Vacuity, vanity, proposal of a elapsed time fadeaway, an essay in portuguese language, soon on english.

This note briefly discusses the observation of elapsed time in a flat universe while exploring the argument of past-eternal time versus emergent time in cosmology. A flat universe with an incomplete past forever has a finite age. Despite an infinite number of Planck time coordinates independent of phenomena and endless expansion, a flat universe never develops an age with an infinite number of Planck times. This observation indicates the impossibility of infinitely elapsed time in the future or past, which limits (...) acceptable scientific models of cosmology. (shrink)

Youthness and Aging, Time elapsed and relapsed memory, between lollenyness and secrecy about our desires, in front of openess and the back of the Ego.

Seventy-seven years have elapsed since the Sylhet referendum (July 6 & 7, 1947). The part of Sylhet that was scissored during the partition and the Bengalis who came from the other side are still carrying the deep wound of the curse of that partition, compromising with the marginalization. Moreover, the Bengalis of the state are facing a special identity crisis as a result of the nationwide skepticism about the status of Bengalis in Assam. Following the Sylhet referendum, the curse of (...) the Sylhet bifurcation, that is, the second partition of Sylhet is still haunting them. The article attempts to illustrate a chronological analysis of the context and consequences of this century-long language tussle leading to persistent racial conflict and the other consequences relating to identity and citizenship. (shrink)

The Julius Blumfeld review (the review) of Escape from Leviathan (EfL) includes various kind words and especially welcome criticisms. This reply attempts to respond to the criticisms as best as it can. There have been further replies to criticisms, additional articles, and even books clarifying and developing this overall philosophical theory of libertarianism in the time that has elapsed since the first version of this reply. Consequently, it is now possible to revise it to make it somewhat clearer.

Though almost forty years have elapsed since its first publication, it is a testament to the philosophical acumen of its author that 'The Matter of Chance' contains much that is of continued interest to the philosopher of science. Mellor advances a sophisticated propensity theory of chance, arguing that this theory makes better sense than its rivals (in particular subjectivist, frequentist, logical and classical theories) of ‘what professional usage shows to be thought true of chance’ (p. xi) – in particular ‘that (...) chance is objective, empirical and not relational, and that it applies to the single case’ (ibid.). The book is short and dense, with the serious philosophical content delivered thick and fast. There is little by way of road-mapping or summarising to assist the reader: the introduction is hardly expansive and the concluding paragraph positively perfunctory. The result is that the book is often difficult going, and the reader is made to work hard to ensure correct understanding of the views expressed. On the other hand, the author’s avoidance of unnecessary use of formalism and jargon ensures that the book is still reasonably accessible. In the following, I shall first summarise the key features of Mellor’s propensity theory, and then offer a few critical remarks. (shrink)

In this paper Kant's "perpetual peace" is being interpreted as a realistic utopia. Kant's "perpetual peace" remains an utopia even today in the sense that the described perpetual world peace is still a long way to go from today's state of world politics. But Kant also tried to show that the utopian scenario is possible under realistic assumptions. Therefore this essay examines the question, if Kant's basic assumptions - such as for example the assumption that democracies are generally non aggressive (...) - are still valid in the light of the political experiences of the two centuries that have elapsed since the publication of the "perpetual peace" and how the realisation of Kant's utopia can best be promoted in today's situation. (shrink)

To discover affects within Husserl’s texts designates a difficult investigation; it points to a theme of which these texts were forced to speak, even as they were explicitly speaking of regional ontologies and the foundations of sciences. For we may at first wonder: where can affection find a positive role in the rigor of a pure philosophy that seeks to account for its phenomena from within the immanence of consciousness? Does this not mean that the very passivity and foreignness of (...) affect will be overlooked; will it not be continually linked to a Vorstellung that issues as a ray of the pure ego? That is, will the phenomenological account of affect be reduced to the cognition of an object, as Emmanuel Levinas suggests? Yet there are affects in Husserl’s texts that maintain their autonomy and resist subsumption to an objectivating intentionality.We may see this in the Lectures On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time: in the longitudinal intentionality of retention, through which consciousness becomes aware of its elapsed phases without making them into objects—a passive synthesis that gives the flow of time-constituting consciousness the form of a continually deferred auto-affection.1We find it again as early as the fifth Logical Investigation, 2 providing us with the impetus to radicalize Husserlian phenomenology. (shrink)

A new dimension beyond criticism, pessimism and dispute.

