Centripetalism is often perceived as a type of a political system for a multi-segmental, especially multi-ethnic, country in order to create among the members of the political elite of moderate, accomodative, and integrative political behavior cross-cutting segmental divisions which, reaching beyond group interests, depoliticize the segmental separateness and, in this manner, reduce their significance. One of the central institutions of centripetalism is decentralization leading to a division of large segments into smaller parts that inhabit different, ideally multi-segmental regions, (...) thus inclining regional political elites of different segments to collaborate. Although both Nigeria and Indonesia have similar centripetal territorial structures, only Nigeria is a federation. This paper focuses on Nigerian centripetal federalism and its link to the so-called federal character principle that is mostly consociational in substance. Krzysztof Trzcinski, Centripetal Federalism, in: 50 Shades of Federalism, ed. by Soeren Keil & Paul Anderson, Canterbury: Canterbury Christ Church University & Montréal: CRÉQC, 2020. (shrink)

The principal aim of this article is to explain the specificity of the requirement for the spatial distribution of votes in presidential elections – an institution that has existed in Nigeria since 1979 and in Indonesia since 2001. It also seeks to describe the political conditions which contributed to that institution’s introduction and functioning in those two countries. The article will end with a comparison between the two cases, including a discussion of the present differences between them. The article will (...) also contain a preliminary appraisal of whether the existence of the requirement in question is helping to reduce the level of conflictive behavior in relations between ethnic groups in the multi-ethnic societies of Nigeria and Indonesia. This article has been published in "Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia" 2017, Vol. 30, Issue 1, pp. 89-107. (shrink)

In 2001 the Indonesian government agreed to the introduction in the Indonesian Papua of regional, consociational elements of power-sharing, despite the fact that the dominant model of this system in Indonesia is centripetalism. The so-called special autonomy for the Indonesian Papua has never been fully implemented, however. The article seeks to test the thesis that the Indonesian authorities' institution of consociational arrangements for Papua, and their subsequent failure to fully implement those arrangements, were, in fact, tactical moves serving to (...) reduce the threat arising from growing pro-independence aspirations among the Papuans and to firmly attach Papuan territory to Indonesia. This article has been published in "Hemispheres" 2016, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 5-20. (shrink)

In this article, the author analyzes the term "power-sharing" in the context of power exercised within a state. He first examines the term in the very general sense, in which it can be applied to all types and dimensions of sharing of power between various groups and institutional entities. Second, the author examines the meaning of the term in the narrow sense, that is, the phenomenon of systemic sharing of power by groups (segments) whose membership is based on ascribed criteria (...) such as common ancestors, relatives, or racial background, and/or cultural ones such as a common language, religion, or celebrations. The basic segmental units in this sense are nations (understood in the sociological sense), ethnic groups, or religious and denominational communities that form part of divided societies. Third, the article shows the differences between the principal models (types) of power-sharing in the narrow sense: consociationalism, centripetalism, and hybrid power-sharing. (shrink)

The aim of this study is to demonstrate the validity of the thesis that in Indonesia one can find institutions that characterize two power-sharing models which are considered opposites of one another in political theory – centripetalism and consociationalism. In consequence, the Indonesian power-sharing system should be viewed as a hybrid, or mixed, system, and not a typically centripetal system as is usually the case in the literature. At the beginning of this article, a short analysis of Indonesia’s political (...) situation is given for the purpose of defining the factors which determined the introduction of inter-segmental power-sharing arrangements in that country. This is followed by a description of the specificity of consociationalism and centripetalism. The article goes on to discuss specific institutions of both power-sharing models that exist in Indonesia and ends with some concluding remarks on the thesis advanced at the outset. The article has been published in "Polish Political Science Yearbook" 2017, vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 168–185. For more on combining institutions of different models of power-sharing see: Krzysztof Trzcinski, Hybrid Power Sharing: On How to Stabilize the Political Situation in Multi-Segmental Societies, "Politeja" 2018, vol. 56, no. 5, pp. 86-107. (shrink)

There are various ways of reducing conflicts and of stabilizing the political situation in states where society is made up of many different ethnic groups and religious communities, and where relations between these segments – or between them and the central government – are tense. A particularly important way is the establishment in those states of a political system based on power-sharing (PS), which allows members of various ethnic and religious segments to take part in the exercise of power. The (...) literature on the subject usually discusses two models of PS: consociationalism and centripetalism. A third model is encountered in practice, however, that of hybrid power-sharing (HPS), which combines the institutions of the first two. The main objective of this article is to explain the nature and origins of HPS. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to demonstrate the thesis that the stabilization of Nigeria’s complicated political situation is furthered by the functioning in that country of institutions based on two models of interethnic power-sharing – consociationalism and centripetalism – and that the two are to some extent complementary in Nigerian practice, despite the fact that political theory sees the two as opposites of each other. The article begins with a short analysis of the political situation in Nigeria. This (...) is followed by a presentation of the problem of defining the notion of political stability and an assessment of the same in the Nigerian context. The article then goes on to discuss the nature of centripetalism and consociationalism and specific centripetal and consociational institutions involved in the stabilization of the political situation in Nigeria. The article ends with the author’s conclusions about the initial thesis. The article has been published in "Politeja" 2016, vol. 42, no. 3, pp. 53-73. For more on combining institutions of different models of power-sharing see: Krzysztof Trzcinski, Hybrid Power Sharing: On How to Stabilize the Political Situation in Multi-Segmental Societies, "Politeja" 2018, vol. 56, no. 5, pp. 86-107. (shrink)

