The Porn Factor. Pornography and child sexual abuse es un libro que ha surgido fruto de la experiencia de la autora de darse cuenta de que después de 38 años de matrimonio con su esposo, durante 13 años él había abusado de menores de edad. La respuesta está en que los perpetradores son manipuladores tan altamente calificados, que pueden engañar incluso a la pareja con quien viven y convencer al menor que mantener el secreto en la oscuridad es críticamente importante (...) para ambos. Los perpetradores son usualmente adictos a la pornografía y esto es lo que busca la autora de este libro: que entendamos que nuestra sociedad se está “pornificando”, que vivimos en una “cultura pornificada” y que esta droga (la pornografía), es tan adictiva como la cocaína y está siendo uno de los principales factores causantes del abuso sexual de niños, niñas y adolescentes. (shrink)

This chapter presents an account of an angrily virtuous, or patient, person informed by research on emotion in empirical and philosophical psychology. It is argued that virtue for anger is determined by excellence and deficiency with respect to all three of anger’s psychological functions: appraisal, motivation, and communication. Many competing accounts of virtue for anger assess it by attention to just one function; it is argued that singular evaluations of a person’s anger will ignore important dimensions of anger that bear (...) on virtue and vice. Thus, possessing excellence with respect to only one function of anger is insufficient for virtue. The account is also extended to the characteristic vices of anger: wrath and meekness. (shrink)

Forgiveness as a positive response to wrongdoing is a widespread phenomenon that plays a role in the moral lives of most persons. Surprisingly, Kant has very little to say on the matter. Although Kant dedicates considerable space to discussing punishment, wrongdoing and grace, he addresses the issues of human forgiveness directly only in some short passages in the Lectures on Ethics and in one passage of the Metaphysics of Morals. As noted by Sussman, the TL passage, however, betrays some ambivalence. (...) Kant establishes a duty of virtue to be forgiving (TL, 6:460), yet he immediately warns against its excess: meek toleration of recurrent wrongs could manifest a lack of self-respect and a violation of a duty to oneself (TL, 6:461). Sussman claims that this ambivalence ultimately arises from the fact that forgiveness sits uncomfortably in Kant’s moral thought. First, forgiveness has an ‘ineluctably elective aspect’ that makes it, to a certain extent, arbitrary and dependent on particular features of the forgiver’s psychology and, as such, in tension with Kant’s central claims that human beings are autonomous agents capable of determining their own moral status. Second, according to Sussman, Kant’s moral retributivism, i.e. ‘the particular moral position that every moral wrong against another deserves punishment of the wrongdoer’ seems to be in tension with the possibility of a ‘truly redemptive forgiveness’. Moreover, forgiveness also seems to be in tension with a passage of the Religion in which Kant argues that the moral guilt from our original evil disposition cannot be understood as a debt or liability that can be compensated, erased, transferred or otherwise wiped out by others (Rel, 6:72). Thus, to the extent that forgiveness might be thought to involve the forgoing of moral guilt, it seems incompatible with Kant’s views on culpability and punishment. This chapter seeks to clarify Kant’s views on forgiveness in order to show that, although not often appreciated, personal forgiveness plays an important role in the lives of ordinary human agents as understood by Kant. In particular, I aim to show there is a conception of forgiveness available to Kant that is not incompatible with Kant’s views of punishment and culpability. In Section 1, I argue that, for Kant, far from being merely ‘elective,’ forgiveness is, under certain conditions, morally required. I provide a brief summary of an interpretation of Kant’s theory of forgiveness that I have defended in recently published work , in order to argue that Kant’s duty to be forgiving should be understood as an imperfect duty of virtue which is conditional on repentance. Kant is not ambivalent about this duty because he maintains that when the relevant conditions are not met, we have a perfect duty to ourselves not to forgive unrepentant wrongdoers. The TL passage thus identifies two different duties. In Section 2, I show that forgiveness, as conceptualised by Kant, does not require the forgoing of punishment or the overcoming of moral guilt and that this could, in fact, be seen as an attractive feature of Kant’s position. I end by offering a very brief assessment of Kant’s views. (shrink)

