Autonoesis and belief in a personal past: an evolutionary theory of episodic memory indices

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Abstract
In this paper I discuss philosophical and psychological treatments of the question "how do we decide that an occurrent mental state is a memory and not, say a thought or imagination?" This issue has proven notoriously difficult to resolve, with most proposed indices, criteria and heuristics failing to achieve consensus. Part of the difficulty, I argue, is that the indices and analytic solutions thus far offered seldom have been situated within a well-specified theory of memory function. As I hope to show, when such an approach is adopted, not only does a new, functionally-grounded answer emerge; we also gain insight into the adaptive significance of the process proposed to underwrite our belief in the memorial status of a mental state (i.e.,autonoetic awareness).
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First archival date: 2013-11-07
Latest version: 6 (2014-08-21)
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References found in this work BETA
The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture.Barkow, Jerome; Cosmides, Leda & Tooby, John (eds.)

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Citations of this work BETA
What Memory Is.Klein, Stan

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2013-11-08

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