Platons Theaitetos stellt die grundlegende Frage "Was ist Wissen?" und untersucht verschiedene erkenntnistheoretische Ansätze. Der Dialog, der maßgeblich von Sokrates dominiert wird, bindet neben Theaitetos und seinem Lehrer Theodoros auch zahlreiche vorsokratische und sokratische Denker ein. Die Arbeit analysiert die Rolle des Daimon ti – einer inneren Stimme, die vor Fehlentscheidungen warnt – im Kontext der Suche nach Erkenntnis. Dabei wird die Hypothese untersucht, ob der Daimon ti als metaphysische Instanz einen Beitrag zur Erlangung wahrer Erkenntnis leisten kann. Besonders relevant (...) ist die theologische Dimension des Dialogs, die von Platon in die Figur des Sokrates projiziert wird. Die Analyse beleuchtet, wie diese Interpretation im Einklang mit den überlieferten Positionen des historischen Sokrates zu Gott, Göttern und dem Göttlichen steht, und hinterfragt die Legitimität solcher Deutungen angesichts seines Asebieprozesses. (shrink)

In this paper I start with the familiar accusation that divine command ethics faces a "Euthyphro dilemma". By looking at what Plato’s ’Euthyphro’ actually says, I argue that no such argument against divine-command ethics was Plato’s intention, and that, in any case, no such argument is cogent. I then explore the place of divine commands and inspiration in Plato’s thought more generally, arguing that Plato sees an important epistemic and practical role for both.

Purpose: Some enigmatic remarks and behaviors of Socrates have been a subject of debate among scholars. We investigated the possibility of underlying epilepsy in Socrates by analyzing pathographic evidence in ancient literature from the viewpoint of the current understanding of seizure semiology. Methods: We performed a case study from a literature survey. Results: In 399 BCE, Socrates was tried and executed in Athens on the charge of “impiety.” His charges included the “introduction of new deities” and “not believing in the (...) gods of the state,” because he publicly claimed that he was periodically and personally receiving a “divine sign,” or daimonion, that directed him in various actions. We found textual evidence that his daimonion was probably a simple partial seizure (SPS) of temporal lobe origin. It was a brief voice that usually prohibited Socrates from initiating certain actions. It started when he was a child, and it visited Socrates unpredictably. Moreover, we found at least two descriptions of Socrates’ unique behavior that are consistent with complex partial seizures (CPSs). The fact that Socrates had been experiencing both SPSs and CPSs periodically since childhood makes the diagnosis of temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE) likely. Conclusions: We hypothesize that Socrates had a mild case of TLE without secondary generalization. This is the first report in 2,400 years to present a pathographic diagnosis of TLE in Socrates based on specific diagnostic features in the ancient textual evidence. Our study demonstrates that the knowledge of modern epileptology could help understand certain behaviors of historic figures. (shrink)

This paper argues that Socrates does not claim to be a political expert at Gorgias 521d6-8, as many scholars say. Still, Socrates does claim a special grasp of true politics. His special grasp (i) results from divine dispensation; (ii) is coherent true belief about politics; and (iii) also is Socratic wisdom about his own epistemic shortcomings. This condition falls short of expertise in two ways: Socrates sometimes lacks fully determinate answers to political questions, and he does not grasp the first (...) principles of politics. (shrink)

While much attention has been paid to the role of divine inspiration in the case of Socrates within Plato’s early and middle period dialogues, this paper examines Plato’s late period works and argues that despite the drastic changes in methodology found in dialogues such as the Sophist and Philebus, Plato still acknowledges, and emphasizes, the role played by divine inspiration in regard to Socratic knowledge.