Throughout its history, analytic philosophy has established a decidedly anti-rhetoric self-understanding. Yet the historical development of analytic philosophy, leading from Russell to Quine and Davidson, successively puts this anti-rhetorical ideals in question. Even though the rhetorics of clarity and objectivity remain, the discussions of post-analytic philosophy focus more and more an an understanding of language which is forced to acknowledge its irreducible practical and situational aspects. Analytical philosophy, then, should be seen as a decidedly anti-rhetoric tradition which tries to keep (...) up the spirit of scientific enlightenment in times of growing skepticism -- and which is driven, by the very force of clarity and a better understanding, to develop a picture of language which undermines this ideal at least in some aspects. (shrink)

The core idea of 'becoming major', as it can be found in Kant's famous essay about the Enlightenment, is the concept of self-legislation or self-governance. Minority is described as a state of dependency on some heteronomous guidance (i.e. church, doctor, or the state), whereas majority is defined by Kant as the ability to guide oneself, using one's own understanding ('Verstand'). These definitions display a deep affinity to central concepts of Kant's philosophy: the autonomy of rational ethics, as it is defended (...) in the second Critique, and the copernican revolution in epistemology, which is the topic of the first Critique. Picking up on these similarities, the text isolates some of the essential conditions for Kant's understanding of an enlightened state of majority. Kant's theoretical works spell out conceptual preconditions for his radical account of self-guidance and gives it a more detailed form. This allows to articulate some of the historical assumptions and theoretical implications of majority which we might have lost out of sight in a time where 'self-management' is a ubiquitous demand. (shrink)

Report about the "resolute reading" of Wittgenstein.

Analytic philosophy of language has often criticized classical pragmatism for holding to an unwarranted notion of experience which lapses into epistemological foundationalism; defenders of the classics have denied such a consequence. The paper tries to move this debate forward by pointing out that the criticism of the empiricist “given” is not wedded to a specific philosophical method, be it linguistic or pragmatist. From a broader historical perspective drawing in particular on Kant, antifoundationalism turns out to be deeply rooted in modern (...) western philosophy and its ambivalent attitude towards the success of the empirical sciences. This diagnosis allows to reassess classical pragmatism beyond the perceived alternative “language vs. experience”, and to concentrate on antifoundationalism as the real challenge to any modern, epistemologically oriented philosophy. In that perspective, classical pragmatism’s genuine contribution is to do justice to antifoundationalism by focusing on the experimental dynamic of scientific practice, which is most commonly ignored by the analytic tradition. Pragmatism identifies rationality with the practical operation of reflexively determining and articulating what is being experienced. With this approach, it is argued, experiential pragmatism serves modern antifoundationalism ends better than its analytic siblings. (shrink)

In French post-structuralism, »decentering« signifies the criticism of any metaphysical »centre« which is supposed to reign the development and the logic of discourse, and hence of thinking. In particular, anthropology and the recourse to humanism were suspected to miss the plurality and the self-differing nature of discursive practices. This article presents Dewey’s philosophy as an alternative to this criticism. Dewey is comparably sceptical of any attempt to treat the human being as a metaphysical essence. Nevertheless, he develops an explicit humanism (...) which defends the central values of freedom, openness, and growth. This paradoxical humanism is rendered possible by developing a concept of nature, and the human being, which,decenters‘ the specific human capacities by consequently treating them as an integral part of nature. (shrink)

The article offers a close reading of chapter 6 of Dewey's 'Experience and Nature'. It explains how Dewey reformulates the classical notion of the subject in pragmatist terms, emphasizing in particular Dewey's idea that 'experience' is not a priori subjective, but rather has to be appropriated by the acting individual in order to become one's own experience in an emphatic sense.

The so-called ›resolute‹ reading of Wittgenstein, most notably represented by Cora Diamond and James Conant, claims that the text of the Tractatus does not convey a philosophical thesis. In engaging with the text and its literary form, the reader is supposed to cultivate an experience which will eventually allow her to confront (moral) reality without any obstructing philosophical abstractions. The article argues that this under- standing of the text implicitly rests on the traditional and highly problem- atic distinction between rhetoric (...) and ›serious‹ speech, between a use of language which describes facts and one which elicits experiences. By re- constructing the alleged effect of a ›resolute‹ reading of the Tractatus with the help of Iser’s theory of literary experience, it is shown that the ›real- ism‹ that the resolute readers argue for can have no substance at all. (shrink)

Questions Cavell's thesis that scepticism is a "natural" condition for mankind, by exploring certain historical developments (such as the scientific revolution) which does give scepticism a "natural" place in modern thinking. Emphasis is laid upon the question how scepticism can be an overwhelming ordinary experience, which is traced back to the establishment of devices such as the microscope.

Review of Matthias Jung, "Gewöhnliche Erfahrung", Mohr Siebeck: Türingen 2014.

Review of Michel Foucault, 'Le gouvernement de soi et des autres'.