In the first part of this article we briefly describe the design and development of a Consciousness Studies concentration at Goddard College, a student centered, progressive educational institution in the northeastern United States. We emphasize the tensions we experienced between different orientations in Consciousness Studies and especially the one related to the scientific and transpersonal ends of the spectrum of consciousness. In the second part, we relate the scientific‐transpersonal issue that we experienced at Goddard to the broader theory and practice (...) of Consciousness Studies. We also link the latter to the so‐called explanatory gap between third and first person forms of consciousness and the call for first person methods of exploring consciousness. Our conclusion is that the scientific approach has the edge and is at risk of assimilating other approaches to the detriment of Consciousness Studies. In our view, the future development of Consciousness Studies, both in theory and practice, requires several different approaches from the scientific to the transpersonal and privileging one is to narrow the field of possibilities and to risk falling prey to one‐sidedness. (shrink)

One of the most well-known and defining characteristics of indigenous Andean thought is its adherence to a “complementary dualism” in which the “opposites” of existence are viewed as interdependent parts of a harmonious whole. This is in many ways in stark contrast to Western philosophical models, which have historically tended towards an “antagonistic dualism,” the view that the opposites are engaged in an eternal struggle for dominance. This paper considers how a culture’s relationship to the opposites—whether seen as a “war” (...) or a “dance”—influences the way an individual creates psychological meaning. The results of my research into Andean complementary dualism are first presented. I then consider how this cultural-philosophical worldview compares to other complementary models, specifically that of G.W. Hegel and C. G. Jung. The paper concludes with a consideration of how the similar ideals of these complementary worldviews might inform the work of transpersonal researchers and practitioners. (shrink)

The question of what human consciousness “is,” how it “works,” and what it “does” is currently being approached by myriad fields of study, each with their own particular goals and research techniques. But despite the undeniably complex nature of this enigmatic phenomenon, the prevailing scientific and institutional paradigm seems to imply that only quantitative, experimentally focused approaches are a worthy means of illuminating “truth” about human consciousness. -/- In this paper, I begin by borrowing Popper’s metaphor of “clock systems” versus (...) “cloud systems,” applying each to quantitative and qualitative inquiry respectively. I make the case that, as Popper urged when articulating his ideas about physical determinism, the field of consciousness research must re-consider the possibility that rejecting the “cloud” or qualitative aspects of consciousness will lead to a stunted, incomplete picture of the phenomenon. Taking examples from my own work as an anthropologist and from the work of my colleagues within the field, I offer examples of and reflections on what qualitative research has to offer all of us who wish to gain insight into human consciousness; in particular, its nature, function, and potential. In response to the one-sidedness within the field, I urge researchers of all types to consider its “double nature” as a positive quality, and offer the reminder that no matter what differences in our particular goals and research styles, our meta-mission remains the same: to illuminate the great mystery that lies in the center of our personhood. (shrink)

Judith Butler’s influential work in feminist theory is significant for its insight that sexist discourse in popular culture affects the agency and consciousness of individuals, but offers an inadequate account of how such discourse might be said to touch, shape, or affect selves. Supplementing Butler’s account of signification with a Deweyan pragmatic account of meaning-making and selective emphasis enables a consistent account of the relationship between discourse and subjectivity with a robust conception of the bodily organism. An analysis of the (...) popular discourse surrounding Hillary Clinton in the 2008 Presidential campaign demonstrates why this hybrid pragmatic/poststructuralist account is necessary. (shrink)

In a reflective and richly entertaining piece from 1979, Doug Hofstadter playfully imagined a conversation between ‘Achilles’ and an anthill (the eponymous ‘Aunt Hillary’), in which he famously explored many ideas and themes related to cognition and consciousness. For Hofstadter, the anthill is able to carry on a conversation because the ants that compose it play roughly the same role that neurons play in human languaging; unfortunately, Hofstadter’s work is notably short on detail suggesting how this magic might be (...) achieved1. Conversely in this paper - finally reifying Hofstadter’s imagination - we demonstrate how populations of simple ant-like creatures can be organised to solve complex problems; problems that involve the use of forward planning and strategy. Specifically we will demonstrate that populations of such creatures can be configured to play a strategically strong - though tactically weak - game of HeX (a complex strategic game).We subsequently demonstrate how tactical play can be improved by introducing a form of forward planning instantiated via multiple populations of agents; a technique that can be compared to the dynamics of interacting populations of social insects via the concept of meta-population. In this way although, pace Hofstadter, we do not establish that a meta-population of ants could actually hold a conversation with Achilles, we do successfully introduce Aunt Hillary to the complex, seductive charms of HeX. (shrink)

Hillary Putnam has famously argued that we can know that we are not brains in a vat because the hypothesis that we are is self-refuting. While Putnam's argument has generated interest primarily as a novel response to skepticism, his original use of the brain in a vat scenario was meant to illustrate a point about the "mind/world relationship." In particular, he intended it to be part of an argument against the coherence of metaphysical realism, and thus to be part (...) of a defense of his conception of truth as idealized rational acceptability. Putnam's conclusions about the scenario are, however, actually out of line with central and plausible aspects of his own account of the relationship between our minds and the world. Reflections on semantics give us no compelling reason to suppose that claims like "I am a brain in a vat" could not turn out to be true. (shrink)

