Results for 'Jayanta Bhaṭṭa'

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  1. Though He Is One, He Bears All Those Diverse Names: A Comparative Analysis of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s Argument for Toleration.David Slakter - 2015 - Philosophy East and West 65 (2):430-443.
    In the Āgamadambara (“Much Ado about Religion”), Jayanta Bhatta appears to be making a case for religious toleration and pluralism. This paper considers whether Jayanta has a concept like toleration in mind at all, or at least something that we today might understand to be toleration. If he is doing neither, our understanding of the nature of tolerance and its conceptual limits may be furthered by determining exactly what he is talking about and why it looks so much (...)
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  2. The Pragma-Dialectics of Dispassionate Discourse: Early Nyāya Argumentation Theory.Malcolm Keating - 2022 - Religions 10 (12).
    Analytic philosophers have, since the pioneering work of B.K. Matilal, emphasized the contributions of Nyāya philosophers to what contemporary philosophy considers epistemology. More recently, scholarly work demonstrates the relevance of their ideas to argumentation theory, an interdisciplinary area of study drawing on epistemology as well as logic, rhetoric, and linguistics. This paper shows how early Nyāya theorizing about argumentation, from Vātsyāyana to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, can fruitfully be juxtaposed with the pragma-dialectic approach to argumentation pioneered by Frans van Eemeren. (...)
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  3. Gaṅgeśa on Absence in Retrospect.Jack Beaulieu - 2021 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 49 (4):603-639.
    Cases of past absence involve agents noticing in retrospect that an object or property was absent, such as when one notices later that a colleague was not at a talk. In Sanskrit philosophy, such cases are introduced by Kumārila as counterexamples to the claim that knowledge of absence is perceptual, but further take on a life of their own as a topic of inquiry among Kumārila’s commentators and their Nyāya interlocutors. In this essay, I examine the Nyāya philosopher Gaṅgeśa’s epistemology (...)
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  4. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Pārthasārathi Miśra on First- and Higher-Order Knowing.Malcolm Keating - 2022 - Philosophy East and West 72 (2):396-414.
    According to the seventh-century C.E. philosopher Kumārila Bhat.t.a, epistemic agents are warranted in taking their world-presenting experiences as veridical, if they lack defeaters. For him, these experiences are defeasibly sources of knowledge without the agent reflecting on their content or investigating their causal origins. This position is known as svatah prāmāṇya in Sanskrit (henceforth the SP principle). -/- As explicated by the eleventh-century commentator, Pārthasārathi Misŕa, this position entails that epistemic agents know things without simultaneously knowing that they know them, (...)
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  5. Śālikanātha on Absence in the Pramāṇapārāyaṇa: An Introduction and Translation.Jack Beaulieu - 2023 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 51 (3):215-238.
    This is a brief philosophical introduction to, and an annotated translation of, the section on absence from Śālikanātha’s Pramāṇapārāyaṇa (Study of the Instruments of Knowledge), a foundational work of Prābhākara epistemology. In this section, which focuses on the epistemology of absence, Śālikanātha argues against the Bhāṭṭa view that there is a sui generis instrument of knowledge (pramāṇa) by which we learn of absence (abhāva). He does so by arguing for a subjective reductionist thesis about absence, according to which the absence (...)
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  6. The Cow is to be Tied Up: Sort-Shifting in Classical Indian Philosophy.Keating Malcolm - 2013 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 30 (4):311-332.
    This paper undertakes textual exegesis and rational reconstruction of Mukula Bhaṭṭa’s Abhidhā-vṛttta-mātṛkā, or “The Fundamentals of the Communicative Function.” The treatise was written to refute Ānandavardhana’s claim, made in the Dhvanyāloka, that there is a third “power” of words, vyañjanā (suggestion), beyond the two already accepted by traditional Indian philosophy: abhidhā (denotation) and lakṣaṇā(indication).1 I argue that the explanation of lakṣaṇā as presented in his text contains internal tensions, although it may still be a compelling response to Ānandavardhana.
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  7. Ācārya Māņikyanandi’s Parīkşāmukha Sūtra – Essence of the Jaina Nyāya आचार्य माणिक्यनन्दि विरचित परीक्षामुख सूत्र.Vijay K. Jain (ed.) - 2021 - Dehradun, India: Vikalp Printers.
    The science-of-thought (Nyāya) has always been an integral part of the four constituents (anuyoga) – prathamānuyoga, karuņānuyoga, caraņānuyoga, and dravyānuyoga – of the Jaina Scripture. Through Parīkşāmukha Sūtra, Ācārya Māņikyanandi (circa 7th-8th century A.D.) churned the nectar of the science-of-thought (Nyāya) from the ocean of the words of the master-composers like Ācārya Samantabhadra and Bhaţţa Akalańka Deva. The valid-knowledge (pramāņa) ascertains the true nature of objects while the fallacious-knowledge (pramāņābhāsa) does the opposite. Parīkşāmukha Sūtra characterizes, as per the earlier authoritative (...)
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