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Owen Jeffrey Crocker
University of Victoria
  1.  6
    Freedom of Conscience: A Communal-based Approach.Owen Jeffrey Crocker - 2024 - Appeal: Review of Current Law and Law Reform 29 (1):25-47.
    Despite the plethora of freedom of religion literature (under section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), the corresponding literature on the freedom of conscience is minimal. To further the discussion on the freedom of conscience, I rely heavily on the philosophical literature to make an important distinction; the difference between individual- based and communal-based conceptions of conscience. Whereas the former is plagued with subjectivity, making it difficult to conceptualize a working framework for the Charter right, the latter (...)
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  2. The Separability Thesis: A Comparison Between Natural Law and Legal Positivism.Owen Jeffrey Crocker - 2022 - Sophia: Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy 16 (1):60-71.
    The purpose of this paper is to examine the separability of law and morality within an analytic jurisprudential framework. The paper is comprised of four parts. First, the separability thesis will be discussed and defined. Second, Hart’s legal positivist account of law will be presented, which defends the separability thesis. Third, two objections from a natural law perspective (classical and contemporary) will be proposed against the legal positivist position, thereby rejecting the separability thesis. Each objection will be accompanied by a (...)
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  3. Moral Responsibility in the Age of Free Will Skepticism: A Defence of Frankfurtian-Compatibilism.Owen Jeffrey Crocker - 2022 - Compos Mentis: Undergraduate Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 10 (1):1-19.
    Free will skepticism is radical in its core claim that free will is illusory. Criminal law, however, appears to presuppose that persons are free and hence, morally responsible for their actions. So, if free will skepticism is true, our current practices that hold people to account for their wrongs appears unjustified–even immoral. This paper will challenge the free will skeptic’s core claim that free will does not exist and defend current practices of moral responsibility by offering (and defending) a Frankfurtian-compatibilist (...)
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