Is there something about the deep logic of democracy that destines it to succeed in the world? Democracy, the form of politics that includes everyone as equals – does it perhaps suit human nature better than the alternatives? After all, surely any person who is excluded from the decision-making in a society will be more liable to rise up against it. From ancient thinkers like Seneca to contemporary thinkers like Francis Fukuyama, we can see some version of this line of (...) thought. Seneca thought that tyrannies could never last long; Fukuyama famously argued that liberal democracy is the end of history. I want to focus instead on the person credited with giving the most direct and uncompromising statement of this thought: Benedict de Spinoza. However, in this article, I argue to the contrary that Spinoza’s view of aristocracy should give pause to radical democrats. He does not see a historical movement towards democracy, nor does he see the superiority of democracy as written into human nature. (shrink)

According to a recent interpretive orthodoxy, Spinoza is a profoundly democratic theorist of state authority. I reject this orthodoxy. To be sure, for Spinoza, a political order succeeds in proportion as it harnesses the power of the people within it. However, Spinoza shows that political inclusion is only one possible strategy to this end; equally if not more useful is political exclusion, so long as it maintains what I call the depoliticised acquiescence of those excluded.

Consonant with the ongoing “aesthetic turn” in legal scholarship, this article pursues a new conception of law as poetry. Gestures in this law-as-poetry direction appear in all three main schools in the philosophy of law’s history, as follows. First, natural law sees law as divinely-inspired prophetic poetry. Second, positive law sees the law as a creative human positing (from poetry’s poesis). And third, critical legal theory sees these posited laws as calcified prose prisons, vulnerable to poetic liberation. My first two (...) sections interpret two texts at the intersections among these three theories, namely Percy Bysshe Shelley’s “A Defense of Poetry” and Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America. Shelley identifies a poetic rebirth in the ruins of natural law, suggesting a philosophy of law as “natural poesis.” And Tocqueville names several figurative aristocracies capable of redeploying aristocratic law against democratic despotism, suggesting a philosophy of law as “aristo-poetic counterforce.” Finally, I propose a new theory of law as poetry bridging these two theories, “natural aristo-poetic counterforce.”. (shrink)

One of the many areas of his philosophical project that René Descartes (1596–1650) left to be developed by future generations is political theory. While Descartes took relatively little interest in the realm of the political as long as the political stability necessary to tend to quiet philosophical meditation was maintained, later Cartesian philosophers developed their understanding of political theory in more explicit and detailed terms. Among these, two philosophers stand out: Géraud de Cordemoy (1626–1684) and Antoine Le Grand (1629–1699). However, (...) their political philosophy is little known. I first study the case of Cordemoy who emerges as a fierce defender of absolutism, especially that of Louis XIV. I will then turn to Antoine Le Grand who equally favours monarchical rule over aristocracy and democracy. Overall, this article contributes in important ways to the history of political philosophy, specifically, in seventeenth-century France. (shrink)

A -/- abortion and infanticide/ academic freedom/ academics/ action/ act-omission doctrine/ addiction and dependence/ adoption/ advertising/ affirmative action/ age of consent/ age of criminal responsibility/ age of majority/ agent/ aggression/ agriculture/ aid, foreign/ AIDS/ air/ akrasia/ allies/ altruism/ American Civil War (1861-1865)/ American exceptionalism/ American War of Independence (1775–1783)/ anarchic social order/ anarcho-capitalism/ anarchy/ animal rights/ animal welfare/ apartheid/ apathy/ appeasement/ apriorism/ aristocracy/ arms trade/ arms race/ artificial intelligence/ arts and sciences/ assassination/ asset stripping/ asylum seekers/ atomism, social/ Austrian (...) School of economics/ authoritarianism/ authority/ autonomy, intellectual/ axis/ -/- B -/- balance of trade/ balance of power (international)/ banking/ bankruptcy, insolvency, and limited liability/ barriers to entry/ begging/ belief/ betting/ big business/ bigotry/ biodiversity/ bioethics/ black market/ blackmail/ blasphemy/ booms and slumps/ borders, political/ boxing and dangerous sports/ boycott/ bribery/ British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)/ BSE (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy)/ bureaucracy/ business cycles/ . (shrink)

