equality of Status.Giulio Fornaroli - forthcoming - Law and Philosophy:1-28.
    Two problems about rights have received so far little attention. One is the problem of identifying a general value in the practice of rights. The second is to see when, if at all, rights violations wrong the right-holder, in a morally significant sense. In the present essay, I address the first question by investigating the second. I first show that if we commit to the two ideas, common in the contemporary philosophy of rights, that claim-rights always correlate with directed duties (...)
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  2. Corrective Duties/Corrective Justice.Giulio Fornaroli - 2024 - Philosophy Compass 19 (3):e12968.
    In this paper, I assess critically the recent debate on corrective duties across moral and legal philosophy. Two prominent positions have emerged: the Kantian rights-based view (holding that what triggers corrections is a failure to respect others' right to freedom) and the so-called continuity view (correcting means attempting to do what one was supposed to do before). Neither position, I try to show, offers a satisfactory explanation of the ground (why correct?) and content (how to correct?) of corrective duties. In (...)
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  3. Neglecting Others and Making It Up to Them: The Idea of a Corrective Duty.Giulio Fornaroli - 2023 - Legal Theory 29 (4):289-313.
    I aspire to answer two questions regarding the concept of a corrective duty. The first concerns what it means to wrong others, thus triggering a demand for corrections (the ground question). The second relates to the proper content of corrective duties. I first illustrate how three prominent accounts of corrective duties—the Aristotelian model of correlativity, the Kantian idea that wronging corresponds to the violation of others’ right to freedom, and the more recent continuity view—have failed to answer the two questions (...)
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  4. Rawls contra Rawls: Legitimacy, Normative Impact, and the Basic Structure.Giulio Fornaroli - 2022 - Ethics, Politics, and Society 5 (2):127-145.
    In this paper, I contrast two approaches to political legitimacy, both influenced by Rawls. One is the classic political liberal picture, according to which a state is legitimate if its “constitutional essentials” could be endorsed by reasonable citizens. The alternative is the idea that what makes a state legitimate is primarily its success at organizing the basic structure in a way that is demonstrably favorable to the governed. Specifically, I suggest that a state is legitimate insofar as it organizes the (...)
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