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  1. Too Much Info: Data Surveillance and Reasons to Favor the Control Account of the Right to Privacy.Jakob Thrane Mainz & Rasmus Uhrenfeldt - 2020 - Res Publica 27 (2):287-302.
    In this paper, we argue that there is at least a pro tanto reason to favor the control account of the right to privacy over the access account of the right to privacy. This conclusion is of interest due to its relevance for contemporary discussions related to surveillance policies. We discuss several ways in which the two accounts of the right to privacy can be improved significantly by making minor adjustments to their respective definitions. We then test the improved versions (...)
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  2. Privacy Rights, and Why Negative Control is Not a Dead End: A Reply to Munch and Lundgren.Jakob Thrane Mainz & Rasmus Uhrenfeldt - 2021 - Res Publica 28 (2):391-400.
    Lauritz Munch and Björn Lundgren have recently replied to a paper published by us in this journal. In our original paper, we defended a novel version of the so-called ‘control theory’ of the moral right to privacy. We argued that control theorists should define ‘control’ as what we coined ‘Negative Control’. Munch and Lundgren have recently provided a range of interesting and challenging objections to our view. Independently of each other, they give almost identical counterexamples to our definition of Negative (...)
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  3. Artificial Intelligence and the Secret Ballot.Jakob Mainz, Jorn Sonderholm & Rasmus Uhrenfeldt - forthcoming - AI and Society.
    In this paper, we argue that because of the advent of Artificial Intelligence, the secret ballot is now much less effective at protecting voters from voting related instances of social ostracism and social punishment. If one has access to vast amounts of data about specific electors, then it is possible, at least with respect to a significant subset of electors, to infer with high levels of accuracy how they voted in a past election. Since the accuracy levels of Artificial Intelligence (...)
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  4. Big Data Analytics and How to Buy an Election.Jakob Mainz, Rasmus Uhrenfeldt & Jorn Sonderholm - 2021 - Public Affairs Quarterly 32 (2):119-139.
    In this article, we show how it is possible to lawfully buy an election. The method we describe for buying an election is novel. The key things that make it possible to buy an election are the existence of public voter registration lists where one can see whether a given elector has voted in a particular election, and the existence of Big Data Analytics that with a high degree of accuracy can predict what a given elector will vote in an (...)
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