The teaching of Confucius, one of the doctrines built Chinese philosophy, is the movement of thought that has penetrated politics, education, manners and customs in East Asia for centuries. Reading the principles that advise wisdom and virtue through classical texts, we can find out normative moral knowledge. This teaching, in which ethical standards guiding human relations are regulative, promotes hierarchy as required by patriarchal and patrimonial regime. Social structure is grounded on discrimination between nobles and commons. Since the rights and (...) privileges granted to the aristocracy and bureaucracy humiliate citizens and force compliance, social inequality becomes obvious. Just as Confucius cites the idea of spiritual supremacy of rulers, he also bestows a privilege upon the noble class due to their eligibility. It is the people who are actively industrious in serve, deference and obedience. The problem of nepotism, which favors the closer and excludes the farther in relational words and actions, extends all areas from familial to managerial. Consequently, justice, the main canon of virtue, has been disregarded. In this paper, it firstly will be argued that Confucius practices hypocrisy by his paradoxical statements about behavioral norms. Secondly, positional duties, which subjugate people for the interests of the dynasty, does not correspond to liberal humanism, will be confirmed. (shrink)

The delusory quest for disembodiment, against which the quest for re-embodiment is reacting, is characteristic of macroparasites who live off the work, products and lives of others. The quest for disembodiment that characterizes modernism and postmodernism, it is argued, echoes in a more extreme form the delusions on which medieval civilization was based where the military aristocracy and the clergy, defining themselves through the ideal forms of Neo-Platonic Christianity, despised nature, the peasantry and in the case of the clergy, (...) women. This argument is used to expose and reveal the oppressive and ecologically destructive drive underlying the aspirations of the dominant classes in the modern/postmodern world to disembodiment, whether this be seen as the quest to be unbounded by time and place, to be free of dependence on labour and natural resources, to be free of the humdrum of everyday life by entering ‘virtual’ worlds, or, as with post-humanists, to overcome the limits of the body by fusing with technology. These modern and postmodern forms of the quest for disembodiment, it is suggested, now threaten civilization, the future of humanity and most terrestrial life. This analysis is used to clarify the liberating mission of the grand narrative for re-embodiment, exemplified by the quest for Inclusive Democracy, Earth Democracy, Ecological Civilization, or for an Ecozoic Age. The grand narrative of the Age of Re-embodiments is shown to be inseparable from the struggle for truth, justice and liberty as central to real democracy empowering people to augment rather than undermine the conditions for life. (shrink)

In his Republic, Plato argues that self-rulership cannot be widespread enough in a populace due to structural failures of education. This means that rulership by the few with the use of manipulative mythological devices is inevitable. That is, if a populace cannot rule themselves through the use of their reason, then they will be ruled by others through the use of myth, at best, and at worst, violence. Even given this rather grim conclusion, if we closely examine what Plato has (...) to say about politics, we can see that there is no natural impossibility for generalized rule by the many. That is, there is no aristocracy of birth, but there is an aristocracy of the educated. As I will show below, we can develop a more democratic politics out of Plato if we consider the possibility of a democratic education. Before I do that, I will briefly consider Rawls’ comments on the education of citizens for democracy. This will allow for a clearer consideration of the democratic potential of Plato’s political philosophy in his Republic. (shrink)

If we accept the 7th letter as authentic and reliable, a matter that we will not be addressing in this paper, the text that we have in front of us is “an extraordinary autobiographic document”, an autobiography where the “I” as a subject becomes “I” as an object, according to Brisson. The objective of the paper is to examine how we could approach and interpret the excerpt from Plato’s 7th letter regarding the Doric way of life (Δωριστὶ ζῆν). According to (...) Plato, the Sicilian life (Σικελικὸν βίον) that was allegedly a blissful life (βίος εὐδαίμων) would never allow anyone to become virtuous with all these excesses on behalf of the appetitive part of the soul (ἐπιθυμητικόν). In contrast to this specific type of life that is presented as prevalent in the 7th Letter, only Dion used to live virtuously above pleasure and luxury. The “therapy” for this φλεγμαίνουσαν πόλιν of Syracuse is the return to Δωριστὶ ζῆν κατὰ τὰ πάτρια, the return to the Doric way of the forefathers. The phrase Δωριστὶ ζῆν in its context in the 7th Letter is an important one, because it probably shows the significance of adopting the Doric way of life, in order to create the appropriate conditions for a political reform. Examining the guardians who are the ἄριστοι of the ideal city, a class that constitutes the platonic idea of aristocracy in the Republic, we can understand that they receive many important traits from the Doric ideal (especially the educational program). Combining the concept of Δωριστὶ ζῆν with the Doric ideal, we suggest that the Doric model is quite important for the Athenian philosopher functioning as the cornerstone of reform. (shrink)

