Moral Responsibility in the Age of Free Will Skepticism: A Defence of Frankfurtian-Compatibilism

Compos Mentis: Undergraduate Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 10 (1):1-19 (2022)
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Abstract

Free will skepticism is radical in its core claim that free will is illusory. Criminal law, however, appears to presuppose that persons are free and hence, morally responsible for their actions. So, if free will skepticism is true, our current practices that hold people to account for their wrongs appears unjustified–even immoral. This paper will challenge the free will skeptic’s core claim that free will does not exist and defend current practices of moral responsibility by offering (and defending) a Frankfurtian-compatibilist approach to the topics of free will and determinism.

Author's Profile

Owen Jeffrey Crocker
University of Victoria

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