Philosophers debate over the truth of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, the thesis that there is a morally significant difference between doing harm and merely allowing harm to happen. Deontologists tend to accept this doctrine, whereas consequentialists tend to reject it. A robust defence of this doctrine would require a conceptual distinction between doing and allowing that both matches our ordinary use of the concepts in a wide range of cases and enables a justification for the alleged moral difference. (...) In this article, I argue not only that a robust defence of this doctrine is available, but also that it is available within a consequentialist framework. (shrink)

A frequent caveat in online dating profiles – “No fats, femmes, or Asians” – caused an LGBT activist to complain about the bias against Asians in the American gay community, which he called “racial looksism”. In response, he was asked that, if he himself would not date a fat person, why he should find others not dating Asians so upsetting. This response embodies a popular attitude that personal preferences or tastes are simply personal matters – they are not subject to (...) moral evaluation. In this paper, I argue, against this popular attitude, that a personal preference like racial looksism is indeed wrong. A preference like racial looksism is wrong because it is an overgeneralization that disrespects individuality by treating people as exchangeable tokens of one type, and such disrespect denies its objects appreciation that their dignity entitles them to. As it turns out, there is on my account a relevant moral difference between racial looksism and simple looksism. (shrink)

This paper is an attempt to improve the practical argument for beliefs in God. Some theists, most famously Kant and William James, called our attention to a particular set of beliefs, the Jamesian-type beliefs, which are justified by virtue of their practical significance, and these theists tried to justify theistic beliefs on the exact same ground. I argue, contra the Jamesian tradition, that theistic beliefs are different from the Jamesian-type beliefs and thus cannot be justified on the same ground. I (...) also argue that the practical argument, as it stands, faces a problem of self-defeat. I then construct a new practical argument that avoids both problems. According to this new argument, theistic beliefs are rational to accept because such beliefs best supply us with motivation strong enough to carry out demanding moral tasks. (shrink)

In a recent article, Xiaofei Liu seeks to defend, from the standpoint of consequentialism, the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing: DDA. While there are various conceptions of DDA, Liu understands it as the view that it is more difficult to justify doing harm than allowing harm. Liu argues that a typical harm doing involves the production of one more evil and one less good than a typical harm allowing. Thus, prima facie, it takes a greater amount of good to (...) justify doing a certain harm than it does to justify allowing that same harm. In this reply, I argue that Liu fails to show, from within a consequentialist framework, that there is an asymmetry between the evils produced by doing and allowing harm. I conclude with some brief remarks on what may establish such an asymmetry. (shrink)

A common style of argument in the literature on free will and moral responsibility is the Manipulation Argument. These tend to begin with a case of an agent in a deterministic universe who is manipulated, say, via brain surgery, into performing some action. Intuitively, this agent is not responsible for that action. Yet, since there is no relevant difference, with respect to whether an agent is responsible, between the manipulated agent and a typical agent in a deterministic universe, responsibility is (...) not compatible with the truth of determinism. In response, some theorists have argued that there is a relevant difference, and have developed two sorts of accounts of that difference: bypassing views, and manipulator-focused views. Manipulator-focused views suggest that the difference concerns the presence of a manipulator, whereas bypassing views suggest that the relevant difference concerns the fact that the action issues from attitudes that the manipulated agent acquired in a way that bypassed her capacities for control over her mental life. One sort of case used to decide between these sorts of accounts is a case of machine induction, which is just like a manipulation case, yet the change in the agent is the result of some natural force. Against the received view, Xiaofei Liu argues that such cases pose problems for bypassing views, and favor manipulator-focused views instead. This paper addresses Liu’s arguments, as well as a variety of cases, concluding that cases of machine induction do not provide motivation for a bypassing theorist to adopt a manipulator-focused view. (shrink)

Etnomatematika merupakan konsep matematika yang terdapat didalam suatu budaya. kehadiran matematika yang bernuansa budaya akan memberikan kontribusi yang besar terhadap pembelajaran matematika. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menentukan bagaimana model pembelajaran etnomatematika dalam menumbuhkan motivasi belajar siswa di sekolah dasar. Jenis penelitian deskriptif kualitatif digunakan dalam penelitian ini. Metode penelitian yang meliputi kepada mengamati bersama menemukan jawaban atas masalah secara metode dan analisis. Penelitian ini dilakukan pada bulan Februari 2023 selama semester genap. Dengan cara mengumpulkan data meliputi wawancara kepada guru kelas (...) lV dan siswa kelas lV di SD Lematang Lestari. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa Jembatan Ampera dan Kain Songket pada Kota Palembang Provinsi Sumatera Selatan memiliki etnomatematika yang berkaitan dengan konsep-konsep matematika diantaranya macam-macam garis dan bangun datar. Membuat pembalajaran matematika lebih menarik dan menyenangkan serta menumbuhkan motivasi belajar siswa sesuai dengan wawancara yang dilakukan oleh guru kelas lV dan siswa kelas lV Sekolah Dasar Lematang Lestari. (shrink)

The author Kitija Mirončuka in her article "Human Savages: Frantz Fanon and Racism" analyses how race, a seemingly constant human trait (natural phenomenon), becomes a condition for exclusion, differentiation, and violence (i.e., abnormality). In the article, the body is portrayed as a formalizable object; the author deliberates whether the natural origin is something changeable and exceptional. Introducing the Franco-Algerian philosopher Frantz Fanon, the author focuses on biopolitical practices and forms of violence that imperceptibly incorporate new concepts of human - Algerian (...) appearance, lifestyle, movement, and habits - savagery, animalism, abnormality, extremeness, and unacceptability. The article reviews three perspectives - body and race, body and skin colour, body and rhythm - to indicate that all these features, although common to many bodies, nevertheless, are selectively used to either normalize or discriminate a person based on appearance or cultural and ethnic affiliations. (shrink)