The concept of imperium is central to Spinoza's political philosophy. Imperium denotes authority to rule, or sovereignty. By extension, it also denotes the political order structured by that sovereignty, or in other words, the state. Spinoza argues that reason recommends that we live in a state, and indeed, humans are hardly ever outside a state. But what is the source and scope of the sovereignty under which we live? In some sense, it is linked to popular power, but how precisely, (...) and how is this popular grounding to be reconciled with the absolutist elements in Spinoza's texts? Against prominent liberal and radical democratic interpretations, I argue that Spinoza's insistence on linking imperium to the power of the people amounts to a normative attitude towards politics in which the formal features of a political system are less significant than the concrete everyday functioning of that system. Furthermore, I argue that its good functioning is importantly a product of an institutional order which does not simply defer to human individuality or to the primordial multitude, but instead, actively shapes them. While it may be worthwhile railing against monarchy and aristocracy and demanding liberal or radical democracy, the prior and more important challenge is to increase the robustness and resilience of the multitude within whatever form of state presents itself, through boring, meticulous, and incremental institutional design. For Spinoza, it is a robust and resilient political order that truly merits being called absolute. (shrink)

A World Without Poverty: Applying the Universal Law of Balance in Nature -/- Introduction -/- Poverty is not a natural condition but a direct result of wrong decision-making that has ignored the universal law of balance in nature. Despite technological advancements and abundant resources, billions of people suffer from hunger, lack of healthcare, unemployment, and poor living conditions. The root cause of this suffering lies in imbalances in wealth, resources, population, environment, education, governance, and labor, all of which stem from (...) decisions based on false information, greed, and short-term thinking. -/- Moreover, the consequences of wrong decision-making extend beyond poverty. Imbalances create conflicts, social unrest, and major wars as societies compete over limited resources, power, and wealth. If humanity had applied the universal law of balance from the beginning, the world could have prevented not only poverty but also many historical conflicts and wars. This essay explores how wrong decision-making violates natural balance, leading to poverty, conflict, and war—and how applying the universal law of balance could have created a more peaceful and prosperous world. -/- The Role of Correct Information in Decision-Making -/- One of the biggest reasons poverty, conflict, and war exist is because societies have made decisions based on false, incomplete, or manipulated information. When leaders and institutions ignore truth, science, and rational thinking, they create imbalances that harm societies. Some key consequences of wrong information in decision-making include: -/- 1. Economic policies that favor the elite, creating wealth gaps that lead to revolution and unrest. -/- 2. Overexploitation of natural resources, leading to food shortages, climate change, and displacement of communities. -/- 3. Corrupt political decisions, resulting in dictatorship, oppression, and rebellion. -/- 4. Religious and ideological extremism, causing violent conflicts based on misinformation. -/- 5. Militarization and unnecessary wars, driven by propaganda rather than rational diplomacy. -/- If humanity had prioritized correct knowledge, scientific reasoning, and ethical decision-making, many of history’s greatest conflicts—along with the poverty they created—could have been avoided. -/- How Wrong Decisions Create Imbalances That Lead to Poverty, Conflict, and War -/- Poverty, conflict, and war did not occur naturally—they are direct results of wrong decisions that ignored balance. These decisions created major global imbalances, leading to inequality, suffering, and destruction. -/- 1. Economic Imbalance: Extreme Wealth Concentration Leads to Revolutions -/- Wrong Decision: Allowing unregulated capitalism and corrupt governments to concentrate wealth in the hands of a few. -/- Effect: Economic inequality fuels resentment, leading to violent revolutions and class wars. -/- Example: The French Revolution (1789) was caused by extreme wealth inequality. The monarchy and aristocracy controlled all resources, while the poor struggled to survive. This led to mass uprisings, executions, and civil war. -/- 2. Resource Imbalance: Overexploitation Leads to Resource Wars -/- Wrong Decision: Overexploiting natural resources instead of managing them sustainably. -/- Effect: Countries fight over limited resources, leading to wars, invasions, and territorial disputes. -/- Example: The Iraq War (2003) was largely influenced by oil interests. Instead of investing in renewable energy, global powers fought for control of Iraq’s oil reserves, leading to destruction and economic collapse. -/- 3. Population Imbalance: Overpopulation Causes Social Unrest -/- Wrong Decision: Ignoring the relationship between population growth and available resources, leading to overcrowded cities and slums. -/- Effect: High unemployment, poverty, and crime increase, leading to violent uprisings. -/- Example: The Arab Spring (2010-2012) began as protests over unemployment and poverty in overpopulated countries like Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria. It led to government collapses, civil wars, and massive refugee crises. -/- 4. Environmental Imbalance: Climate Change Causes Wars Over Survival -/- Wrong Decision: Destroying forests, polluting water sources, and overfishing for short-term economic gain. -/- Effect: Droughts, food shortages, and mass migrations force nations into conflicts over survival. -/- Example: The Syrian Civil War (2011-present) was worsened by a climate-induced drought that forced rural populations into cities, increasing tensions and contributing to violent conflict. -/- 5. Educational Imbalance: Ignorance and Misinformation Fuel War and Extremism -/- Wrong Decision: Underfunding education and spreading propaganda instead of critical thinking. -/- Effect: People are easily manipulated into war and violence based on false ideologies. -/- Example: Nazi Germany used false racial theories and propaganda to justify war and genocide, leading to World War II (1939-1945). Had people been educated in critical thinking and ethics, they might have resisted such dangerous ideologies. -/- 6. Political Imbalance: Corrupt Leadership Leads to War and Oppression -/- Wrong Decision: Leaders prioritizing power and greed over human welfare. -/- Effect: Dictatorships, oppression, and civil wars. -/- Example: World War I (1914-1918) was caused by political greed and imperialist ambitions, leading to millions of deaths and widespread poverty. -/- 7. Labor Imbalance: Worker Exploitation Leads to Revolutions and Strikes -/- Wrong Decision: Allowing corporations to exploit workers while keeping profits concentrated at the top. -/- Effect: Poor working conditions lead to strikes, protests, and violent uprisings. -/- Example: The Russian Revolution (1917) was triggered by poor working conditions, low wages, and food shortages, leading to the collapse of the Russian monarchy and the rise of the Soviet Union. -/- How the Universal Law of Balance Could Have Prevented Poverty, Conflict, and War -/- If the universal law of balance in nature had been applied, humanity would have: -/- 1. Used Correct Information to Make Rational Decisions -/- Governments would have made policies based on science, fairness, and sustainability, not propaganda. -/- Example: Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway) use fact-based governance, leading to economic stability and low poverty rates. -/- 2. Balanced Economic Systems -/- Wealth would have been distributed fairly instead of accumulating in the hands of a few. -/- Example: Switzerland has balanced capitalism with social protections, avoiding economic collapses and revolutions. -/- 3. Managed Resources Sustainably -/- Instead of overexploitation, societies would have invested in renewable energy and conservation. -/- Example: Costa Rica has preserved forests and developed eco-tourism, avoiding conflicts over resource scarcity. -/- 4. Controlled Population Growth to Match Resources -/- Governments would have balanced population growth through education and healthcare policies. -/- Example: Thailand used education and healthcare investment to stabilize its population and economy. -/- 5. Provided Universal Access to Education -/- People would have been educated on critical thinking, ethics, and sustainability. -/- Example: Finland offers free education, ensuring that people are informed and less vulnerable to war propaganda. -/- 6. Established Just and Accountable Governments -/- Leaders would have been scientifically trained in governance, ethics, and sustainability, preventing corruption. -/- Example: Switzerland’s decentralized system ensures fair leadership and stability. -/- 7. Ensured Fair Labor Practices -/- Workers would have received fair wages and benefits, preventing revolutions and mass strikes. -/- Example: Germany’s labor laws ensure that workers are well-paid, reducing poverty and social unrest. -/- Conclusion -/- Poverty, conflict, and war are not natural—they are consequences of wrong decisions based on false information, greed, and short-term thinking. Had humanity followed the universal law of balance in nature, we would have created a world with economic fairness, sustainable societies, and peace. By ensuring correct knowledge in decision-making, fair wealth distribution, environmental conservation, and ethical leadership, poverty and war could have been prevented. The future still depends on whether we choose to restore balance—or repeat the mistakes of the past. -/- . (shrink)