Anglo-American general jurisprudence remains preoccupied with the relationship of legality to morality. This has especially been so in the re-reading of Lon Fuller’s theory of an implied morality in any law. More often than not, Fuller has been said to distinguish between the identity of a discrete rule and something called ‘morality’. In this reading of Fuller, however, insufficient attention to what is signified by ‘morality’. Such an implied morality has been understood in terms of deontological duties, the Good life, (...) naturalism, and subjectively posited values. Each of these interpretations has a shared common denominator: namely, the distinction between ‘is’ and ‘ought’, ‘facts’ and ‘values’. Legality is said to be nested in an ‘is’ world. An ‘is’ cannot be derived from an ‘ought’. This essay aims to press this distinction further. Fuller, I intend to argue, does indeed accept the is/ought distinction as have his commentators. The associations of the ‘oughts’ with deontological duties, the Good life, naturalism and subjective values, however, have been misdirected. This has been so because Fuller presupposed that legality was a matter of a spatial structure. Non-law was situated outside the structure. If a legislator or judge considered matters outside the structure as if they were binding upon jurists and, for that matter, upon members of the legal structure, the law was not binding. The crucial incident of the structure was the boundary of the structure. Fuller’s structuralist theory of law offers the opportunity to better understand what he signified by ‘the internal morality of law’. I shall privilege several elements of his theory: the relation of legal units to a structure, the nature of a structure, the constituents of a structure (territorial space, its pillars and its matter); the forms of the legal structure; the centrifugal and centripetal structures, the structure and traditional theories of morality, the role of the legal official in a structure, and why the internal knowledge in the structure is binding. Fuller especially privileged two features of a legal structure. The one was the boundary of the structure. The second concerned the exteriority of the boundary. Both features presupposed a territorial sense view of legal knowledge. The legal mind analysed any social problem through the map of such a sense of legal space. By concentrating upon the discrete rule in isolation of the implied structural boundary to which the rule referred, commentators have attributed been misdirected in their analyses of Fuller’s theory of law and morality. My argument in this respect will proceed as follows. In order to clarify Fuller’s senses of the morality of law, I shall first outline what he means by a ‘structure’. Second, how is the structure related to legal knowledge? Third, what are the various forms of the structure? Fourth, is the structure centrifugal or centripetal? And finally, why is the structure binding? (shrink)

The evolution from pre-human primates to modern Homo sapiens is a complex one involving many domains, ranging from the material to the social to the cognitive, both at the individual and the community levels. This article focuses on a critical qualitative transition that took place during this evolution involving both the social and the cognitive domains. For the social domain, the transition is from the face-to-face forms of social interaction and organization that characterize the non-human primates that reached, with Pan, (...) a hiatus due to the centripetal effects that highly individualized behavior has on a social system. The transition is to the relation-based forms of social organization that evolved in the hominins ancestral to Homo sapiens and are universal in human societies today. For the cognitive domain, this transition involves going from behavior responding mainly to phenomenal level sensory inputs to behavior formed in accordance with the concept of a relation, initially abstracted from behavior patterns, then extending the concept of a relation beyond abstraction from behavior patterns to the concept of a relation generated recursively through constructing the relation of a relation. This extension made possible the construction of systems of relations; initially genealogical systems of relations constructed culturally using the logic of recursion, and subsequently, the symbolic, computational systems of kin term relations referred to by anthropologists as kinship terminologies. The latter are “constructed realities” in the sense this term is used by cultural anthropologists. It follows that the evolution of relation-based systems of social interaction is not adequately accounted for through population model evolutionary accounts such as the Dual Inheritance Theory of human evolution since “constructed realities” constitute collectively and publicly shared cultural knowledge rather than the individually and privately possessed knowledge that is assumed in the population model framework for human evolution. (shrink)

