As I read the texts of Aquinas and the state of the discussion among his interpreters on the question of the compatibility between creaturely freedom and divine providence, an alternative interpretation suggests itself. My impression is that traditional interpreters left Aquinas’ account of the relationships among human freedom, providence and divine goodness inadequately defended, while Maritain and Lonergan with fair intention subverted it, because their readings were hampered by libertarian intuitions about human freedom which Aquinas did not share. -/- Understanding (...) Aquinas’ account of freedom in compatibilist terms reveals greater coherence in his account of the nature of human freedom and the role our freedom plays in the created order than do accounts infected with libertarian notions of freedom. Once the compatibilist conception of freedom is comprehended, it functions like a lens of superior clarity through which other aspects of Aquinas’ thought concerning the created order can be seen afresh. Accordingly, our first task is to craft the lens itself: a compatibilist conception of freedom will be ground from the material available in Aquinas’ writing on the will, its acts, and their causes in a way unclouded by the apparent tensions between causality and freedom which libertarian intuitions introduce. Then grasping the compatibilist lens, we will see through it a coherent account of the high purpose in the plan of providence for free creatures. Finally, we will observe coherence in Aquinas’ account of the permission of sin and even the ultimate failure of free creatures through the perspective afforded by compatibilist freedom. (shrink)

In this essay I explore the Christian and Humanitarian foundation of BOSCO-Uganda, an international community centered around dignified globalization of Northern Uganda. BOSCO, recipient of the Breaking Borders Award in Technology from Google and Global Voices in 2010, provides off-grid solar, computing, and associated training in over 50 sites scattered across half a dozen districts in the North. Formally an arm of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Gulu, BOSCO unites Christian and secular efforts harmoniously. The main burden of this essay (...) is to present a dialectic overview of an account of Christianity and a theology of collaboration that explains its success in achieving that harmony. (shrink)

Here I defend an account of the sanctity of human life in just the sense that Peter Singer denies is defensible. (More recently, Alasdair MacIntyre seems to have echoed Singer's argument.) I argue that the acquisition of three kinds of goods--adequate self-esteem, fruitful human relationships, and rich participation in the lives of others--require an assessment of the worth of human beings which amounts to viewing them as inviolable ends-in-themselves. -/- This argument is developed further in two subsequent essays: Toward a (...) Full Theory of Self-Esteem, parts I and II. (shrink)

In this essay, I will offer a general account of self-esteem which makes room for a number of psychologically possible varieties of self-esteem. Since both philosophers and social scientists are interested in the connection between self-esteem and human well-being, I will present criteria for assessing the adequacy of different kinds of self-esteem. After showing in Part I that other prominent varieties, induding the one Rawls identified as a primary human good, fail to meet these criteria, I will--in Part II--present an (...) account of the nature and development of a particular variety of self-esteem which succeeds in measuring up to them. Throughout and in summary, I will show how the analysis of self.esteem I offer promises to explain the phenomena covered by other analyses, while overcoming the limitations facing those analyses. (shrink)

Moral theory requires for its development an account of human wellbeing, of what it is for a thing to be good for a person: a theory, that is, of nonmoral goodness. Contemporary moral theorists--notably the so-called "new natural law theorists" and consequentialists alike--have come under fire for their failure to provide defensible accounts of nonmoral goodness.' This essay will present in outline three important rival approaches to the question of nonmoral goodness--natural law, communitarian, and informed-desire approaches--and will identify some significant (...) strengths and weaknesses within and some principle differences among these rival versions. One of these approaches, the full-information informed-desire approach of recent popularity, will be developed to overcome its shortcomings by incorporating natural law and communitarian resources. Finally, the resulting view will be presented as maintaining the strengths and avoiding the weaknesses of each of the three rival approaches discussed, and thus as showing more promise than they for serving as the foundation of moral theory. (shrink)