Whereas civil discourse is usually thought to be about defusing conflict, this essay argues it may be fruitfully thought of as fighting honorably for what we believe. Thus agonistic honor, which conceives of rightness in terms of fair and respectful contest for status, will be an especially important virtue in contexts—from classrooms to courtrooms to pluralistic democracies in general—where conflict is inevitable and desirable. To motivate this claim, I take a Hobbesian approach. I begin with a rational reconstruction of honor (...) patterned after Hobbes’ rational reconstruction of justice, and imagine honor-equivalents of “rational” individuals in a “state of nature.” I then describe a multi-stage process that culminates in honorable contests among a natural aristocracy. The lessons from this exercise apply to the question of civil discourse: while the "standard model" of civil discourse aims at resolving disagreement by downplaying rivalry and ego, the more realistic agonistic model harnesses these factors to make our civil debates more culturally sustainable. (shrink)

Edmund Burke’s political philosophy is generally known as the theoretical foundation of Western conservatism. In his intellectual elaboration, society is an organic complex organized in many stratified social classes. But who has the right to lead the community towards the common good? Burke’s answer to that question is: the natural aristocracy. Being the society «a clause in the great primeval contract of eternal society» – so writes Burke –, all creatures are «each in their appointed place». And the group (...) destined to lead the whole is represented by the natural aristocracy. However, this aristocracy shouldn’t be entirely confused with the big landowners and with the traditional nobility; rather, Burke’s vision is founded over a classical concept based on virtue and wisdom, and the natural aristocrats are described as «those who are virtute et honore majores». Hence, the aristocracy of birth and wealth is only a part of it — and every civil society will develop a natural aristocracy, or else fall into chaos and subversion. (shrink)

With the publication of the First Discourse, Rousseau initiated a famous debate over the social value of the arts and sciences. As this debate developed, however, it transformed into a question of the value of the intellectuals as a social class and touched upon questions of identity formation. While the philosophes were lobbying to become a new cultural aristocracy, Rousseau believed the ideological glorification of intellectual talent demeaned the peasants and working classes. This essay argues that amour propre, as (...) put forth in the Second Discourse, was in part designed to address this concern and is an attempt to highlight the dangers of making talent the measure of a human. (shrink)

We sometimes imagine that diversity of religion, culture and ethnicity is a problem of the present, one that sets our time apart. However in the 17th century at the end of the Reformation and the wars of religion that divided Europe, overthrowing medieval institutions, social, political and religious hierarchies that had dominated for centuries, the question of how to govern a diverse multitude of individuals was a pressing practical and theoretical question. By taking human diversity as primary, Baruch Spinoza proposed (...) a theory of the state that does not require pre-existing unity among individuals and so provides a theory of justice, which can be scaled to the global. Further, Spinoza’s theory of political and individual power offers positive reasons why we may want to build global democratic institutions to solve the problems of global justice. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality suggests aristocracies inadvertently produce a dangerous “slavish” counter-type of moral agency grounded in resentment and exhibiting a morality of resignation. Throughout the text, he conflates biological and political registers, speaking of human types as “species” (die Spezies) and classes as “races” (die Rassen), thus implying all human kinds are socially constructed and that their primary cause is political organization. It’s in this sense that Nietzsche is a “radical aristocrat.” Against the conservative view that social (...) hierarchy mirrors a fixed order in nature, he recognizes hierarchies create the types they seek to preserve, precisely against natural contingency. This poses a practical dilemma for aristocracies: how maintain an underclass without provoking the slavish psychology and morality that undermine aristocratic values? In other texts, Nietzsche develops an answer with his interpretation of the Hindu law of Manu. Every aristocracy must create the illusion that classes are natural castes rather than political constructions. Caste-systems are cultural and ideological institutions designed to protect class-systems by giving class identities the appearance of fixed “species”: deeply-internalized forms of psychology and moral agency that reinforce class positions by being more rigidly-defined and easily socially recognized. In The Wretched of the Earth, Frantz Fanon subversively redirects this theory away from Nietzsche’s reactionary aims toward revolutionary ones, applying its logic to the racialized hierarchy of colonization. Fanon also blurs the line between the social and biological, referring to colonizer and colonized as different “species” (espèces) and suggesting social position causes class-groups to develop the deep psychological and moral identities characteristic of castes. For Fanon, race is the primary way colonized societies materially support caste-ideology. Though socially-determined, race-concepts are anchored in visible differences, giving the class position of the colonized a false appearance of naturalness. However, against Nietzsche, who blames the oppressed for slave morality, Fanon insists “the colonizer creates the colonized.” Slavish psychology originates in the ruling class who, to save their good conscience, reinterpret privilege as merit by adopting a Manichean view of the colonized as essentially evil, leading to deep-seated hatred for them as a racialized caste. The colonizers’ primary psychology of resentment in turn produces a secondary psychology of resentment among the colonized, shaping both into opposing “species,” identities grounded in each other’s exclusion, pressing the colonized not (as Nietzsche thinks) toward moral revolt but toward political revolution. Fanon’s critical reconstruction of Nietzsche’s caste-theory has three important consequences. First, Nietzsche’s analysis implies, against his own hopes, that aristocracies necessarily produce their own downfall. Second, if race is politically constructed as a disguised form of class, racism cannot be overcome independently of the class structures it was created to disguise. However, third, if caste-systems produce not just racist attitudes, practices, and social structures but also the racist as a species of psychological identity grounded in resentment, then while class politics can resolve racism’s historical origins, it will not prevent its continuation among existing members of that type. Consequently, anti-racist politics cannot be reduced to issues of either class or race alone. (shrink)

