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  1.  97
    The role of imagination and recollection in the method of phenomenal contrast.Hamid Nourbakhshi - 2023 - Theoria 89 (5):710-733.
    The method of phenomenal contrast (in perception) invokes the phenomenal character of perceptual experience as a means to discover its contents. The method implicitly takes for granted that ‘what it is like’ to have a perceptual experience e is the same as ‘what it is like’ to imagine or recall it; accordingly, in its various proposed implementations, the method treats imaginations and/or recollections as interchangeable with real experiences. The method thus always contrasts a pair of experiences, at least one of (...)
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  2. Does Perception Track Deific properties: A Case for Deific Perception.Hamid Nourbakhshi - manuscript
    This paper argues for deific perception, the idea that some perceptual experiences represent deific properties, as an explanation for a certain type of religious experience. Using Siegel's method of phenomenal contrast, a pair of experiences are compared: an ordinary perception of a black rose, and one where the rose seems imbued with religious significance. Intuitively, these have different phenomenologies. Deific perception posits that in the religiously-significant experience, a deific property like "being a creature of God" partly constitutes the visual phenomenology. (...)
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  3.  63
    The Fact of Reason: An Analysis of Owen Ware’s and Jeanine Grenberg’s Interpretations.Hamid Nourbakhshi - manuscript
    Jeanine Grenberg argues that in Kant's moral philosophy, we access the moral law through feeling, specifically the feeling of respect. She claims the fact of reason refers to our conscious experience of categorical imperative and moral necessity is revealed through this feeling. Owen Ware critiques this "affect of reason" interpretation, arguing it relies on the flawed premise that all facts forced upon us are accessible only through sensibility. He uses Kant's example of the concept of substance, which we comprehend through (...)
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  4.  48
    Perceiving Grounded Moral Properties.Hamid Nourbakhshi - manuscript
    The advocates of moral perception claim that we can literally perceive moral properties such as goodness and badness. One of the objections to the thesis of moral perception is that since we are not able to causally interact with moral properties and these properties are causally inert, thus they do not fall into the scope of our perception. In reply, the advocates propose different solutions: 1) moral properties supervene on natural properties, 2) moral properties are secondary natural properties, and 3) (...)
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