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  1. added 2019-09-11
    Self-Deception in and Out of Illness: Are Some Subjects Responsible for Their Delusions?Quinn Hiroshi Gibson - 2017 - Palgrave Communications 15 (3):1-12.
    This paper raises a slightly uncomfortable question: are some delusional subjects responsible for their delusions? This question is uncomfortable because we typically think that the answer is pretty clearly just ‘no’. However, we also accept that self-deception is paradigmatically intentional behavior for which the self-deceiver is prima facie blameworthy. Thus, if there is overlap between self-deception and delusion, this will put pressure on our initial answer. This paper argues that there is indeed such overlap by offering a novel philosophical account (...)
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  2. added 2019-07-04
    Історії Інших у ліриці Мар’яни Савки.Iryna Borysiuk - 2018 - NaUKMA Researh Papers. Literary Studies 1:49-57.
    Статтю присвячено проблемі конструювання суб’єкта в ліриці Мар’яни Савки з погляду взаємодії Я/Іншого, що є однією з найбільш характерних рис поетики дев’яностників. Суб’єкт лірики в поезії дев’яностників мовить із перспективи приватного досвіду, оскільки саме приватне є точкою відліку в осмисленні колективного культурно-історичного досвіду. Інтермедіальні сюжети в ліриці Савки дають можливість суб’єкту лірики побачити й пізнати себе крізь проекцію мистецького твору. Тілесний, приватний досвід суб’єкта є рамкою осмислення досвіду Іншого – саме так конструюється комунікативна пам’ять у ліриці Мар’яни Савки.
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  3. added 2019-06-30
    Review of Papish, Laura. Kant on Evil, Self-Deception and Moral Reform. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. 280. $74.13 (Cloth). [REVIEW]Samuel J. M. Kahn - forthcoming - Ethics.
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  4. added 2019-05-18
    What Does Emotion Teach Us About Self-Deception? Affective Neuroscience in Support of Non-Intentionalism.Federico Lauria & Delphine Preissmann - 2018 - Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 13 (2):70-94.
    Intuitively, affect plays an indispensable role in self-deception’s dynamic. Call this view “affectivism.” Investigating affectivism matters, as affectivists argue that this conception favours the non-intentionalist approach to self-deception and offers a unified account of straight and twisted self-deception. However, this line of argument has not been scrutinized in detail, and there are reasons to doubt it. Does affectivism fulfill its promises of non-intentionalism and unity? We argue that it does, as long as affect’s role in self-deception lies in affective filters—that (...)
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  5. added 2018-09-26
    Reconciling Practical Knowledge with Self-Deception.Eric Marcus - forthcoming - Mind:fzy061.
    Is it impossible for a person to do something intentionally without knowing that she is doing it? The phenomenon of self-deceived agency might seem to show otherwise. Here the agent is not (at least in a straightforward sense) lying, but yet disavows a correct description of her intentional action. This disavowal might seem expressive of ignorance. However, I show that the self-deceived agent does know what she’s doing. I argue that we should understand the factors that explain self-deception as masking (...)
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  6. added 2018-09-22
    Sich in die eigene Tasche lügen? Selbsttäuschung als irrationales Projekt.Amber Griffioen - 2017 - PHILOKLES: Zeitschrift Für Populäre Philosophie 21:4-23.
    This article for the PHILOKLES Journal for Popular Philosophy surveys a few common theoretical approaches to the phenomenon of self-deception before putting forward a thus far relatively unexplored intentionalist option, namely what the author calls the "project model of self-deception". On this model, self-deception is understood as a dynamic, diachronic activity, aimed at the preservation of a certain self-image, to which an agent is implicitly committed. The author shows how this model can make subjects responsible for their self-deceptions without running (...)
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  7. added 2018-09-22
    Don’T Step on the Foul Line: On the (Ir)Rationality of Superstition in Baseball.Amber Griffioen - 2013 - Logique Et Analyse 56 (223):319-32.
    Baseball is an exceptionally superstitious sport. But what are we to say about the rationality of such superstitious behavior? On the one hand, we can trace much of the superstitious behavior we see in baseball to a type of irrational belief. But how deep does this supposed irrationality run? It appears that superstitions may occupy various places on the spectrum of irrationality — from motivated ignorance to self-deception to psychological compulsion —depending on the type of superstitious belief at work and (...)
