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  1. Consciousness qua Mortal Computation.Kleiner Johannes - manuscript
    Computational functionalism posits that consciousness is a computation. Here we show, perhaps surprisingly, that it cannot be a Turing computation. Rather, computational functionalism implies that consciousness is a novel type of computation that has recently been proposed by Geoffrey Hinton, called mortal computation.
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  2. Three Comments in Case of a Structural Turn in Consciousness Science.Kleiner Johannes - manuscript
    Recent activities in virtually all fields engaged in consciousness studies indicate early signs of a structural turn, where verbal descriptions or simple formalisations of conscious experiences are replaced by structural tools, most notably mathematical spaces. My goal here is to offer three comments that, in my opinion, are essential to avoid misunderstandings in these developments early on. These comments concern metaphysical premises of structuralist approaches, overlooked assumptions in regard to isomorphisms, and the question of what structure to consider on the (...)
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  3. If consciousness is dynamically relevant, artificial intelligence isn't conscious.Kleiner Johannes & Ludwig Tim - manuscript
    We demonstrate that if consciousness is relevant for the temporal evolution of a system's states—that is, if it is dynamically relevant—then AI systems cannot be conscious. That is because AI systems run on CPUs, GPUs, TPUs or other processors which have been designed and verified to adhere to computational dynamics that systematically preclude or suppress deviations. The design and verification preclude or suppress, in particular, potential consciousness-related dynamical effects, so that if consciousness is dynamically relevant, AI systems cannot be conscious.
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