There are two main issues in this article, namely: firstly, is about major distinction of the concept of knowledge truth in philosophy and religion, and, secondly, is about relation between philosophy and religion. In the first issue, it is mentioned that although philosophy and religion are similarly in creation norms truth and false, but the both are differently in determining its criteria. Religion, on the side, determines these criteria based on wahyu, so it results the true or absolute truth. On (...) other side, philosophy determines these criteria based on aql, so it results the speculative or relative truth. While in the second issue, the article explains that to seek the truth of knowledge or the true knowledge, so philosophy can used really as a good tool to explain and support religion position. Whereas religion can used as a source to inspirited fervent and true philosophical thinking. Point of intersection of the both is its position in the same matter, namely: “the Ultimate Reality”. However, distinction of the both is not site in that matter of intersection, but it site in the way or method to research it. (shrink)

Overall, this book is indispensable for anyone wanting to have a richer understanding of how the Qur’an is read and interpreted within a feminist context. It is a wonderful synthesis of the work that has been done in the field thus far and provides tools necessary to seek out new avenues in understanding the Qur’an while still retaining a feminist spirit. Yet, in the end, this book does not disturb Muslim world order. It remains an overwhelming possibility for Hidayatullah (...) that interpretations which hierarchally differentiate between men and women may not be wrong. There is a comforting sense of resignation, or at least an affirmation of the ambivalence that Muslim mothers have transmitted to their daughters for centuries. We, feminist Muslims, are left with the same ambiguity with which we started the book. However, we now have a much deeper understanding of the nature of that ambiguity, and that perhaps is worth embracing in itself. (shrink)

This thesis examines Mir-Hosseini’s hermeneutical strategies to reinterpret how Islam understands gender equality by evaluating whether she allows the text to speak or uses specific hermeneutical methods to create the desired egalitarian meaning. I argue that her strategies fail to succeed by examining her understanding of Qur’an 4:34, which she considers the linchpin to furthering gender oppression in Islam, by utilizing Aysha A. Hidayatullah’s work as a framework of examination. I evaluate the interpretive choices she uses to recover gender (...) equality in the Qur’anic and the hadith texts and show that her effort fails to show that the Islamic texts teach the gender equality she purports that they teach. (shrink)

In Feminist Edges of the Qur’an, Aysha Hidayatullah argues that certain Qur’anic verses are incorrigibly male-privileging and are themselves privileged. Hence, egalitarian readings of the Qur’an are unsupported and unsupportable. If, as egalitarians propose, such verses are unjust, then either the Qur’an is not God’s word or God is unjust. By contrast, I argue that no evidence suggests any such verses are incorrigibly male- privileging. Further I indicate egalitarian rereadings for relevant contenders and note that, in any case, no (...) Qur’anic evidence warrants the primacy of such verses. Finally, since controverting egalitarian readings of such verses are available, the logical form of Hidayatullah’s argument merely shows that if they are read to exhibit injustice, those readings cannot be God’s word. Since believers hold that the Qur’an is God’s word, there is no option but to reread them. (shrink)