Artykuł traktuje o systemie politycznym typu power-sharing, który określany jest mianem centrypetalizmu (ang. centripetalism). System centrypetalny ukształtowany został w dwóch ważnych – zwłaszcza ze względu na dużą liczbę ludności, wielkość gospodarek oraz posiadane zasoby surowców energetycznych – państwach wieloetnicznych: Nigerii i Indonezji. Państwa te mają prezydencki system rządów. Centrypetalizm dopuszcza do udziału we władzy reprezentantów elit politycznych różnych grup etnicznych, stymulując ich do pojednania, współpracy i integracji politycznej w poprzek podziałów etnicznych. W ten sposób ma osłabiać znaczenie tych podziałów (...) w warunkach wieloetniczności. Szerszym celem centrypetalizmu jest ogólne zmniejszenie konfliktów w relacjach między reprezentowanymi przez elity polityczne grupami etnicznymi. Celami artykułu są: wyjaśnienie istoty centrypetalizmu; przedstawienie złożonego kontekstu etnopolitycznego w państwach, w których system ten został implementowany; omówienie głównych instytucji centrypetalizmu nigeryjskiego i indonezyjskiego; próba odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy centrypetalizm spełnia cele, dla których został ustanowiony; oraz wskazanie jego wad. (shrink)

Core-periphery imbalances and regional disparities figure prominently on the agenda of several disciplines, which result from their enormous impact on economic and social development around the world. In sociology, international relations, and economics, this concept is crucial in explanations of economic exchange. There are few countries that play a dominant role in world trade, while most countries have a secondary or even a tertiary position in world trade. Moreover, when we are discussing global, continental, regional, and national economies, we can (...) present regions and even smaller territorial units which have higher wages than some underdeveloped areas within the same larger area in focus. Such regional inequalities and injustices are the main themes of the core-periphery model, which focuses on tendencies of economic activities to concentrate around some pivotal points. It seeks to explain the spatial inequalities or imbalances observable on all levels or scales by highlighting the role of horizontal and vertical relations between various entities from the level of towns and cities to the global scale. The existence of a core-periphery structure implies that in the spatial dimension, the socioeconomic development is usually uneven. From such a geographical perspective, the regions known as the "core" are advanced in various areas, while other regions described as the "periphery" serve as a social, economic, and political backstages, backyards, and supply sources or - in some cases - are even subject to degradation and decline. Furthermore, the level of development has a negative correlation with distance from the core. The economies of the states that have gone through various stages of development at the earliest and with the fastest pace have become wealthy core regions and growth poles. Those countries and regions where these processes have been slower become or remain the poor periphery. (shrink)

Orson Scott Card and his Ender Series have had a profound impact on the genre of contemporary science fiction, meriting an academic analysis of some of his more theoretical ideas. I have chosen to analyze his concept of “Center” and “Edge” nations found in Xenocide and Children of the Mind through the lens of international relations, sociological, and political theory, in order to bring nuance to an underdeveloped theory that many non-academics may be familiar with. Ultimately, we must conclude that (...) Card’s concept of “Center” and “Edge” nations is too stagnant and does not account for social and hegemonic change, which influences the justifications of why these “nations” may be considered “Center” in the first place. (shrink)

Monografia ta traktuje o ograniczaniu konfliktów w relacjach między segmentami społecznymi (takimi jak grupy etniczne, wspólnoty religijne), w których członkostwo opiera się na podstawach askryptywnych i kulturowych, a także między nimi a władzą centralną w Nigerii i Indonezji. Państwa te mają burzliwą historię niepodległego bytu, ogromne wieloetniczne i wieloreligijne populacje, duże gospodarki oraz zasoby surowców energetycznych. Jak wskazują liczne raporty, będą wkrótce należeć do najważniejszych w świecie. W Nigerii i Indonezji funkcjonują systemy polityczne oparte na tzw. power-sharing (współrządzeniu), tj. takie, (...) które za pomocą specyficznych formalnych i nieformalnych instytucji (rozumianych jako zespoły reguł) dopuszczają do udziału we władzy elity polityczne wywodzące się z różnych segmentów etnicznych i religijnych. Celem instytucji power-sharing jest budowanie pokoju i stabilności politycznej. Autor badań, których owocem jest ta praca, dokonał identyfikacji, wyjaśnienia i analizy roli oraz genezy najistotniejszych z nich, dowodząc zarazem, że w Nigerii i Indonezji współistnieją instytucje dwóch głównych modeli power-sharing, tj. konsocjonalizmu i centrypetalizmu. W konsekwencji wykazał, że międzysegmentowe współrządzenie w obu państwach ma charakter hybrydowy. Jest to poszerzenie empirycznej teorii power-sharing. Jej klasycy, Arend Lijphart (konsocjonalista) i Donald L. Horowitz (centrypetalista), nie przywiązywali większej wagi do możliwości implementacji instytucji dwóch modeli w ramach tego samego systemu politycznego. Tymczasem w Nigerii i Indonezji łączenie instytucji centrypetalnych i konsocjonalnych przyczyniło się do ograniczenia konfliktów. (shrink)