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William Vanderburgh
California State University, San Bernardino
William Lee Vanderburgh
California State University, San Bernardino
  1. Of Miracles and Evidential Probability: Hume’s “Abject Failure” Vindicated.William L. Vanderburgh - 2005 - Hume Studies 31 (1):37-61.
    This paper defends David Hume's "Of Miracles" from John Earman's (2000) Bayesian attack by showing that Earman misrepresents Hume's argument against believing in miracles and misunderstands Hume's epistemology of probable belief. It argues, moreover, that Hume's account of evidence is fundamentally non-mathematical and thus cannot be properly represented in a Bayesian framework. Hume's account of probability is show to be consistent with a long and laudable tradition of evidential reasoning going back to ancient Roman law.
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  2. Putting a New Spin on Galaxies: Horace W. Babcock, the Andromeda Nebula, and the Dark Matter Revolution.William L. Vanderburgh - 2014 - Journal for the History of Astronomy 45:141-159.
    When a scientist is the first to perform a difficult type of observation and correctly interprets the result as a significant challenge to then-widely accepted core theories, and the result is later recognized as seminal work in a field of major importance, it is a surprise to find that that work was essentially ignored by the scientific community for thirty years. Such was the fate of the doctoral research on the rotations of the Andromeda Nebula (M31) conducted by Horace Welcome (...)
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    Of Miracles and Evidential Probability.William L. Vanderburgh - 2005 - Hume Studies 31 (1):37-61.
    This paper defends Hume’s argument against miracles from John Earman’s Bayesian attack. Attention to historical context and to details of interpretation show that Hume’s argument is different and more sophisticated than Earman and other critics have held. The linchpin in the defense is showing that Hume’s theory of probability is deliberately different from the mathematical theory of probability, and in particular that it has its roots in a tradition of evidential probability going back to ancient Roman law.
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