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Olivier Massin
Université de Neuchâtel
  1. Brentano on Sensations and Sensory Qualities.Massin Olivier - 2017 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 87-96.
    This chapter has three sections. The first introduces Brentano’s view of sensations by presenting the intentional features of sensations irreducible to features of the sensory objects. The second presents Brentano’s view of sensory objects —which include sensory qualities— and the features of sensations that such objects allow to explain, such as their intensity. The third section presents Brentano’s approach to sensory pleasures and pains, which combines both appeal to specific modes of reference and to specific sensory qualities.
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  2.  28
    "'Unless I Put My Hand Into His Side, I Will Not Believe'. The Epistemic Privilege of Touch.Massin Olivier & De Vignemont Frédérique - 2020 - In Gatzia Dimitria & Brogaard Berit (eds.), The Epistemology of Non-Visual Perception. Oxford University Press. pp. 165-188.
    Touch seems to enjoy some epistemic advantage over the other senses when it comes to attest to the reality of external objects. The question is not whether only what appears in tactile experiences is real. It is that only whether appears in tactile experiences feels real to the subject. In this chapter we first clarify how exactly the rather vague idea of an epistemic advantage of touch over the other senses should be interpreted. We then defend a “muscular thesis”, to (...)
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  3.  15
    Realism's Kick.Massin Olivier - 2019 - In Limbeck-Lilienau Christoph & Stadler Friedrich (eds.), The Philosophy of Perception Proceedings of the 40th International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium. De Gruyter. pp. 39-57.
    Samuel Johnson claimed to have refuted Berkeley by kicking a stone. It is generally thought that Johnson misses the point of Berkeley's immaterialism for a rather obvious reason: Berkeley never denied that the stone feels solid, but only that the stone could exist independently of any mind. I argue that Johnson was on the right track. On my interpretation, Johnson’s idea is that because the stone feels to resist our effort, the stone seems to have causal powers. But if appearances (...)
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  4. The Metaphysics of Economic Exchanges.Massin Olivier & Tieffenbach Emma - 2017 - Journal of Social Ontology 3 (2):167-205.
    What are economic exchanges? The received view has it that exchanges are mutual transfers of goods motivated by inverse valuations thereof. As a corollary, the standard approach treats exchanges of services as a subspecies of exchanges of goods. We raise two objections against this standard approach. First, it is incomplete, as it fails to take into account, among other things, the offers and acceptances that lie at the core of even the simplest cases of exchanges. Second, it ultimately fails to (...)
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