In this paper, we aim to show that a study of Gilbert Ryle’s work has much to contribute to the current debate between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism with respect to skill and know-how. According to Ryle, knowing how and skill are distinctive from and do not reduce to knowing that. What is often overlooked is that for Ryle this point is connected to the idea that the distinction between skill and mere habit is a category distinction, or a distinction in form. (...) Criticizing the reading of Ryle presented by Jason Stanley, we argue that once the formal nature of Ryle’s investigation is recognized it becomes clear that his dispositional account is not an instance of reductionist behaviorism, and that his regress argument has a broader target than Stanley appears to recognize. (shrink)

This article takes up the proposal that action and expression enable perceptual knowledge of other minds, a proposal that runs counter to a tradition of thinking that other minds are special in that they are essentially unobservable. I argue that even if we accept this proposal regarding perceptual knowledge, there is still a difference between knowing another person and knowing other things. I articulate this difference by pointing out that I can know another person by sharing knowledge with her. Such (...) sharing is expressed in the use of the second-person pronoun. Thus, I argue, other minds are indeed special as objects of knowledge, but not in the way the tradition has supposed. (shrink)

Outbreaks of novel influenza viruses are continually occurring on many places on our planet, with the ultimate and most extreme consequence being a full-scale pandemic. Modern communication technology is widely used for risk communication regarding recommended change in behavior patterns and other precautions in order to mitigate the transmission. However, the assumption and bias that modern communication technology constitutes the norm causes vulnerable groups to be at possible risk of systematic exclusion to correct and updated information. Through conducting a literature- (...) and case analysis, the aim of this study is to identify insufficient or inadequate risk communication efforts in South Korea and Vietnam during influenza outbreaks, especially with concern of vulnerable groups. Further, to analyze how national influenza preparedness plans observe or ignore these insufficiencies. Results show that vulnerable groups are explicitly recognized in the preparedness plan of Vietnam. However, the South Korean preparedness plan show a more homogenous approach. Both South Korea and Vietnam showed a broad variety of channels used in their risk communication strategies which could be positive in terms of a broad outreach to a heterogenous population, including vulnerable groups. Four key factors that moderate the outcomes of risk communication were identified: Channels, Messages, Transparency and Trust. (shrink)

In the introduction to the special volume, Gilbert Ryle: Intelligence, Practice and Skill, Julia Tanney introduces the contributions of Michael Kremer, Stina Bäckström and Martin Gustafsson, and Will Small, each of which indicates concern about the appropriation of Ryle’s distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that in seminal work in contemporary epistemology. Expressing agreement with the authors that something has gone awry in these borrowings from Ryle, Tanney takes this criticism to a deeper level. She argues that the very notion (...) of content-bearing, causally-efficacious mental states, let alone representational states of knowledge-that or knowledge-how, embodies the very presuppositions that Ryle calls into question in his rejection of classical theories of meaning and his related warning of the type-errors involved in conflating rational and mechanistic explanation. That these mental posits are presupposed, unchallenged, in today’s debates make his arguments against intellectualism particularly difficult to discern. (shrink)