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  8. added 2018-01-05
    The Irrational Project: Toward a Different Understanding of Self-Deception.Amber Leigh Griffioen - 2010 - Iowa Research Online.
    This dissertation focuses on questions regarding the metaphysical and psychological possibility of self-deception and attempts to show that self-deception is a phenomenon best characterized as both motivated and intentional, such that self-deceivers can be held responsible for their deceptions in a stronger sense than that of being merely epistemically negligent. -/- In Chapter One, I introduce the paradoxes of self-deception, which arise when one attempts to draw a close analogy between self- and other-deception, and I discuss the various ways in (...)
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  9. added 2017-05-10
    Self-Deception as Affective Coping. An Empirical Perspective on Philosophical Issues.Federico Lauria, Delphine Preissmann & Fabrice Clément - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 41:119-134.
    In the philosophical literature, self-deception is mainly approached through the analysis of paradoxes. Yet, it is agreed that self-deception is motivated by protection from distress. In this paper, we argue, with the help of findings from cognitive neuroscience and psychology, that self-deception is a type of affective coping. First, we criticize the main solutions to the paradoxes of self-deception. We then present a new approach to self-deception. Self-deception, we argue, involves three appraisals of the distressing evidence: (a) appraisal of the (...)
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  10. added 2017-05-06
    An Agentive Non-Intentionalist Theory of Self-Deception.Kevin Lynch - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):779-798.
    The self-deception debate often appears polarized between those who think that self-deceivers intentionally deceive themselves (‘intentionalists’), and those who think that intentional actions are not significantly involved in the production of self-deceptive beliefs at all. In this paper I develop a middle position between these views, according to which self-deceivers do end up self-deceived as a result of their own intentional actions, but where the intention these actions are done with is not an intention to deceive oneself. This account thus (...)
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  11. added 2016-12-16
    Can Anosognosia Vindicate Traditionalism About Self-Deception?José Eduardo Porcher - 2015 - Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 44 (2):206-217.
    The traditional conception of self-deception takes it for an intrapersonal form of interpersonal deception. However, since the same subject is at the same time deceiver and deceived, this means attributing the agent a pair of contradictory beliefs. In the course of defending a deflationary conception of self-deception, Mele [1997] has challenged traditionalists to present convincing evidence that there are cases of self-deception in which what he calls the dual belief-requirement is satisfied. Levy [2009] has responded to this challenge affirming that (...)
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  12. added 2016-12-08
    Davidson on Rationality and Irrationality.Simone Gozzano - 1999 - In Mario De Caro (ed.), Interpretations and Causes. New Perspectives on Donald Davidson's Philosophy. Dordrecht: Synthese Library, Kluwer.
    In this paper I argue that Davidson's solution to the paradoxes of irrationality is incompatible with his holistic assumption on the mental.
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  13. added 2016-03-28
    On Making Sense of Oneself: Reflections on Julian Barnes's The Sense of an Ending.Dhananjay Jagannathan - 2015 - Philosophy and Literature 39 (1A):106-121.
    Life can be awful. For this to be the stuff of tragedy and not farce, we require a capacity to be more than we presently are. Tony Webster, the narrator of Julian Barnes’s The Sense of an Ending, poses a challenge to this commitment of ethics in his commentary on the instability of memory. But Barnes leads us past this difficulty by showing us that Tony’s real problem is his inability to make sense of himself—a failure of self-knowledge. Tony’s past (...)
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  14. added 2015-12-14
    From Self-Deception to Self-Control.Vasco Correia - 2014 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 14 (3):309-323.
    ‘Intentionalist’ approaches portray self-deceivers as “akratic believers”, subjects who deliberately choose to believe p despite knowing that p is false. In this paper I argue that the intentionalist model leads to a number of paradoxes that seem to undermine it. I claim that these paradoxes can nevertheless be overcome in light of the rival hypothesis that self-deception is a non-intentional process that stems from the influence of emotions upon cognitive processes. Furthermore, I propose a motivational interpretation of the phenomenon of (...)
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  15. added 2015-11-05
    Self-Deception and the Selectivity Problem.Marko Jurjako - 2013 - Balkan Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):151-162.