Al-Fārābī's discussed fundamental issues in the first ten sections of Kītāb al-Mīllah briefly. Defining the nation (religion), describing the types of societies, dividing the nation (religion) into opinions and actions, and mentioning each of them, synonyms of the nation with other concepts such as religion and shārīʿa, the method of inferring the opinions of the nation, the similarity of the virtuous nation to philosophy, the relationship between the two components of the nation with theoretical philosophy and phronesis (practical philosophy), dealing (...) with fallacies using topic and rhetoric, the reasons for not expressing some laws by the first ruler, the conditions of the rulers after the first ruler, the wisdom, jurisprudence and virtue of the nation's ruler, and discussing the philosophical nature of jurisprudence, the most important contents of Al-Fārābī's in this ten section. On the other hand, it must be claimed that various theories can be extracted from Kītāb al-Mīllah: 1. Revelation as the highest faculty of reason; 2. The unity of theoretical philosophy and Phronesis- the unity of theoretical and practical reason; 3. Philosophy of jurisprudence; 4. Governance philosophy; 5. shārīʿa purposes; 6. Aristocracy; 7. Philosophical jurisprudence. In this paper, in addition to the translation of the first ten sections of Kītāb al-Mīllah, its content is also explained and these seven ideas are extracted from this treatise. (shrink)

The epistemological differences between Skinner and Plato are widely recognized. However, in the political scope, Skinner seems to get closer to Plato, even mentioning Republic as an inspiration for Walden two. Based on that affinity, this article aims to explain political similarities between Walden two and Republic. To avoid an anachronism with the term politics, in comparison of two works so different in time and cultural context, discussions are based on Aristotle’s systematic proposal. According to that proposal, the political field (...) involves at least: i) forms of government; ii) the characteristics of the governed population, and iii) the mechanisms used to prevent the government from degenerating. Following these points, it is possible to conclude that Walden two’s political proposal converges with the Platonic one, mainly concerning the adoption of an aristocracy. Despite that affinity, Skinner’s argument of justifying a techno-scientific aristocracy faces problems absent in Republic. That calls into question Walden two’s coherence with some of the philosophical assumptions of Radical Behaviorism. (shrink)

