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Matthew Jope [3]Matt Jope [1]
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Matthew Jope
University of Edinburgh
  1. Closure, credence and rationality: a problem for non-belief hinge epistemology.Matt Jope - 2019 - Synthese (Suppl 15):1-11.
    Duncan Pritchard’s Epistemic Angst promises a novel solution to the closure-based sceptical problem that, unlike more traditional solutions, does not entail revising our fundamental epistemological commitments. In order to do this, it appeals to a Wittgensteinian account of rational evaluation, the overarching theme of which is that it neither makes sense to doubt nor to believe in our anti-sceptical hinge commitments. The purpose of this paper is to show that the argument for the claim that there can be no rational (...)
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  2.  54
    The symmetry problem for testimonial conservatism.Matthew Jope - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6149-6167.
    A prima facie plausible and widely held view in epistemology is that the epistemic standards governing the acquisition of testimonial knowledge are stronger than the epistemic standards governing the acquisition of perceptual knowledge. Conservatives about testimony hold that we need prior justification to take speakers to be reliable but recognise that the corresponding claim about perception is practically a non-starter. The problem for conservatives is how to establish theoretically significant differences between testimony and perception that would support asymmetrical epistemic standards. (...)
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  3.  28
    Trust and Confidence: A Dilemma for Epistemic Entitlement Theory.Matthew Jope - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (7):2807-2826.
    In this paper I argue that entitlement theorists face a dilemma, the upshot of which is that entitlement theory is either unmotivated or incoherent. I begin with the question of how confident one should be in a proposition on the basis of an entitlement to trust, distinguishing between strong views that warrant certainty and weak views that warrant less than certainty. Strong views face the problem that they are incompatible with the ineliminable epistemic risk that is a feature of the (...)
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    Intuitive Closure, Transmission Failure, and Doxastic justification.Matthew Jope - 2022 - In Matthew Jope & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), New Perspectives on Epistemic Closure. New York: Routledge.
    In response to the claim that certain epistemically defective inferences such as Moore’s argument lead us to the conclusion that we ought to abandon closure, Crispin Wright suggests that we can avoid doing so by distinguishing it from a stronger principle, namely transmission. Where closure says that knowledge of a proposition is a necessary condition on knowledge of anything one knows to entail it, transmission makes a stronger claim, saying that by reasoning deductively from known premises one can thereby acquire (...)
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