    In this article I discuss and evaluate the selectivity problem as a problem put forward by Bermudez (1997, 2000) against anti-intentionalist accounts of self-deception. I argue that the selectivity problem can be raised even against intentionalist accounts, which reveals the too demanding constraint that the problem puts on the adequacy of a psychological explanation of action. Finally I try to accommodate the intuitions that support the cogency of the selectivity problem using the resources from the framework provided by an anti-intentionalist (...)
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  16. added 2015-07-26
    Self-Deception Won't Make You Happy.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2009 - Social Theory and Practice 35 (1):107-132.
    I argue here that self-deception is not conducive to happiness. There is a long train of thought in social psychology that seems to say that it is, but proper understanding of the data does not yield this conclusion. Illusion must be distinguished from mere imagining. Self-deception must be distinguished from self-inflation bias and from self-fulfilling belief. Once these distinctions are in place, the case for self-deception falls apart. Furthermore, by yielding false beliefs, self-deception undermines desire satisfaction. Finally, I argue for (...)
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  17. added 2015-07-26
    Keeping Self-Deception in Perspective.Lawrence Lengbeyer - 1998 - In Jean-Pierre Dupuy (ed.), Self-Deception and Paradoxes of Rationality. CSLI Publications.
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  18. added 2015-05-24
    Willful Ignorance and Self-Deception.Kevin Lynch - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):505-523.
    Willful ignorance is an important concept in criminal law and jurisprudence, though it has not received much discussion in philosophy. When it is mentioned, however, it is regularly assumed to be a kind of self-deception. In this article I will argue that self-deception and willful ignorance are distinct psychological kinds. First, some examples of willful ignorance are presented and discussed, and an analysis of the phenomenon is developed. Then it is shown that current theories of self-deception give no support to (...)
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  19. added 2015-05-09
    Prospects for an Intentionalist Theory of Self-Deception.Kevin Lynch - 2009 - Abstracta 5 (2):126-138.
    A distinction can be made between those who think that self-deception is frequently intentional and those who don’t. I argue that the idea that self-deception has to be intentional can be partly traced to a particular invalid method for analyzing reflexive expressions of the form ‘Ving oneself’ (where V stands for a verb). However, I take the question of whether intentional self-deception is possible to be intrinsically interesting, and investigate the prospects for such an alleged possibility. Various potential strategies of (...)
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  20. added 2015-01-31
    Is Self-Deception Pretense?José Eduardo Porcher - 2014 - Manuscrito 37 (2):291-332.
    I assess Tamar Gendler's (2007) account of self-deception according to which its characteristic state is not belief, but imaginative pretense. After giving an overview of the literature and presenting the conceptual puzzles engendered by the notion of self-deception, I introduce Gendler's account, which emerges as a rival to practically all extant accounts of self-deception. I object to it by first arguing that her argument for abandoning belief as the characteristic state of self-deception conflates the state of belief and the process (...)
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  21. added 2014-04-02
    Self-Deception and Shifts of Attention.Kevin Lynch - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (1):63-75.
    A prevalent assumption among philosophers who believe that people can intentionally deceive themselves (intentionalists) is that they accomplish this by controlling what evidence they attend to. This article is concerned primarily with the evaluation of this claim, which we may call ‘attentionalism’. According to attentionalism, when one justifiably believes/suspects that not-p but wishes to make oneself believe that p, one may do this by shifting attention away from the considerations supportive of the belief that not-p and onto considerations supportive of (...)
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  22. added 2014-04-01
    Self-Deception and Stubborn Belief.Kevin Lynch - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (6):1337-1345.
    Stubborn belief, like self-deception, is a species of motivated irrationality. The nature of stubborn belief, however, has not been investigated by philosophers, and it is something that poses a challenge to some prominent accounts of self-deception. In this paper, I argue that the case of stubborn belief constitutes a counterexample to Alfred Mele’s proposed set of sufficient conditions for self-deception, and I attempt to distinguish between the two. The recognition of this phenomenon should force an amendment in this account, and (...)
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  23. added 2014-04-01
    On the “Tension” Inherent in Self-Deception.Kevin Lynch - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):433-450.