Divus Augustus Pater. The cult of divine Augustus under the rule of the Julio-Claudian dynasty -/- Summary The cult of divine Augustus was one of the most important phenomena of ideological nature under the rule of the Julio-Claudian dynasty. The crucial point of its development was the apotheosis conducted on 17 September 14 AD. The new cult was derived greatly from numerous borrowings from the rites of various gods of the Roman Pantheon. As divus, Augustus received a separate priest, a (...) private priestess, and a college of priests. The first flamen Augustalis became Germanicus. The holder of this title enjoyed many privileges. It seems unlikely, however, that flamen Augustalis controlled the entire cult of divine Augustus. This was the role of the emperor as both the supreme priest and the inheritor of political power. Sodales Augustales also had special cult functions. This religious fraternity had a mixed private-state character just like many of the institutions of the early principate. It was a cult college of gens Iulia and, most of all, of Augustus. From its beginning it enjoyed high prestige. The members of this religious fraternity were recruited among the Senate elite and the family of the emperor. Sacerdos divi Augusti occupies a different place in the priesthood established to worship Augustus. This female priesthood, despite its humble cult and political role, is of great interest to scholars. In spite of discerning investigations by researchers, there seem to have been only two priestesses in the Julio-Claudian dynasty – Julia Augusta, the widow of the creator of the principate, and Antonia Augusta. There is even no certainty that the latter had preformed the function at all. Augustus, as a god, was given a separate temple under a Senate decree. However, the construction work went slowly ahead. Therefore, divus Augustus was initially worshipped in other places of worship. At first, it was the temple of Mars Ultor. He was also worshipped in the sacrarium on the Palatine. One encounters certain difficulties when trying to identify the places of Augustus’ worship in Rome. Ultimately, there seem to have been two sacraria in the capital of the Empire. There is no certainty, however, whether yet another temple was located next to the templum novum divi Augusti on the Palatine. In trying to analyse the phenomenon of the divinity of the Roman emperors, and Augustus in particular, it is necessary to refer to the genesis of Emperor worship. Within the framework of official religion it is important to distinguish such elements as genius and numen. Although the consecratio act conducted by the Senate meant the crossing of the boundary between the human Augustus and the divine Augustus, it is important to remember that Augustus had prepared his apotheosis for a long time and already enjoyed divine honours during his lifetime. Certain elements of Augustus worship developed under his rule continued to exist for some time after the death of the creator of the principate. Augustus divinity was guarded by the law of maiestas. At the beginning of the rule of Tiberius it mostly protected divus Augustus himself. Gradually, despite some opposition, the law began to serve the ruling emperor. There is little certainty of how many cases were brought under the crimen laesae maiestatis against those who insulted the divine Augustus. The issue of trials for offending the law of maiestas is accounted for one-sidedly by ancient historians, which complicates the work of contemporary researchers. There is, however, no denying that for Tiberius (Augustus’ successor) the trials on the charge of maiestas turned out to be a trap. The cult of divus Augustus was approved throughout the Empire. Nevertheless, some weaker voices of opposition could be heard. These were present in the Senate circles cherishing the memory of the last defenders of the Republic, as well as among some ethnic and religious communities. The latter included Judaism and emerging Christianity. The political consequences of Augustus’ deification were very serious. He significantly contributed to the ruling of the Julio-Claudian dynasty for over 50 years. The main reason for that was the fact that in the Rome of that time the tradition of power succession was not yet well-grounded. Directly after the principate creator’s death, his consecratio took place – he was assigned priests and many godly honours and a temple was erected in his honour. These actions obviously took place under Augustus’ successor Tiberius who, during his rule, constantly tried to emulate the divine predecessor and referred to his decrees on numerous occasions. Tiberius was the emperor who contributed to the cult of his adoptive father to the greatest extent. However, one cannot fail to notice that his actions were somehow ambiguous. It has to be remembered that, in addition to his sincere respect for the divine Augustus, Tiberius also tried to use the authority of the creator of the principate to strengthen his power. This is exemplified by the motto imprinted on coins: DIVVS AVGVSTVS PATER. Caligula took a different approach to the Augustan cult. When assuming power after Tiberius, he was in a different position. The 20-year rule by Augustus’ successor greatly contributed to the strengthening of the idea of the principate ’s stability in the minds of the Romans. This allowed Caligula to pay less heed to the Senate aristocracy, as well as other institutional elements of the Republic. Under these circumstances, the cult of Augustus underwent modifications. Divus Augustus still remained at the heart of the religious propaganda of the Roman state and gens Iulia, but