In this paper, I analyze multiple aspects of how gender norms pervaded the 2016 election, from the way Clinton and Trump announced their presidency to the way masculinity and femininity were policed throughout the election. Examples include Hillary Clinton, Donald Trump, Barack Obama, and Gary Johnson. I also consider how some women who support Trump reacted to allegations about sexual harassment. The difference between running for President as a man and running for President as a woman makes all the (...) difference in the world. (OPEN ACCESS). (shrink)

This paper attempts to answer two questions: What is epistemic agency? And what are the motivations for having this concept? In response to the first question, it is argued that epistemic agency is the agency one has over one’s belief-forming practices, or doxastic dispositions, which can directly affect the way one forms a belief and indirectly affect the beliefs one forms. In response to the second question, it is suggested that the above conception of epistemic agency is either implicitly endorsed (...) by those theorists sympathetic to epistemic normativity or, at minimum, this conception can make sense of the legitimacy of the normative notions applicable to how and what one should believe. It is further contended that belief formation in some respects is a skill that can be intentionally developed and refined. Accepting this contention and the existence of certain epistemic norms provide inconclusive yet good reasons to endorse this concept. Recent challenges to this concept by Hillary Kornblith and Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij are also considered. (shrink)

As an idea, transhumanism has received increasing attention in recent years and across numerous domains. Despite presidential candidates such as Zoltan Istvan, who ran on an explicitly Transhumanist platform in 2016 but later dropped out to endorse Hillary Clinton, transhumanism has taken root more recently in the conspiratorial imaginations of the dark web. Given the philosophy’s central emphasis on technology as an inherent good, imaginations in supposed alt-right internet circles have criticised it as an ideological gateway to global, fully-automated (...) Communism. This is not to say that such discussions on transhumanism are exclusively siloed and on the margins of society. Related discussions are happening at various well-known institutions and research centres such as the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, a non-profit think tank dedicated to techno-progressivism where I have been managing director for half a decade. What I mean to say here is that transhumanism is not monolithic. It is best described as multi-faceted and existing in different instantiations across multiple domains. James Michael MacFarlane’s recent book, Transhumanism as a New Social Movement: The Techno- Imagination, is an attempt to trace the history, meaning, and practices that characterise this variegated term. (shrink)

Semantic externalism Are the meanings of natural kind words, such as “water” or “tiger,” in the head or in the world? This question is pressing and controversial in contemporary philosophy. The nature of the meaning related to propositional contents and words of the natural kind raises a fundamental disagreement between two groups of philosophers: defenders of internalism and defenders of externalism. The two groups differ on how to define meaning. Internalists say that meaning is determined entirely by aspects that are (...) internal to the speaker, and mental contents are semantic contents that are in our minds or heads, their slogan is “Meanings are in the head or brain.” Externalists say that meaning is determined, at least in part, by aspects that are external to the speaker, and that contents are linguistic signs and exist in the outside world, and their slogan is “Meanings do not exist only in the head.” In this article, I want to shed explanatory light on this disagreement by examining its origins, explaining some of the arguments in support of externalism, and demonstrating the impact of this disagreement on understanding the nature of meaning. This article addresses several topics: 1. Various types of externalism 2. Description theory and causal theory 3. Hillary Betnam and Twin Earth thought experiment 4. Tyler Berg and arthritis argument 5. Donald Davidson and perceptual externalism 6. Andy Clark and David Chalmers: active externalism -/- هل معانى ألفاظ النوع الطبيعى، مثل "ماء" أو "نمر"، فى الرأس أم فى العالم؟ هذا السؤال ملح ومثير للجدل فى الفلسفة المعاصرة. فطبيعة المعنى المتعلق بالمضامين القضوية وألفاظ النوع الطبيعى يثير خلافًا أساسيًّا بين فريقين من الفلاسفة هم أصحاب النزعة الداخلية internalism وأصحاب النزعة الخارجية externalism. ويختلف الفريقان على كيفية تحديد المعنى. يقول الداخليون إن المعنى يتحدد كلية عن طريق جوانب تكون داخلية للمتكلم، والمضامين العقلية هى مضامين دلالية تكون فى عقولنا أو رؤوسنا، وشعارهم هو "المعانى توجد في الرأس أو المخ". ويقول الخارجيون إن المعنى يتحدد فى جانب منه على الأقل عن طريق جوانب تكون خارجية للمتكلم، والمضامين هى إشارات لغوية وتوجد فى العالم الخارجى، وشعارهم هو "المعانى لا توجد فى الرأس فقط". وأريد فى هذه المقالة أن ألقى ضوءًا شارحًا على هذا الخلاف، وذلك من خلال النظر فى أصوله، وشرح بعض الحجج المؤيدة للنزعة الخارجية، وبيان أثر هذا الخلاف فى فهم طبيعة المعنى. وتعالج هذه المقالة عدة موضوعات هي: 1- صور منوعة من النزعة الخارجية 2- نظرية الوصف والنظرية السببية 3- هيلارى بتنام وتجربة فكر الأرض التوأم 4- تايلر بيرج وحجة التهاب المفاصل . (shrink)