Concern for and interest in research integrity has increased significantly during recent decades, both in academic and in policy discourse. Both in terms of diagnostics and in terms of therapy, the tendency in integrity discourse has been to focus on strategies of individualisation (detecting and punishing individual deviance). Other contributions to the integrity debate, however, focus more explicitly on environmental factors, e.g. on the quality and resilience of research ecosystems, on institutional rather than individual responsibilities, and on the quality of (...) the research culture. One example of this is the Bonn PRINTEGER Statement. This editorial to the LSSP thematic series (article collection) entitled Addressing integrity challenges in research: the institutional dimension invites authors to contribute to the research integrity debate. Notably, we are interested in submissions addressing issues such as institutional responsibilities, changes in the research climate, duties of research managers and research performing or research funding organisations (RPOs and RFOs) as well as new approaches to integrity education. (shrink)

The importance of teaching critical thinking skills at the college level cannot be overemphasized. Teaching a subcategory of these skills—argument analysis—we believe is especially important for first-year students with their college careers, as well as their lives, ahead of them. The struggle, however, is how to effectively teach argument analysis skills that will serve students in a broad range of disciplines.

Concern for and interest in research integrity has increased significantly during recent decades, both in academic and in policy discourse. Both in terms of diagnostics and in terms of therapy, the tendency in integrity discourse has been to focus on strategies of individualisation. Other contributions to the integrity debate, however, focus more explicitly on environmental factors, e.g. on the quality and resilience of research ecosystems, on institutional rather than individual responsibilities, and on the quality of the research culture. One example (...) of this is the Bonn PRINTEGER Statement. This editorial to the LSSP thematic series entitled Addressing integrity challenges in research: the institutional dimension invites authors to contribute to the research integrity debate. Notably, we are interested in submissions addressing issues such as institutional responsibilities, changes in the research climate, duties of research managers and research performing or research funding organisations as well as new approaches to integrity education. (shrink)

There is substantial evidence from many domains that visual representations aid various forms of cognition. We aimed to determine whether learning to construct visual representations of argument structure enhanced the acquisition and development of argumentative writing skills within the context of first-year college writing course. We found a significant effect of the use of argument diagrams, and this effect was stable even when multiple plausible correlates were controlled for. These results suggest that natural⎯and relatively minor⎯modifications to standard first-year composition courses (...) could provide substantial increases in student writing ability. (shrink)

Editorial introduction to series of papers resulting from a European Commission Project on mental capacity.

In his new book ‘When the Grain of Wheat Doesn't Die. A Philosophical Archaeology of Revelation, Ruud Welten examines the concept of revelation from a philosophical, rather than a religious perspective. The focus is not on a higher power revealing itself to humanity, but on the revelation of human nature itself. Central to this examination is the phenomenological question regarding the nature of appearance. The primary concern is not what appears, but rather how the appearance itself occurs. Welten posits (...) that the notion of revelation and religious discourse surrounding it elucidate fundamental aspects of this phenomenological inquiry. -/- Interestingly, the seemingly peculiar title ‘When the Grain of Wheat Doesn't Die’ remains unexplained within the text. Those familiar with the New Testament will recognize a reference to the parable of the grain of wheat described in John 12:24: " Most assuredly, I say to you, unless a grain of wheat falls into the ground and dies, it remains alone; but if it dies, it produces much grain. He who loves his life will lose it, and he who hates his life in this world will keep it for eternal life." The core principle underlying this parable is that new possibilities emerge only through risking or relinquishing the old. The title thus alludes to a structure reminiscent of Christian concepts of rebirth or conversion, wherein a rupture with existing frameworks creates an opening for a new mode of existence. The question arises as to how this structure relates to the research described in the subtitle as "A Philosophical Archaeology of Revelation." -/- The subtitle first specifies a particular method ("a philosophical archaeology") and subsequently indicates the subject under investigation using this method ("revelation"). Archaeology as a philosophical method has gained prominence following Foucault's work. However, Welten employs the term archaeology not primarily in the Foucauldian sense, but rather views phenomenology and psychoanalysis as forms of archaeology that aim to uncover elements previously obscured from view. Upon initial examination, the metaphor of the grain of wheat and that of archaeology appear somewhat incongruous. Archaeology suggests the unearthing of the hidden, the revelation of an origin that has been obscured. The sowing of a grain, conversely, appears more indicative of something buried and concealed, deposited in the ground to facilitate the genesis of something new. For Welten, however, the point is that in both cases something must first be taken away before a new opening can occur that disrupts the existing order. This is exemplified in one case by the dying of the grain, and in the other, by the removal of the barren leaves. (shrink)

