In this paper, partly historical and partly theoretical, after having shortly outlined the development of the meta-ethics in the 1900?s starting from the Tractatus of Wittgenstein, I argue it is possible to sustain that emotivism and intuitionism are unsatisfactory ethical conceptions, while on the contrary, reason (intended in a logical-deductive sense) plays an effective role both in ethical discussions and in choices. There are some characteristics of the ethical language (prescriptivity, universalizability and predominance) that cannot be eluded (pain the non (...) significativity of the same language) by those who want to morally reason, i.e. by those who intend to regulate their own behaviour on the basis of knowledged and coherent principles. These characteristics can be found whether or not all possible ontological-metaphysics foundations of morals are taken into account. Furthermore the deontic logic systems allow the formalization of ethical theories and - at least in principle - a rigorous critical discussion of the same, but obviously nothing can be affirmed on the value of truth of the axioms of a system. In the deontic logic systems Hume?s law is assumed as an implicit result of inferential (conventional) rules and the acceptance of Hume?s law as a logical-linguistic thesis does not involve the cancellation of values (nihilism) or ethical relativism or indifferentism. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Trevor Hedberg and Jordan Huzarevich assessed a number of objections against practical apatheism, concluding that they are either unsuccessful or at least very controversial. The aim of this discussion note is to contribute to their discussion by presenting and analysing a short argument for a reason in favor of apatheism; one that appeals to a particular universalist formulation of the thesis of theodical individualism. After briefly introducing a distinction between a particular and a universal version of (...) apatheism, I present the argument, assess its merits in light of some objections to it, I conclude that at least one reason in favor of a particular practical apatheistic position is warranted by it. Finally, I suggest some alternative reasons that could be advanced in favor of apatheism, and I distinguish between strong and weak forms of apatheism. (shrink)