The customary way of interpreting the dialogue between Arjuna and Kṛṣṇa in the Bhagavad-Gita is to consider it merely as an expression of the fear of the diffident Arjuna, who is depicted by almost all the commentators as being scared of fighting the battle, and Kṛṣṇa’s ingenuous solution to it. This paper argues that this common way of looking at the conflict leaves the central theme of the debate unattained and unsolved. The debate can also be viewed as a statement (...) of the confrontation between two ethics and two notions of the self. The claim is not that the customary interpretation is false, or that the present one is the only possible interpretation. It rather makes a much moderate claim that it is possible to give the text an alternative reading, which sheds some light on the nature of Indian ethics as such. It is long debated as to whether India had ever had an ethics. This paper claims to give some insight into the debate. (shrink)

In Descartes' Cogito, Saved from the Great Shipwreck, Husain Sarkar convincingly argues that the Cartesian cogito as it appears in Meditation Two cannot be an argument but must be understood as an intuition emerging from the process of ('extraordinary') doubt. Sarkar mentions in the Preface that only the negative part of his thesis in intended to be decisive (X). However, as the book unfolds it becomes evident that his "positive" effort, his interpretation of the cogito as an intuition (...) although not decisive, is no less important. Sarkar shows how his reading of the cogito can account for other aspects of Descartes' writings (memory, the will, the theory of deduction) and offers this as further proof for the correctness of his interpretation. (shrink)

Review of: Husain Sarkar. A Theory of Method. xvii+ 229 pp., bibl., indexes. Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1983. $29.95. The subject of this book is best stated in the author's words: "A theory is about the world; a method is about theories; and, a theory of method is about methods" (p. 1). A theory of method seeks to offer a general framework within which to choose among methods. Through critical examination of the positions of Karl Popper, Imre (...) Lakatos, and Larry Laudan, Sarkar develops his own framework for evaluating methods, which includes two bold proposals: that the history of science cannot be used as an arbitrator among methods, and that methods should be chosen by testing the heuristic advice they give about which lines of scientific research to pursue further. (shrink)

In this essay I seek to critically evaluate some forms of holism and organicism in biological thought, as a more deflationary echo to Gilbert and Sarkar's reflection on the need for an 'umbrella' concept to convey the new vitality of holistic concepts in biology (Gilbert and Sarkar 2000). Given that some recent discussions in theoretical biology call for an organism concept (from Moreno and Mossio’s work on organization to Kirschner et al.’s research paper in Cell, 2000, building on (...) chemistry to articulate what they called “molecular vitalism,” studying the “vitalistic” properties of molecular, cellular, and organismal function, and Pepper and Herron’s suggestion in their 2008 paper that organisms define a category that evolutionary biology cannot do without), the question, what concept of organicism are they calling for? To what extent are such claims philosophically committed to a non-naturalistic concept of organism as organizing centre, as a foundational rather than heuristic concept – or possibly a “biochauvinism,” to use Di Paolo’s term (Di Paolo 2009)? My aim in this paper is to conceptually clarify the forms of holism and organicism that are involved in these cases (and I acknowledge that the study of early 20th-century holisms [Peterson 2010] indicates that not all of them were in fact ‘organicist’ or ‘biologistic’). I suggest that contemporary holists are still potentially beholden to a certain kind of vitalism or “biochauvinism”; but that when they reduce their claims to mere heuristics, conversely, they risk losing sight of a certain kind of organizational “thickness”, a “vital materiality” (Wheeler 2010) which is characteristic of biological systems (Bechtel 2007). And I ask if it is possible to articulate a concept of biological holism or organicism which is neither an empirical ‘biochauvinism’ nor a metaphysical ‘vitalism’? (shrink)

The following considers the role of historical fidelity in habitat reconstruction efforts. To what extent should habitat reconstruction be guided by the goal of recreating some past state of a damaged ecosystem? I consider Sarkar’s “replacement argument,” which holds that, in most habitat reconstruction efforts, there is little justification for appealing to historical fidelity. I argue that Sarkar does not provide adequate grounds for deprecating historical fidelity relative to other natural values such as biodiversity or wild nature.

The idea of this paper came to me from my junior colleague and friend Saikat Sarkar who mentioned in a different context this paper's title. Existing work in this field registers two themes: those scholars who are abroad perforce critique whites since their unwritten code for getting tenure etc. is to lessen the guilt of their masters in First World social sciences' and humanities departments. And then there is the instance of First world scholars using these (mostly) subaltern-studies' scholars (...) to invade developing world academic systems with agenda of their own. This essay mentions the first sort and then deviates from contemporary scholarship in proving that multiculturalism may not be the right solution to ethnic plurality. It goes on to show how these Third World scholars attempted and attempt to erase individuality in the name of Cosmopolitanism. This last is the latest fad in humanities' departments in South East Asia, especially, India. (shrink)

This reviewer had earlier had the misfortune of reviewing Sarah Jacoby's puerile book on Sera Khandro for Prabuddha Bharata. Jacoby had nearly made this reviewer puke. Same is the case with Bihani Sarkar's monograph. On the basis of this monograph she might win academic brownie points but it is a study which should have been dumped. The existence of the monograph is not only an insult to Hinduism and the Sanatana Dharma; it is technically wrong in its structuralist, iterative (...) hermeneutics which derives from the likes of Mircea Eliade. The reviewer knows that Sarkar will one day be a biggie in the first world peddling Hinduism ; she should have confined herself only to Sanskrit literature and not try to pass herself as a (faux) Hindu theologian. This book does no credit to the publisher. (shrink)