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  1. Ulterior Motives and Moral Injury in War.Saba Bazargan-Forward - 2024 - In Andrew I. Cohen & Kathryn McClymond (eds.), Moral Injury and the Humanities: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Routledge.
    Guilt is a moral emotion that plays an important role in some understandings and manifestations of moral injury. In “Ulterior Motives and Moral Injury in War,” I note that soldiers returning from war are often assailed by profound feelings of guilt. Such soldiers might feel irrevocably diminished as persons, which is characteristic of a type of moral injury. I explore how the ulterior motives of the leaders who authorized the war might exacerbate the moral injury of soldiers. According to the (...)
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  2. Compensation and Proportionality in War.Saba Bazargan-Forward - 2017 - In Finkelstein Claire, Larry Larry & Ohlin Jens David (eds.), Weighing Lives in War. Oxford University Press).
    Even in just wars we infringe the rights of countless civilians whose ruination enables us to protect our own rights. These civilians are owed compensation, even in cases where the collateral harms they suffer satisfy the proportionality constraint. I argue that those who authorize or commit the infringements and who also benefit from those harms will bear that compensatory duty, even if the unjust aggressor cannot or will not discharge that duty. I argue further that if we suspect antecedently that (...)
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  3. Weighing Lives in War- Foreign vs. Domestic.Saba Bazargan-Forward - 2017 - In Larry May (ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of the Just War. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 186-198.
    I argue that the lives of domestic and enemy civilians should not receive equal weight in our proportionality calculations. Rather, the lives of enemy civilians ought to be “partially discounted” relative to the lives of domestic civilians. We ought to partially discount the lives of enemy civilians for the following reason (or so I argue). When our military wages a just war, we as civilians vest our right to self-defense in our military. This permits our military to weigh our lives (...)
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  4. The Identity-Enactment Account of associative duties.Saba Bazargan-Forward - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2351-2370.
    Associative duties are agent-centered duties to give defeasible moral priority to our special ties. Our strongest associative duties are to close friends and family. According to reductionists, our associative duties are just special duties—i.e., duties arising from what I have done to others, or what others have done to me. These include duties to abide by promises and contracts, compensate our benefactors in ways expressing gratitude, and aid those whom we have made especially vulnerable to our conduct. I argue, though, (...)
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  5. Complicity.Saba Bazargan-Forward - 2018 - In Kirk Ludwig & Marija Jankovic (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality. New York: Routledge.
    Complicity marks out a way that one person can be liable to sanctions for the wrongful conduct of another. After describing the concept and role of complicity in the law, I argue that much of the motivation for presenting complicity as a separate basis of criminal liability is misplaced; paradigmatic cases of complicity can be assimilated into standard causation-based accounts of criminal liability. But unlike others who make this sort of claim I argue that there is still room for genuine (...)
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  6. Accountability and Intervening Agency: An Asymmetry between Upstream and Downstream Actors.Saba Bazargan-Forward - 2017 - Utilitas 29 (1):110-114.
    Suppose someone (P1) does something that is wrongful only in virtue of the risk that it will enable another person (P2) to commit a wrongdoing. Suppose further that P1’s conduct does indeed turn out to enable P2’s wrongdoing. The resulting wrong is agentially mediated: P1 is an enabling agent and P2 is an intervening agent. Whereas the literature on intervening agency focuses on whether P2’s status as an intervening agent makes P1’s conduct less bad, I turn this issue on its (...)
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  7. Dignity, Self-Respect, and Bloodless Invasions.Saba Bazargan-Forward - 2017 - In Ryan Jenkins & Bradley Strawser (eds.), Who Should Die? The Ethics of Killing in War. New York: Oxford University Press.
    In Chapter 7, “Dignity, Self-Respect, and Bloodless Invasions”, Saba Bazargan-Forward asks How much violence can we impose on those attempting to politically subjugate us? According to Bazargan-Forward, “reductive individualism” answers this question by determining how much violence one can impose on an individual wrongly attempting to prevent one from political participation. Some have argued that the amount of violence one can permissibly impose in such situations is decidedly sub-lethal. Accordingly, this counterintuitive response has cast doubt on the reductive individualist project. (...)
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  8. Standards of Risk in War and Civil Life.Saba Bazargan-Forward - 2017 - In Florian Demont-Biaggi (ed.), The Nature of Peace and the Morality of Armed Conflict. Cham: Imprint: Palgrave Macmillan.
    Though the duties of care owed toward innocents in war and in civil life are at the bottom univocally determined by the same ethical principles, Bazargan-Forward argues that those very principles will yield in these two contexts different “in-practice” duties. Furthermore, the duty of care we owe toward our own innocents is less stringent than the duty of care we owe toward foreign innocents in war. This is because risks associated with civil life but not war (a) often increase the (...)
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  9. Varieties of Contingent Pacifism in War.Saba Bazargan-Forward - 2014 - In Helen Frowe & Gerald R. Lang (eds.), How We Fight: Ethics in War. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-17.
    The destruction wrought by even just wars lends undeniable appeal to radical pacifism, according to which all wars are unjust. Yet radical pacifism is fundamentally flawed. In the past decade, a moderate and more defensible form of pacifism has emerged. According to what has been called ‘contingent pacifism’, it is very unlikely that it is morally permissible to wage any given war. This chapter develops the doctrine of contingent pacifism by distinguishing and developing various versions of it, and by assessing (...)
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  10. Defensive Liability Without Culpability.Saba Bazargan-Forward - 2016 - In Christian Coons & Michael Weber (eds.), The Ethics of Self-Defense. New York, NY: Oxford University Press USA.
    A minimally responsible threatener is someone who bears some responsibility for imposing an objectively wrongful threat, but whose responsibility does not rise to the level of culpability. Minimally responsible threateners include those who knowingly commit a wrongful harm under duress, those who are epistemically justified but mistaken in their belief that a morally risky activity will not cause a wrongful harm, and those who commit a harm while suffering from a cognitive impairment which makes it prohibitively difficult to recognize and (...)
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    Noncombatant Immunity and War-Profiteering.Saba Bazargan-Forward - 2017 - In Frowe Helen & Lazar Seth (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Ethics of War. Oxford University Press.
    The principle of noncombatant immunity prohibits warring parties from intentionally targeting noncombatants. I explicate the moral version of this view and its criticisms by reductive individualists; they argue that certain civilians on the unjust side are morally liable to be lethally targeted to forestall substantial contributions to that war. I then argue that reductivists are mistaken in thinking that causally contributing to an unjust war is a necessary condition for moral liability. Certain noncontributing civilians—notably, war-profiteers—can be morally liable to be (...)
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