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Jack M. C. Kwong
Appalachian State University
  1.  79
    The Phenomenology of Hope.Jack M. C. Kwong - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (3):313-325.
    What is the phenomenology of hope? A common view is that hope has a generally positive and pleasant affective tone. This rosy depiction, however, has recently been challenged. Certain hopes, it has been objected, are such that they are either entirely negative in valence or neutral in tone. In this paper, I argue that this challenge has only limited success. In particular, I show that it only applies to one sense of hope but leaves another sense—one that is implicitly but (...)
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  2. How to Theorize About Hope.Jack M. C. Kwong - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    In order to better understand the topic of hope, this paper argues that two separate theories are needed: One for hoping, and the other for hopefulness. This bifurcated approach is warranted by the observation that the word ‘hope’ is polysemous: It is sometimes used to refer to hoping and sometimes, to feeling or being hopeful. Moreover, these two senses of 'hope' are distinct, as a person can hope for some outcome yet not simultaneously feel hopeful about it. I argue that (...)
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  3. Hope and Hopefulness.Jack M. C. Kwong - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (7):832-843.
    This paper proposes a new framework for thinking about hope, with certain unexpected consequences. Specifically, I argue that a shift in focus from locutions like “x hopes that” and “x is hoping that” to “x is hopeful that” and “x has hope that” can improve our understanding of hope. This approach, which emphasizes hopefulness as the central concept, turns out to be more revealing and fruitful in tackling some of the issues that philosophers have raised about hope, such as the (...)
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  4.  85
    Bitterness Without Hope.Anna Cremaldi & Jack M. C. Kwong - forthcoming - Journal of Social Philosophy.
    This paper develops and defends an anger-based account of bitterness. In particular, it argues that contrary to what some scholars have maintained, an adequate account of bitterness does not require the concept of hope. That is, bitterness is neither disappointed hope (McFall) nor hopeless anger (Stockdale). Instead, it proposes that bitterness is better understood as unresolved anger, an emotion experienced when a lack of resolution to our violated moral expectations forces us to swallow our anger. Construing the emotion this way (...)
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  5.  97
    Shame and Moral Autonomy.Jack M. C. Kwong - 2021 - Ratio 34 (1):44-55.
    Does shame have a place in a mature moral agent's psychology? Does it play a useful and positive role in morality? One skepticism that disputes shame's compatibility with mature moral agency or its being a useful moral emotion is that shame appears heteronomous in nature: We experience shame not because we have behaved badly by our own moral standards, but because we have been reproved by other people and suffered an injury to our social image. To mitigate this skepticism, this (...)
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  6. The Social Dimension of Open-Mindedness.Jack M. C. Kwong - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.
    This paper explores how open-mindedness and its exercise can be social in nature. In particular, it argues that an individual can be regarded as open-minded even though she does not conduct all of the intellectual tasks as required by open-mindedness by herself; that is, she delegates some of these tasks to her epistemic peers. Thinking about open-mindedness in such social terms not only opens up the possibility that there are different and surprising ways for an individual to be open-minded, but (...)
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  7. Why Concepts Should Not Be Pluralized or Eliminated.Jack M. C. Kwong - 2014 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 8 (1):7-23.
    Concept Pluralism and Concept Eliminativism are two positions recently proposed in the philosophy and the psychology of concepts. Both of these theories are motivated by the view that all current theories of concepts are empirically and methodologically inadequate and hold in common the assumption that for any category that can be represented in thought, a person can possess multiple, distinct concepts of it. In this paper, I will challenge these in light of a third theory, Conceptual Atomism, which addresses and (...)
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