Modeling social interactions based on individual behavior has always been an area of interest, but prior literature generally presumes rational behavior. Thus, such models may miss out on capturing the effects of biases humans are susceptible to. This work presents a method to model egocentric bias, the real-life tendency to emphasize one's own opinion heavily when presented with multiple opinions. We use a symmetric distribution, centered at an agent's own opinion, as opposed to the Bounded Confidence (BC) model used in (...) prior work. We consider a game of iterated interactions where an agent cooperates based on its opinion about an opponent. Our model also includes the concept of domain-based self-doubt, which varies as the interaction succeeds or not. An increase in doubt makes an agent reduce its egocentricity in subsequent interactions, thus enabling the agent to learn reactively. The agent system is modeled with factions not having a single leader, to overcome some of the issues associated with leader-follower factions. We find that agents belonging to factions perform better than individual agents. We observe that an intermediate level of egocentricity helps the agent perform at its best, which concurs with conventional wisdom that neither overconfidence nor low self-esteem brings benefits. (shrink)

In the Sāṁkhya, Puruṣa (self) is free, inactive and it is the nature of consciousness (cetanā). It is beyond time and space, and it has both merit and demerit, attachment and detachment. It is real form which is not bounded. All actions, pleasure and suffering, change and feeling, etc. are the distortions of the body. Puruṣa (self) is beyond the bodily and mental suffering (dukhaḥ). Puruṣa (self) is neither the cause nor the effect. Puruṣa (self) is not material, and it (...) is also not known by direct perception. Ācharya Śaṅkara critiques the Sāṁkhya view and says, If Puruṣa (self) is inactive then how can it possibly influence the others? Śaṅkara also questions the relation of the Puruṣa (self) with the Prakṛṭi (non-self). This paper elaborates the nature and the existence of Puruṣa (self), purpose of the inactive Puruṣa (self), the subjectivity of Puruṣa (self) from the text “Sāṁkhyakārikā”. A critical analysis of Śaṅkara‟s critique of the “Sāṁkhyakārikā” is made and by providing an analytical assessment of the self (Puruṣa) and its relation with the non-self (Prakṛṭi) the paper attempts at arguing against Śaṅkara‟s logic. (shrink)

Samkhya philosophy is one of the oldest philosophies in the Indian philosophical system. This philosophy is independent in origin and mainly known for its evolution theory. Samkhya philosophy has accepted the two ultimate and independent realities, Nature and pure Consciousness. This paper is an attempt to comprehend the notion of deep ecology from the Samkhya’s evolution theory perspective. In this paper, firstly, we have elucidated the Samkhya philosophy of suffering and the solution to the problem. In the second part of (...) the article, we have argued that how Samkhya's philosophical notion of Nature demonstrates our embeddedness in Nature. Therefore, the idea of deep ecology is always there in one or another form in Samkhya philosophy. It has also connections to the idea of sustainable development. (shrink)

Sāṁkhya philosophy is the oldest philosophical school. Sāṁkhya philosophy explains the universe accepting only two fundamental categories which are prakṛṭi and puruṣa- where prakṛṭi is unconsciously active and puruṣa is consciously inactive. Similarly, Sāṁkhya philosophy discusses the mind-body relation in terms of puruṣa and prakṛṭi. Sāṁkhya also talks about the subjective identity as well as objective world. Although Sāṁkhya discusses about manyness of selves (bahu-puruṣa), but there is an argument that Sāmkhya philosophy would not establish the existence of other minds. (...) So, the argument of Sāṁkhya for other minds seems to stop midway. In this paper, I purport to discuss Sāṁkhya perspective and existence of other minds presented in Sāṁkhya philosophy. The paper also critically examines the Sāṁkhyakārikā of Īswarakṛṣṇa to bring out the possibility of epistemological argument of the other minds. (shrink)

"Bioethics A Very Short Introduction" for UG level or beginners.

Literasi digital adalah sebuah keniscaayaan dalam proses komunikasi di era disrupsi, khususnya bagi kalangan pelajar atau santri di sekolah dan madrasah. Sebagai salah satu pemgguna sosial media yang paling aktif, santri di madrasah dan dayah perlu memahami mana berita yang benar dan bohong (hoax) yang sudah bercampur di dunia maya, terlebih berita sensitif yang berpotensi ke ranah hukum dan radikalisme dalam beragama. Pendampingan literasi digital ini ditujukan kepada santri aliyah di empat Pondok Pesantren favorit di Kota Banda Aceh dan Kabupaten (...) Aceh Besar dengan fokus penangkalan berita bohong (hoax). Adapun metodologi yang digunakan dalam tulisan ini adalah dengan menggunakan participatory learning and action (PLA) sebagai metode dalam pendampingan anak usia sekolah. Dalam pelaksanaannya, ditemukan bahwa santri aliyah masih minim sekali kesadaran literasi digital khususnya terkait beberapa hal yang berkontribusi kepada penangkalan berita bohong. Hasil dari pendampingan ini diharapkan bisa memberikan kontribusi penting bagi upaya sosialisasi dan kampanye yang lebih terarah terhadap upaya peningkatan kesadaran literasi digital bagi anak usia sekolah, baik dasar maupun menengah, termasuk integrasinya kedalam kurikulum. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to compare various meditative states, such as Buddhist dhyāna‐s, yogic nirbīja samādhi and nondual awareness (Tib. gñis‐med). The primary sour‐ ce texts I refere to are Yogasūtras of Patañjali, Ānāpānasmṛtisūtra (MN 118), Samādhisūtra (AN 41), The Tibetan Yogas of Dream and Sleep. I also discuss some relevant claims of contemporary empirical studies. First, I define the key terms used in Eastern meditation studies as well as in neurophenomenology, a contemporary method applied to examining the (...) meditative states of mind, such as samādhi, dhyāna, and śamatha. Inspired by Shinzen Young, I distinguish three groups of meditative states that might be identified with nondual awareness. These three groups are: the second, the third and fourth Buddhist dhyāna being equivalent to nirvicāra samādhi and nirānanda samādhi in the classical Indian yoga; nirbīja samādhi and nondual awareness, typical to the Mahayāna contemplative traditions. I explain why we can recognize each of the above states as nondual awareness and how they differ from each other. Then, I make a comparison between meditation practice explained in Ānāpānasmṛtisūtra and nondual awareness presented in the Tibetan Buddhism. Besides, I discuss the above kinds of mental states in terms of recent neurophenomenological findings. While doing so, I am trying to demonstrate that our understanding of meditation can benefit from the empirical studies which help us to objective this kind of subjective experience, to some degree, if they are given an adequate place in our study. (shrink)