Results for 'autonoesis'

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  1. Autonoesis and Belief in a Personal Past: An Evolutionary Theory of Episodic Memory Indices.Stan Klein - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (3):427-447.
    In this paper I discuss philosophical and psychological treatments of the question "how do we decide that an occurrent mental state is a memory and not, say a thought or imagination?" This issue has proven notoriously difficult to resolve, with most proposed indices, criteria and heuristics failing to achieve consensus. Part of the difficulty, I argue, is that the indices and analytic solutions thus far offered seldom have been situated within a well-specified theory of memory function. As I hope to (...)
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  2. Autonoesis and Reconstruction in Episodic Memory: Is Remembering Systematically Misleading?Kourken Michaelian - 2018 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41.
    Mahr and Csibra view autonoesis as being essential to episodic memories and construction as being essential to the process of episodic remembering. These views imply that episodic memory is systematically misleading, not because it often misinforms us about the past, but rather because it often misinforms us about how it informs us about the past.
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  3. Epistemic Authority, Episodic Memory, and the Sense of Self.Jennifer Nagel - 2018 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41.
    The distinctive feature of episodic memory is autonoesis, the feeling that one’s awareness of particular past events is grounded in firsthand experience. Autonoesis guides us in sharing our experiences of past events, not by telling us when our credibility is at stake, but by telling us what others will find informative; it also supports the sense of an enduring self.
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  4. Special Attention to the Self: A Mechanistic Model of Patient RB’s Lost Feeling of Ownership.Hunter Gentry - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-29.
    Patient RB has a peculiar memory impairment wherein he experiences his memories in rich contextual detail, but claims to not own them. His memories do not feel as if they happened to him. In this paper, I provide an explanatory model of RB's phenomenology, the self-attentional model. I draw upon recent work in neuroscience on self-attentional processing and global workspace models of conscious recollection to show that RB has a self-attentional deficit that inhibits self-bias processes in broadcasting the contents of (...)
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  5. Opening the Doors of Memory: Is Declarative Memory a Natural Kind?Kourken Michaelian - 2015 - Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews 6 (6):475-482.
    Klein's target article argues that autonoetic consciousness is a necessary condition for memory; this unusually narrow view of the scope of memory implies that only episodic memory is, strictly speaking, memory. The narrow view is opposed to the standard broad view, on which causal connection with past experience is sufficient for memory; on the broad view, both declarative (i.e., episodic and semantic) and procedural memory count as genuine forms of memory. Klein mounts a convincing attack on the broad view, arguing (...)
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  6. The Phenomenology of Remembering is an Epistemic Feeling.Denis Perrin, Kourken Michaelian, Sant' & André Anna - forthcoming - Frontiers in Psychology.
    This paper aims to provide a psychologically-informed philosophical account of the phenomenology of episodic remembering. The literature on epistemic or metacognitive feelings has grown considerably in recent years, and there are persuasive reasons, both conceptual and empirical, in favour of the view that the phenomenology of remembering—autonoetic consciousness, as Tulving influentially referred to it, or the feeling of pastness, as we will refer to it here—is an epistemic feeling, but few philosophical treatments of this phenomenology as an epistemic feeling have (...)
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