In addition to thinking about the meanings of solidarity, it is important to address how solidarity of the appropriate sort can be cultivated. Possibilities include the transformative power of key individuals or events; and the role of institutions. In health care it is suggested that a combination of the two strategies is required. Professional conduct includes not only acting in 'face to face' delivery, but also engaging with those institutions which enable or disable certain ways of acting, so that they (...) are constantly subject to revision to ensure that they facilitate the provision of decent healthcare. (shrink)

In response to Ruud ter Meulen’s contribution, it is argued that, although the relationship between these concepts is both tight and complex, solidarity should be carefully distinguished from justice. Although ter Meulen wants to defend a normative conception of solidarity, the relation to its descriptive component is not always very clear. As a normative concept it should not collapse into that of justice; and as a descriptive notion it is obviously defective. In order to successfully navigate between these unhappy (...) alternatives, ter Meulen rightfully turns to critical theory. But then it is still not entirely clear how the normative considerations that ter Meulen wants to defend follow from this promising framework. (shrink)

The paper provides an analysis of the relationship between the concepts of justice and solidarity. The point of departure of the analysis is Ruud ter Meulen’s claim that these concepts are different but mutually complementary, i.e. are two sides of the same coin. In the paper two alternative accounts of the relationship are proposed. According to the first one, solidarity can be defined in terms of justice, i.e. is a special variety of liberal justice, viz. social liberal justice, which, (...) apart from the value of liberty, also stresses the importance of the value of equality. An example of such a theory is Rawls’s theory of justice, within which the value of equality is ‘encoded’ in the principle of fair equality of opportunity and in the difference principle. According to the second account, solidarity is an expression of a special type of social relationships – the so-called ‘thick relationships’, which are non-superficial, positive, their paradigmatic examples being family and friendship; in other words, the rules of solidarity are rules that are built into ‘thick relationships’. On the first account, justice and solidarity are not different, while on the second account they are different but mutually exclusive rather than mutually complementary. In the last part of the paper some remarks on the social causes of solidarity are made. (shrink)

The paper points out three serious problems in Ruud ter Meulen’s view of solidarity and of its role in healthcare ethics. First, it is not clear whether and to what extent ter Meulen expects normative concepts to be rooted in existing social practices: his criticism of liberal theories of justice seems to imply a different view on this issue than his implicit assumption that normative concepts are independent from social and historical trends. Second, it is not clear at which (...) level his notion of solidarity is meant to be applied: does it provide principles for individuals or for institutions? Nor is it clear at what level of generality it should work: is it meant for healthcare institutions or for states, for citizens or for healthcare practitioners? Third, it is not at all clear how the communitarian and the universalist aspirations in his conception of solidarity can be reconciled. In light of such difficulties it is argued that within philosophical discourse solidarity can be a useful notion only if it can be clearly distinguished from existing and commonly used ethical concepts. Three examples of such narrow and specific uses of solidarity are presented. Finally, a sceptical view of confining the work of applied philosophers to articulating normative concepts is put forward and an alternative view of blending empirical and philosophical analysis is proposed. This vision of field philosophy requires serious attention and careful understanding of the circumstances and constraints within which normative recommendations operate. It is suggested that such a modest and empirically grounded understanding of normative work is a better way of honouring the belief that philosophy is rooted in social institutions and in complex webs of relations. (shrink)