Graham Priest has influentially claimed that the Sorites paradox is an Inclosure paradox, concluding that his favored dialetheic solution to the Inclosure paradoxes should be extended to the Sorites paradox. We argue that, given Priest’s dialetheic solution to the Sorites paradox, the argument purporting to show that that paradox is an Inclosure is unsound, and discuss some issues surrounding this fact.

One of the main problems that Paul Horwich’s Minimalist theory of truth must face is the generalization problem, which shows that Minimalism is too weak to have the fundamental explanatory role Horwich claims it has. In this paper, I defend Horwich’s response to the generalization problem from an objection raised by Bradley Armour-Garb. I also argue that, given my response to Armour-Garb, Horwich’s proposal to cope with the generalization problem can be simplified. -/- L’un des principaux problèmes auxquels la théorie (...) minimaliste de la vérité de Paul Horwich doit faire face est le problème de la généralisation. Horwich soutient que le minimalisme a un rôle explicatif fondamental, mais le problème de la généralisation montre que cette théorie est trop faible pour tenir ce rôle. Dans cet article, je défends la réponse d’Horwich au problème de la généralisation à partir d’une objection soulevée par Bradley Armour-Garb. Je prétends également que ma réponse à Armour-Grab nous permet de formuler d’une manière plus simple la réponse d’Horwich au problème de la généralisation. (shrink)

In this paper I introduce Horwich’s deflationary theory of truth, called ‘Minimalism’, and I present his proposal of how to cope with the Liar Paradox. The proposal proceeds by restricting the T-schema and, as a consequence of that, it needs a constructive specification of which instances of the T-schema are to be excluded from Minimalism. Horwich has presented, in an informal way, one construction that specifies the Minimalist theory. The main aim of the paper is to present and scrutinize some (...) formal versions of Horwich’s construction. (shrink)

In recent years, some authors have proposed quantitative measures of the coherence of sets of propositions. Such probabilistic measures of coherence (PMCs) are, in general terms, functions that take as their argument a set of propositions (along with some probability distribution) and yield as their value a number that is supposed to represent the degree of coherence of the set. In this paper, I introduce a minimal constraint on PMC theories, the weak stability principle, and show that any correct, coherent, (...) and complete PMC cannot satisfy it. As a matter of fact, the argument offered in this paper can be applied to any coherence theory that uses a priori procedures. I briefly explore some consequences of this fact. (shrink)

Imagine a sculptor who molds a lump of clay to create a statue. Hylomorphism claims that the statue and the lump of clay are two different colocated objects that have different forms, even though they share the same matter. Recently, there has been some discussion on the requirements of consistency for hylomorphist theories. In this paper, we focus on an argument presented by Maegan Fairchild, according to which a minimal version of hylomorphism is inconsistent. We argue that the argument is (...) unsound or, at best, it just points to a well-known problem for hylmorphist theories. Additionally, we explore some general consequences of this fact. (shrink)

Legitimidad política y neutralidad estatal puede ser considerado como un intento de responder a la pregunta que un defensor de una doctrina comprehensiva religiosa, filosófica o de la buena vida, podría realizarle a un Estado liberal: ¿por qué debo aceptar que las decisiones sobre políticas públicas se justifiquen por valores neutrales y no por los de la doctrina a la cual adhiero, los cuales considero como verdaderos y correctos? La importancia de una respuesta adecuada radica en que, de acuerdo con (...) Garreta Leclercq, uno de los principales objetivos del liberalismo contemporáneo, surgido a partir de la obra de John Rawls, consiste en brindar una conexión coherente entre tres ideas básicas: la de legitimidad política -según la cual los principios que guían el accionar estatal no deberían poder ser rechazados razonablemente por los ciudadanos razonables-, la de neutralidad de justificación -de acuerdo con la cual el Estado no debe apelar a la verdad de doctrinas comprehensivas para fundamentar su ejercicio del poder político - y la de persona razonable, es decir, un individuo que, por un lado, renuncia a usar el poder estatal para imponer su doctrina como verdadera y, por el otro, participa del esfuerzo cooperativo para alcanzar fundamentos políticos que sean independientes de la aceptación de una determinada doctrina comprehensiva. (shrink)

Symposium on Christopher Bennet's The Apology Ritual. A Philosophical Theory of Punishment [Cambridge University Press, 2008].