4 found
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  1. Do We Really Not Know What Toulmin’s Analytic Arguments Are?Tomáš Kollárik - 2023 - Informal Logic 43 (3):417-446.
    The aim of this paper is to challenge the idea that Toulmin’s main focus in The Uses of Argument is to critique formal deductive logic. I first try to challenge the argument that, on the basis of what Toulmin says about analytic arguments, it is impossible to determine exactly what they are. I will then attempt to determine the basic contours of analytic arguments. Finally, I will conclude that the concept of an analytic argument involves epistemological assumptions to which formal (...)
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  2. Is Argument From Cause to Effect Really Defeasible?Tomáš Kollárik - 2023 - Filosofie Dnes 15 (1):23-51.
    According to informal logic, the possibilities of deductive logic as a tool for analysing and evaluating ordinary arguments are very limited. While I agree with this claim in general, I question it in the case of the argument from cause to effect. In this paper I first show, on the basis of carefully chosen examples, that we usually react differently to falsification of the conclusion of the argument from cause to effect than we do to the falsification of the conclusion (...)
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  3. Vybrané problémy argumentačných schém v pragma-dialektickom prístupe k argumentácii.Tomáš Kollárik - 2024 - Filosofie Dnes 14 (2):50-90.
    V práci sa zaoberám kritickou expozíciou argumentačných schém v kontexte pragma-dialektického prístupu k argumentácii. Nadväzujem pritom na prácu Hitchcocka a Wagemansa (2011), ktorí sa sústredili najmä na problémy súvisiace s typológiou argumentačných schém v pragma-dialektike. Pozorovania Hitchcocka a Wagemansa sú v priebehu výkladu kriticky hodnotené, prípadne upravené. Časť kritiky, ktorú v práci uvádzam, súvisí s tým, že niektoré dôležité aspekty argumentačných schém sú v rôznych pragma-dialektických publikáciách prezentované odlišne bez toho, aby sa odlišnosť akokoľvek komentovala, alebo zdôvodnila. Existencia takýchto zdôvodnení (...)
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  4. Je nedorozumenie medzi kompatibilistami a inkompatibilistami Len verbálne?Tomáš Kollárik - 2019 - Filozofia 74 (9):768-784.
    The aim of this paper is to show that the disagreement between compatibilists and incompatibilists about the compatibility of free will with determinism is merely verbal, since although one side of the dispute claims that free will is compatible with determinism while the other denies it, they actually ascribe a different meaning to the term "free will". One can therefore accept both the compatibilist thesis and the incompatibilist thesis, since the two are not contradictory. My method is to analyse the (...)
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