Reports of not feeling understood are frequent in testimonies of psychological trauma. I argue that these feelings are not a matter of a cognitive failure but rather an expression of the absence of a more pervasive background feeling of belonging. Contemporary accounts of we-intentionality promise but ultimately fall short in explaining this sense of belonging. Gerda Walther offers an alternative account of communal experiences. Her notion of “habitual unification” can explain the background feelings of belonging that are woven through the (...) individual’s everyday experience of being in a shared world. Having unified with another person, the world feels different. It is now experienced in light of a “we.” This is not only the case in actual, singular person-to-person encounters. Unification with others becomes habitual: it retreats into the background of the individual’s awareness, colouring their experience of the world. Thus sedimented, it forms a background sense of belonging to a shared world. Unification is enabled by experiencing others as being similar in a significant way, such as having the same experiences, values, or basic attitude: in Walther’s words, as being a “human, who also....” This, I shall argue, is impacted through traumatizing experiences. Trauma survivors struggle to experience others as “humans, who also...,” resulting in a failure of unification and thus impeding feelings of belonging. Trauma testimonies also suggest that actively seeking out recognition of similarities and shared aspects of experience may once again enable experiencing others as “humans, who also...,” thus enabling unification and re-establishing a sense of belonging. (shrink)

This chapter explores the impact of “bureaucratic individualism” and profit-centered models on the medical profession, specifically examining Chronic Moral Injury (CH-MI). Drawing on Alasdair MacIntyre’s philosophy and Farr Curlin and Christopher Tollefsen’s critique of the Provider of Services Model (PSM) in healthcare, we argue that the erosion of practical reason—a key element for pursuing excellence in the profession—has dire consequences. Within the PSM, the focus on consumerism and radical patient autonomy hampers medical professionals’ ability to make value-informed judgments, contributing to (...) CH-MI and a crisis of purpose. The chapter calls for redefining healthcare models to prioritize human flourishing over corporate interests. (shrink)

This chapter will directly engage what I call Aristotle’s “privileged virtue thesis,” which essentially holds that only a very small number of very privileged people have access to the kind of external goods and mentors that will allow them to flourish through the acquisition of the virtues. Another way of putting this is that virtue is so rare because good formation and mentorship are rare. Aristotle’s thesis is a difficult one to refute given what we know about social learning and (...) the necessary conditions for true moral inspiration to spontaneously occur. Effective moral exemplars must be more than extraordinarily virtuous people that we fancy to imitate, they must also have a specific type of relationship with the student of virtue. Jennifer Herdt recalls this in Putting on Virtue, “What is crucial in order for one’s desires to be transformed into those of a virtuous person is that one love and be loved by the moral exemplar set before one.” As Herdt explains, this requirement is particularly poignant given that virtue is not a mechanical feat that can be produced through compliance. Instead, it requires cultivating affection for what is good. If we contend, as most virtue ethicists would, that moral exemplars are necessary for the acquisition of virtue and recognize the lack of suitable mentors among us, it is no wonder that Aristotle argues virtue is a privilege. However, this chapter will suggest that Christ provides a unique challenge to Aristotle’s privilege of virtue thesis because of the type of moral exemplar Christ is. Moreover, I contend that Peter Abelard’s theory of atonement, particularly its moral exemplarist dimensions, will be especially helpful in helping us understand why. -/- . (shrink)

Traumatic experiences do not merely impact on the individual’s body and psyche, they alter the way we experience others, our interpersonal relationships, and how we make sense of the world. In my dissertation, I integrate work in phenomenology, psychopathology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychiatry, and trauma studies, and draw on trauma testimonies ob- tained in an online questionnaire. I engage analytically with the question of what constitutes a trauma, whether psychological trauma is necessarily pathological, and what the causal and (...) im- plicatory relations between traumatising and post-traumatic experiences are. Informed by these preliminary elaborations, I focus on the intersubjective dimension of trauma, drawing on a qualitative study I conducted in 2020. I show that empathic abilities may be altered but are not necessarily diminished through traumatising experiences; I suggest a framework for under- standing feelings of alienation in the aftermath of trauma; and I demonstrate how feelings of belonging may be re-established. My dissertation is exemplary of how phenomenological frameworks can contribute to a better understanding of psychological trauma and that engaging with trauma can, in turn, inform and enrich philosophical thinking. (shrink)

This chapter demonstrates the role that displacement can play in generating moral injury (MI) within refugee communities. To better understand the consequences of displacement, it considers how individuals’ identities and values are formed through their local communities. While there are many reasons that displacement ought to be understood as a potentially morally injurious experience (PMIE), particular attention is given to the negative effects of disorientation, which are associated with displacement. The chapter uncovers multiple facets of disorientation, such as despair, confusion, (...) and apathy. Understanding the morally injurious consequences of displacement marks an important first step toward better serving refugee communities, particularly those citizens of Ukraine who have been forced to flee their homes in the wake of Russian aggression. (shrink)

Desire is an important philosophical topic that deeply impacts everyday life. Philosophical practice is an emerging trend that uses philosophical theories and methods as a guide to living a eu‐ daimonic life. In this paper, we define desire philosophically and compare different theories of desire in specific Eastern and Western traditions. Based on the Lacanian conceptual–terminological triad of “Need‐Demand‐Desire”, the research of desire is further divided into three dimensions, namely, the subject of desire, the object of desire, and the desire (...) itself. The concept of desire is then an‐ alyzed from this triad and these three dimensions through different philosophical theories. This paper selects Buddhism as the representative of Eastern tradition, and Stoicism as the representative of the West, paying special attention to Stoicism’s “spiritual exercises” following Pierre Hadot. By exploring and comparing the Buddhist paths to liberation from suffering (i.e., the Four Noble Truths and the Noble Eightfold Path) and the two theoretical pillars in Stoicism (i.e., the notions of “living according to nature” and “the dichotomy of control”), practical guidance is then provided for un‐ derstanding and regulating desire in times of crisis. This understanding and regulation of desire constitutes a philosophical therapy for today’s troubles, particularly those caused by excessive or irrational desires. (shrink)