Artykuł zawiera filologiczno-filozoficzną weryfikację „szkicu przekładu” fragmentów księgi Heraklita z Efezu, jakiego przed rokiem 1921 dokonał Henryk Elzenberg. Własnej próby tłumaczenia maksym Efezyjczyka nie oparł Elzenberg na ich źródłach, lecz na trzeciej edycji zbioru Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (1912) Hermanna Dielsa, który wyimki z oryginalnych passusów redagował czterokrotnie i rozmaicie przekładał. By jak najlepiej ocenić i zweryfikować Elzenbergowy „szkic przekładu”, autor przytoczył – kolejno – (1) źródła greckie, (2) własne ich tłumaczenia, (3) teksty greckie analizowanych „fragmentów” Efezyjczyka w redakcji Dielsa, (...) (4) ich niemieckie przekłady autorstwa Dielsa i – na tle ich wszystkich – (5) translatorskie próby Elzenberga. Zastosowana metodologia ułatwiła sformułowanie wniosku, że wierny był wprawdzie młody Elzenberg własnej zasadzie, by niczego – przekładów niemieckiego filologa nie pomijając – nie czytać „potulnie”, na niwie jednak stricte filologicznej bezwiednie padł ofiarą „bezradności” Dielsa, gdyż w jego „szkicu przekładu” aforyzmów Heraklita nic doprawdy nie świadczy o tym, aby (1) odkrył – albo przynajmniej przeczuwał – jakąkolwiek między nimi „współzależność” (Zusammenhang), i by (2) na jej podstawie sformułował jakiekolwiek własne wnioski filozoficzne, odzwierciedlające myśl Efezyjczyka. Najlepiej tego dowiodło porównanie fragmentu B67 z maksymą B53 na tle ich źródeł oraz ich przekładów. *** HERACLITUS IN ELZENBERG’S INTERPRETATION PART I: WHAT MISTAKES COULD THE AUTHOR OF THE TROUBLE WITH EXISTENCE HAVE EASILY AVOIDED, IF ONLY HE HAD VALUED THE SOURCES MORE THAN DIELS’ COLLECTION AND TRUSTED THEM AND HIMSELF MORE? SUMMARY The article contains a philological and philosophical verification of a “sketch of a translation” of the fragments of the book of Heraclitus of Ephesus, which Henryk Elzenberg made before the year 1921. Elzenberg did not base his own attempt to translate maxims of the Ephesian sage on their sources, but on the third edition of the collection Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (1912) compiled by Hermann Diels, who had four times edited and variously translated excerpts from the original passages. In order to best evaluate and verify Elzenberg’s “sketch of a translation”, the author has quoted – in succession – (1) the Greek sources, (2) his own translations of them, (3) Diels’ versions of the Greek texts of the Ephesian’s fragments analyzed here, (4) Diels’ German translations of them and – against all of these – (5) Elzenberg’s attempts at translation. The methodology used in the article has facilitated the formulation of a conclusion that although the young Elzenberg was faithful to his own principle of reading nothing whatsoever “meekly” – without overlooking the translations of the German philologist – nevertheless, on strictly philological grounds, he unwittingly fell victim to Diels’ “helplessness”, because in fact nothing in his “sketch of a translation” of Heraclitus’ aphorisms provides evidence that (1) he discovered – or at least presaged – any “connection” (Zusammenhang) between them, or that (2) he formulated on the basis thereof any philosophical conclusions, reflecting the Ephesian’s thought. The best proof of this emerges from a comparison of fragment B67 with maxim B53 based on the sources and the translations. (shrink)

Psychopaths are brutal individuals, having no empathetic concern for others. Initially, the existence of psychopaths seems to be a mystery from an evolutionary point of view. On close examination, however, it can be accommodated by evolutionary theory. Brutal individuals excelled meek individuals in the desperate circumstances where they had to fight their competitors over natural resources for survival and reproduction. This evolutionary explanation of psychopaths receives support from Pinker's observation of the history of brutality. We have good reasons for predicting (...) that psychopaths are likely to die out in the future. (shrink)

Equality for All: Islam articulates equal rights for all living beings, including animals and birds, and refers to these as communities. “The earth He has assigned to all living creatures” (HQ, 55:10); "There is not a moving (living) creature on earth, nor a bird that flies with its two wings, but are communities like you...then unto their Lord they (all) shall be gathered” (HQ, 6:37); "And for women are rights over men similar to those of men over women." (HQ, 2:228) (...) Muslims’ main pillar of worship, Ibadah, is prayer. Congregational prayer is performed in rows where all men stand before God as equals. There is no special place for the rich or powerful; the meek and poor are not relegated to the back lines. Each man bows his head in humility, knowing that his brothers on either side of him are equally important in the sight of God. (shrink)