    Alfred Mele's deflationary account of self-deception has frequently been criticised for being unable to explain the ?tension? inherent in self-deception. These critics maintain that rival theories can better account for this tension, such as theories which suppose self-deceivers to have contradictory beliefs. However, there are two ways in which the tension idea has been understood. In this article, it is argued that on one such understanding, Mele's deflationism can account for this tension better than its rivals, but only if we (...)
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  24. added 2014-04-01
    Self-Deception, Religious Belief, and the False Belief Condition.Kevin Lynch - 2010 - Heythrop Journal 51 (6):1073-1074.
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  25. added 2014-04-01
    Self-Deception and Confabulation.William Hirstein - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):S418-S429.
    Cases in which people are self-deceived seem to require that the person hold two contradictory beliefs, something which appears to be impossible or implausible. A phenomenon seen in some brain-damaged patients known as confabulation (roughly, an ongoing tendency to make false utterances without intent to deceive) can shed light on the problem of self-deception. The conflict is not actually between two beliefs, but between two representations, a 'conceptual' one and an 'analog' one. In addition, confabulation yields valuable clues about the (...)
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  26. added 2014-03-19
    Depth Psychology and Self-Deception.Robert Lockie - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):127-148.
    This paper argues that self-deception cannot be explained without employing a depth-psychological ("psychodynamic") notion of the unconscious, and therefore that mainstream academic psychology must make space for such approaches. The paper begins by explicating the notion of a dynamic unconscious. Then a brief account is given of the "paradoxes" of self-deception. It is shown that a depth-psychological self of parts and subceptive agency removes any such paradoxes. Next, several competing accounts of self-deception are considered: an attentional account, a constructivist account, (...)
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  27. added 2014-03-18
    Self-Deception and Delusions.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (1):109-124.
    My central question in this paper is how delusional beliefs are related to self-deception. In section 1, I summarize my position on what self-deception is and how representative instances of it are to be explained. I turn to delusions in section 2, where I focus on the Capgras delusion, delusional jealousy (or the Othello syndrome), and the reverse Othello syndrome.
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  28. added 2014-03-15
    Spiritual Blindness, Self-Deception and Morally Culpable Nonbelief.Kevin Kinghorn - 2007 - Heythrop Journal 48 (4):527–545.
    While we may not be able simply to choose what we believe, there is still scope for culpability for what we come to belief. I explore here the distinction between culpable and non-culpable theistic unbelief, investigating the process of self-deception to which we can voluntarily contribute in cases where we do become culpable for failing to believe something.
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  29. added 2014-03-11
    Kierkegaard and the Search for Self‐Knowledge.Daniel Watts - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):525-549.
    In the first part of this essay (Sections I and II), I argue that Kierkegaard's work helps us to articulate and defend two basic requirements on searching for knowledge of one's own judgements: first, that searching for knowledge whether one judges that P requires trying to make a judgement whether P; and second that, in an important range of cases, searching for knowledge of one's own judgements requires attending to how one's acts of judging are performed. In the second part (...)
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  30. added 2014-03-09
    Brain Fiction: Self-Deception and the Riddle of Confabulation.William Hirstein - 2005 - MIT Press.
    [This download contains the Table of Contents and Chapter 1.] This first book-length study of confabulation breaks ground in both philosophy and cognitive science.
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  31. added 2012-11-23
    Review of Robert Trivers' The Folly of Fools: The Logic of Deceit and Self-Deception in Human Life[REVIEW]Neil Van Leeuwen - 2013 - Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 18 (1-2):146-151.
    Here I review Robert Trivers' 2011 book _The Folly of Fools_, in which he advocates the evolutionary theory of deceit and self-deception that he pioneered in his famous preface to Richard Dawkins' _Selfish Gene_. Although the book contains a wealth of interesting discussion on topics ranging from warfare to immunology, I find it lacking on two major fronts. First, it fails to give a proper argument for its central thesis--namely, that self-deception evolved to facilitate deception of others. Second, the book (...)
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  32. added 2012-11-13
    When Are We Self-Deceived?Alfred Mele - 2012 - Humana Mente Journal of Philosophical Studies (20).
