Criticism directed at neoclassical economics has failed to replace it with a similar grand theory. The author argues that one possible explanation may lie in the failure of economists to formulate an opinion as to the philosophical foundations of the author’s object of study. The paper aims to discuss this issue. The argument proceeds in two steps. First, the authors review the prevailing philosophical view of “the self-interest theory (S)”, which is one of the most powerful constituents of today’s economics, (...) and social theorizing in general. Second, the authors present a reasoning framework in which rationality becomes intelligible within a schema of integrating the self’s external and internal conditionalities into a unified view of human reasoning. (shrink)

The Journal of Philosophical Economics comes out from a barely disguised, though deep, anxiety about the way we, the economists, may improve the ways of providing meaningful explanations for what makes and does not make sense in such economic developments as prosperity, globalisation, material imbalances, labour relations, or common property. These issues are usually resuscitated under contemporary labels such as feminism, environmentalism, Marxism, or liberalism. However, it can be argued that these issues have represented in fact recurrent threads of economic (...) thinking dating back to ancient times. (shrink)