also other members of the family of the young Emperor received a number of honours drawing them closer to the world of gods. Drusilla, for that matter, was made a diva. By this, the idea of domus Augusta received a new confirmation. Caligula himself did not cease to participate in, and support, the rites performed to worship his divine grandfather. The available sources lead us to believe that Augustus constituted for the young princeps a role model and a character to which he often compared himself with. For Claudius, the use of the cult of divine Augustus was important as a tool to strengthen political power. But due to the fact that his personal links with divus Augustus were rather weak, Claudius focused on the cult of his grandmother Livia, Augustus’ wife. He also emphasised the function of sacerdos divi Augusti which his mother Antonia Augusta was to fulfil. Claudius faced the task of the ‘reconstruction’ of the cult of Augustus which had deteriorated, especially during the second part of Caligula’s rule. Claudius took a different direction in imitating Augustus than his two predecessors. Augustus’ model was very capacious, allowing him to find examples which could be adjusted to fit his own political goals and personality. Claudius avoided the stiffness characteristic of Tiberius and, at the same time, respected Augustus’ traditions which he Caligula inadvertently abused. Claudius’ attitude to Augustus is not quite clear. Undoubtedly he kept alive the memory of the first princeps, however, there is a lack of testimony about the new honours conferred on divine Augustus during the rule of this Emperor. Almost all of them concentrate around the person of Claudius or his family. There are, however, no honours conferred on the creator of the principate. This type of attitude caused the cult of divine Augustus to be eclipsed by the cult of the ruling Emperor. Nero, the last representative of the Julio-Claudian dynasty descended, unlike Claudius, directly from the line of Augustus. The new emperor deified his predecessor by using the model of Augustus’ apotheosis. In the first part of his rule he drew greatly from the Augustus model of exercising power. Nero ’s ideological platform seems to be the richest in comparison with other emperors of the Julio-Claudian dynasty. The tradition of links with divus Augustus was, however, only one of many different elements. With time, the tradition appeared to play a still smaller role. The departure from the Augustus model took place on many levels. Some of the steps were very radical, whereas others were less significant. The most serious was the elimination of the members of gens Iulia and gens Claudia, and those who could prove their kinship with both the houses. The devastation in Nero ’s closest family put an end to the concept of domus Augusta. Formally, the Emperor did not renounce the divine creator of the principate but, in practice, the idea of the new domus Augusta no longer aimed at presenting Augustus’ descendants united in a single family. Nero was now alone and any creation of ideological concepts of power under those circumstances had to be based around him. These actions ended in disaster. By giving up the Augustan model, Nero lost the support of the army and, as a result, lost power. Apart from the worship of the state religion in the capital, divus Augustus was the subject of a provincial and municipal cult. Here, the worship of divine Augustus was often a continuation, sometimes in an extended form, of the honours Augustus had been granted during his lifetime. In the cult of divus Augustus, in the provinces one can observe a mutual interweaving of elements copied from the capital model and local traditions. The beginning of the provincial cult of Augustus dates back to the rule of Tiberius. The crucial point for the establishment of the provincial cult in the West was the request of the citizens of Hispania Tarraconensis to build a temple for divine Augustus. It is important to emphasise here that he was appointed on a local initiative. In the East, the genesis of the provincial cult is related to the functioning of koinon. In comparison with the western regions, the cult here was characterised not only by longer history but also an extensive system of priesthood and rich ritual. The intensity of development of municipal and private cult in the West depended on the level of social and economic development of the regions. It assumed the most complex forms in the provinces with well-developed city life – generally in the eastern provinces. Whereas the cult of divine Augustus in the western municipal provinces was similar in character to the cult of the principate’s creator in Italy. The greatest testimony to the cult’s development comes from relatively strongly romanised and, at the same time, the wealthiest regions which had been part of the Empire for a long time. These included the mainly proconsular Africa, Spain and Narbonese Gaul. The sources coming from these regions constitute not only an illustration of the development of the cult of divine Augustus and members of domus Augusta, but are also a sign of the processes of romanisation of great numbers of city populations. It is necessary to note that outside Rome we do not encounter an isolated cult of divine Augustus. Whenever we deal with information concerning temples or rituals dedicated to the deified creator of the principate, other members of the family are also worshipped. In fact, during the whole rule of the Julio-Claudian dynasty we actually deal with the cult of divine Augustus in close association with the worship of domus Augusta – domus divina. (shrink)

