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  1. Are Mental States Reducible to Brain States? Or The Quale is Dead: Long Live the Quale!Richard Loosemore - manuscript
    Each of the various philosophical positions on the mind-body problem has grown out of the perceived shortcomings of one or more of its predecessors. One fertile source of aggravation to many of the -isms has been the problem of qualia: the ostensibly irreducible, qualitative character of many of our mental states. An argument is presented here that solves the qualia problem within the context of a otherwise functionalist theory of mind. The proposed solution is unusual in that it both resolves (...)
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  2. Consciousness in Human and Machine: A Theory and Some Falsifiable Predictions.Richard Loosemore - 2009 - In B. Goertzel, P. Hitzler & M. Hutter (eds.), Proceedings of the Second Conference on Artificial General Intelligence. Atlantis Press.
    To solve the hard problem of consciousness we first note that all cognitive systems of sufficient power must get into difficulty when trying to analyze consciousness concepts, because the mechanism that does the analysis will bottom out in such a way that the system declares these concepts to be both real and ineffable. Rather than use this observation to dismiss consciousness as an artifact, we propose a unifying interpretation that allows consciousness to be regarded as explicable at a meta level, (...)
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  3. Human and Machine Consciousness as a Boundary Effect in the Concept Analysis Mechanism.Richard Loosemore - 2012 - In Pei Wang & Ben Goertzel (eds.), Theoretical Foundations of Artificial General Intelligence. Springer. pp. 283--304.
    To solve the hard problem of consciousness we observe that any cognitive system of suffi- cient power must get into difficulty when it tries to analyze consciousness concepts, because the mechanism that does the analysis will “bottom out” in such a way as to make the sys- tem declare these concepts to be both real and ineffable. Rather than use this observation to dismiss consciousness as an artifact, we propose a unifying interpretation that allows consciousness to be explicable at a (...)
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