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Joe Lau [3]Joe Y. F. Lau [1]
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Joe Y. F. Lau
University of Hong Kong
  1. Pietroski on possible worlds semantics for belief sentences.Joe Lau - 1995 - Analysis 55 (4):295-298.
    Pietroski (1993) offers a semantics for belief sentences that is supposed to address the problem of equivalence. This paper argues that his proposal fails to solve the problem.
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  2. The nature of emotions: comments on Martha Nussbaum's Upheavals of thought.Joe Lau - 2007 - In Martha Craven Nussbaum, Joseph Chan, Jiwei Ci & Joe Lau (eds.), The Ethics and Politics of Compassion and Capabilities. Hong Kong: Faculty of Law, The University of Hong Kong.
    Nussbaum’s theory of the emotions draws heavily on the Stoic account. In her theory, emotions are a kind of value judgment or thought. This is in stark contrast to the well-known proposal from William James, who took emotions to be bodily feelings. There are various motivations for taking emotions as judgments. One main reason is that emotions are intentional mental states. They are always about something, directed at particular objects or state of affairs. For example, fear seems to involve the (...)
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    Ceteris paribus preferences, rational farming effects, and the extensionality principle.Joe Y. F. Lau - 2022 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 45:e232.
    Bermúdez argues for rational framing effects in the form of quasi-cyclical preferences. This is supposed to refute the extensionality principle in standard decision theory. In response, I argue that it is better to analyze seemingly quasi-cyclical preferences as ceteris paribus preferences. Furthermore, if frames are included as objects of choice, we can acknowledge rational framing effects without rejecting extensionality.
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