    This article‘s point of departure is a proto-analysis that I have suggested of entering self-deception in acquiring a belief and an associated set of jointly sufficient conditions for self-deception that I have proposed. Partly with the aim of fleshing out an important member of the proposed set of conditions, I provide a sketch of my view about how selfdeception happens. I then return to the proposed set of jointly sufficient conditions and offer a pair of amendments.
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  33. added 2012-10-18
    Who Am I? Beyond 'I Think, Therefore I Am'.Alex Voorhoeve, Frances Kamm, Elie During, Timothy Wilson & David Jopling - 2011 - Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1234:134-148.
    Can we ever truly answer the question, “Who am I?” Moderated by Alex Voorhoeve (London School of Economics), neuro-philosopher Elie During (University of Paris, Ouest Nanterre), cognitive scientist David Jopling (York University, Canada), social psychologist Timothy Wilson (University of Virginia),and ethicist Frances Kamm (Harvard University) examine the difficulty of achieving genuine self-knowledge and how the pursuit of self-knowledge plays a role in shaping the self.
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  34. added 2011-11-11
    Self-Deception.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
    In this entry, I seek to show the interdependence of questions about self-deception in philosophy of mind, psychology, and ethics. I taxonomize solutions to the paradoxes of self-deception, present possible psychological mechanisms behind it, and highlight how different approaches to the philosophy of mind and psychology will affect how we answer important ethical questions. Is self-deception conducive to happiness? How does self-deception affect responsibility? Is there something intrinsically wrong with self-deception? The entry, on the one hand, is a tour of (...)
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  35. added 2010-04-22
    The Motivational Role of Belief.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (2):219 - 246.
    This paper claims that the standard characterization of the motivational role of belief should be supplemented. Beliefs do not only, jointly with desires, cause and rationalize actions that will satisfy the desires, if the beliefs are true; beliefs are also the practical ground of other cognitive attitudes, like imagining, which means beliefs determine whether and when one acts with those other attitudes as the cognitive inputs into choices and practical reasoning. In addition to arguing for this thesis, I take issue (...)
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  36. added 2010-02-08
    An Evolutionary Explanation of Self-Deception.Robert C. Robinson - 2007 - Falsafeh 35 (3).
    Abstract: In Chapter 4 of his "Self-Deception Unmasked" (SDU), Al Mele considers several (attempted) empirical demonstrations of self-deception. These empirical demonstrations work under the conception of what Mele refers to as the 'dual-belief requirement', in which an agent simultaneously holds a belief p and a belief ~p. Toward the end of this chapter, Mele considers the argument of one biologist and anthropologist, Robert Trivers, who describes what he takes to be an evolutionary explanation for coming to form false beliefs. Mele (...)
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  37. added 2009-11-06
    The Spandrels of Self-Deception: Prospects for a Biological Theory of a Mental Phenomenon.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (3):329 – 348.
    Three puzzles about self-deception make this mental phenomenon an intriguing explanatory target. The first relates to how to define it without paradox; the second is about how to make sense of self-deception in light of the interpretive view of the mental that has become widespread in philosophy; and the third concerns why it exists at all. In this paper I address the first and third puzzles. First, I define self-deception. Second, I criticize Robert Trivers' attempt to use adaptionist evolutionary psychology (...)
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  38. added 2008-12-31
    Finite Rational Self-Deceivers.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (2):191 - 208.
    I raise three puzzles concerning self-deception: (i) a conceptual paradox, (ii) a dilemma about how to understand human cognitive evolution, and (iii) a tension between the fact of self-deception and Davidson’s interpretive view. I advance solutions to the first two and lay a groundwork for addressing the third. The capacity for self-deception, I argue, is a spandrel, in Gould’s and Lewontin’s sense, of other mental traits, i.e., a structural byproduct. The irony is that the mental traits of which self-deception is (...)
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  39. added 2008-12-31
    The Product of Self-Deception.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (3):419 - 437.
    I raise the question of what cognitive attitude self-deception brings about. That is: what is the product of self-deception? Robert Audi and Georges Rey have argued that self-deception does not bring about belief in the usual sense, but rather “avowal” or “avowed belief.” That means a tendency to affirm verbally (both privately and publicly) that lacks normal belief-like connections to non-verbal actions. I contest their view by discussing cases in which the product of self-deception is implicated in action in a (...)
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