4 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Robert C. Cummins [3]Robert Cummins [1]
See also
Robert Cummins
University of California, Davis
  1. Inexplicit Information.Robert C. Cummins - 1986 - In Myles Brand & Robert M. Harnish (eds.), The Representation of Knowledge and Belief. University of Arizona Press.
    A discussion of a number of ways that information can be present in a computer program without being explicitly represented.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   45 citations  
  2. Truth and Meaning.Robert C. Cummins - 2002 - In Joseph Keim-Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & David Shier (eds.), Meaning and Truth: Investigations in Philosophical Semantics. Seven Bridges Press. pp. 175-197.
    D O N A L D D AV I D S O N’S “ Meaning and Truth,” re vo l u t i o n i zed our conception of how truth and meaning are related (Davidson    ). In that famous art i c l e , Davidson put forw a rd the bold conjecture that meanings are satisfaction conditions, and that a Tarskian theory of truth for a language is a theory of meaning for that language. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  3. Explanation and Subsumption.Robert C. Cummins - 1978 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1978:163 - 175.
    The thesis that subsumption is sufficient for explanation is dying out, but the thesis that it is necessary is alive and well. It is difficult to attack this thesis: non-subsumptive counter-examples are declared incomplete, or mere promissory notes. No theory, it is thought, can be explanatory unless it resorts to subsumption at some point. In this paper I attack this thesis by describing a theory that (1) would explain every event it could describe, (2) does not explain by subsumption, and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. States, Causes, and the Law of Inertia.Robert Cummins - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 29 (1):21 - 36.
    I argue that Galileo regarded unaccelerated motion as requiring cause to sustain in. In an inclined plane experiment, the cause ceases when the incline ceases. When the incline ceases, what ceases is acceleration, not motion. Hence, unaccelerated motion requires no cause to sustain it.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark