In Plato’s Phaedo, Socrates’ argument for the immortality of the soul fails due to his insufficient explanation for how the soul, as a particular, could partake in an immortality that belongs to universals. Simmias’ objection brings this to light by providing an analogy of a particular. This particular is exemplified by the specific harmony belonging to one instrument, and its relationship to that instrument itself. The soul, having an analogous relation to the body, remains separated from Socrates’ establishment of (...) universals as eternal. (shrink)

At Phaedo 86b7–c2 Simmias puts forward the theory that the soul is the attunement of bodily elements. Many scholars have claimed that this theory originates in the Pythagoreans, especially Philolaus. The claim is largely based on their reading of the Phaedo, since we have scarce doxographical evidence. In this paper I show that the dialogue in question does not constitute any evidence for the Pythagorean origin of Simmias’ attunement theory, and that it rather represents the theory as stemming (...) from a materialistic world view that had become widespread among people at that time. I also pursue the question how and why, then, the attunement theory was able to attract many people, by examining its relation to Socrates’ affinity argument. (shrink)