In this paper, I compare the regimes of democracy and aristocracy as described in Plato's Republic, I argue that that an aristocracy is less collectively good when compared to a democracy as in the former the collective is portrayed by the philosophers. In the latter, the collective is based first on equality and then decided upon by the masses with this principle as a foundation better corresponding with Plato’s metaphysics. I will argue that both the protection of individualism (...) and the pursuit of the collective good of the state can coexist together. A solution for Plato’s dilemma of individualism vs the collective would be a state which inclusively represents the populace and collectively agrees to protect personal individualism, essentially modern liberalism which, due to its egalitarian (rather than hierarchical) nature provides a much more stable political structure. What is good for the state is decided by the foundational understanding of individual equality (stemming from mathematical principles) playing the most vital moral obligatory role. (shrink)

The main disciples of Socrates criticise the use of city walls. However, their attacks are less grounded in a deep strategic reflexion than related to the traumatic consequences of Pericles’ strategy at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. The Lacedemonians’ opposition to the erection of surrounding walls is more likely linked to their aristo- cratic ideology and interests than to moral imperatives. Though Plato and Xenophon’s motives are to avoid political divisions in the city, their positions on fortifications reveal their (...) aristocratic bias and the question of the walls appears to be part of a more general questioning on the spatial and political organisation of the city. On that issue, Aristotle criticises Plato from a pragmatic point of view and defends the use of walls, but under strict conditions only. The Spartan and Socratic critique of the building of the walls, as well as Aristotle reluctance to fully accept them, could be traced back to a common Greek archaic ideal. (shrink)

This is the review of a book by Paula Byrne on Lord Mansfield's great-niece, Dido, whom he raised as his own daughter. Lord Mansfield was the Lord Chief Justice of England in the Eighteenth Century. The child was brought to him as an infant and grew up to become what we would today term his paralegal clerk in his Library at Kenwood House. His great-niece was the child of a black slave and his sister's son, Sir John Lindsay. This is (...) also a narrative of the British Slave trade including some of Lord Mansfield's judgements at the King's Bench Division, Royal Courts of Justice. (shrink)

Philosophy, right from its inception in antiquity, has always been a source of ideas, and inspiration for the transformation of society. In attempt to solve societal problems, philosophers ask critical questions and suggest rational answers to them just like some fundamental theories postulated by great thinkers in the past had been usefully applied to solve contemporary problems. Hence, using analytic method, this work makes vivid through criticism from the light of Plato’s notion on politic, the reason why Nigeria is where (...) she where and even in worst state of degenerating and decaying in all levels caused by wrong administration of her political system. The people can only live a good life if and only if the state is in good hands; those who hold common good at heart. (shrink)