This paper is a commemorative contribution on the occasion of the eight decades that have already elapsed since the publication of Sein und Zeit (1927), the work by Martin Heidegger which perhaps has become in the meantime – considerating the enormous scope of its contemporary influence – the most important philosophical treatise of the 20th century. One must draw attention to the fact that it is not purported an elaboration of the work’s reception, which can be almost imposible to embrace (...) in its entirety for it can well be structured in several phases. There is rather an introductory approach to the manuscript’s history before its publication; purpose that can be seen as a more concrete and less ambitious goal in comparison to the main one, which is nothing but to outline the work’s central topics and the pretentions that it has pursued and carried out. (shrink)

Having agreed to review Tucson 2004, I am embarrassed to admit that I fell asleep eight times during the conference. This cannot have been entirely due to jet lag as I only fell asleep once in 1998, twice in 2000, and four times in 2002. It seems to be a geometric progression correlating with elapsed time. As this was the tenth anniversary conference several speakers indulged in nostalgic reminiscences, but I thought that readers of JCS might prefer a less rose-tinted (...) account which, among other things, might elucidate the dynamics of falling asleep at conferences. (shrink)

Hájek has recently presented the following paradox. You are certain that a cable guy will visit you tomorrow between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. but you have no further information about when. And you agree to a bet on whether he will come in the morning interval (8, 12] or in the afternoon interval (12, 4). At first, you have no reason to prefer one possibility rather than the other. But you soon realise that there will definitely be a future (...) time at which you will (rationally) assign higher probability to an afternoon arrival than a morning one, due to time elapsing. You are also sure there may not be a future time at which you will (rationally) assign a higher probability to a morning arrival than an afternoon one. It would therefore appear that you ought to bet on an afternoon arrival. The paradox is based on the apparent incompatibility of the principle of expected utility and principles of diachronic rationality which are prima facie plausible. Hájek concludes that the latter are false, but doesn't provide a clear diagnosis as to why. We endeavour to further our understanding of the paradox by providing such a diagnosis. (shrink)

Aristotle’s process of constituting the notion of time through Phy., Δ, 10 to Phy., Δ, 12 has the following steps: 1) Time and not-being Since one part of time ‘has been and is not, while the other is going to be and is not yet … one would naturally suppose that what is made up of things which do not exist could have no share in reality.’ (Phy., Δ, 10) 2) Time, divisibility and now We should not regard time as (...) something divisible to parts, some of which belong to past and some other to future. Aristotle argues that ‘if a divisible thing is to exist, it is necessary that, when it exists, all or some of its parts must exist. But of time some parts have been, while others have to be, and no part of it is though it is divisible.’ The last phrase, namely ‘no part of it is’ is based on the fact that ‘what is ‘now’ is not a part.’ The reason being that ‘a part is a measure of the whole, which must be made up of parts. Time, on the other hand, is not held to be made up of ‘nows.’’ (Phy., Δ, 10) 3) Time is not motion Aristotle rejects a general belief based on which time is ‘motion and a kind of change’ because while ‘the change or movement of each thing is only in the thing which changes or where the thing itself which moves or changes may chance to be,’ ‘time is present equally everywhere.’ (Phy., Δ, 10) 4) Time cannot exist without change Although time is not motion or change, it cannot exist without change. One evidence of this, Aristotle says, is the state of our own minds: when it ‘does not change at all or we have not noticed its changing, we do not realize that time has elapsed. Therefore, ‘time is neither movement nor independent of movement.’ (Phy., Δ, 11) 5) Time and before-after Aristotle argues that since ‘before’ and ‘after’ hold primarily in place and in magnitude, they must hold in movement as well due to their correspondence. In fact, ‘the ‘before’ and ‘after’ is identical in substratum with motion, yet differ from it in definition, and is not identical with motion.’ Thereupon, since time and movement correspond wit heach other, they must also hold in time. In fact, there is some kind of unity between motion and before-after: ‘We apprehend time only when we have marked motion, marking it by ‘before’ and ‘after’: and it is only when we have perceived ‘before’ and ‘after’ in motion that we say that time has elapsed. Now we mark them by judging that A and B are different, and that some third thing is intermediate to them. When we think of the extremes as different from the middle and the mind pronounces that the ‘nows’ are two, one before and one after, it is then that we say that there is time, and this that we say is time. For what is bounded by the ‘now’ is thought to be time.’ (Phy., Δ, 11) 6) Time: number of motion in respect of before and after ‘When we perceive the ‘now’ one, and neither as before and after in a motion nor as an identity but in relation to a ‘before’ and an ‘after.’ No item is thought to have elapsed, because there has been no motion either. On the other hand, when we perceive a ‘before’ and an ‘after,’ then we say that there is time. For time is just this- number of motion in respect of ‘before’ and ‘after.’ 7) Time, enumeration and number The consequence of the relation of time and number of motion in respect of before and after is that time is ‘movement in so far as it admits of enumeration.’ A proof of this, Aristotle says, is that ‘we discriminate the more or less by number, but more or less movement by time.’ Therefore, we can say ‘time is a kind of number.’ (Phy., Δ, 11) In this analogy, Aristotle corresponds ‘now’ to the unit of number. ‘If there were no time, there would be no now, and vice versa. Just as the moving body and its locomotion involve each other mutually, so too do the number of the moving body and the number of its locomotion. For the number of the locomotion is time, while the ‘now’ corresponds to the moving body, and is like the unit of the number.’ (Phy., Δ, 11) And this now is not the same during the movement but always different because body carried is different. (Phy., Δ, 11) Aristotle clarifies the sense of number he assigns to time: ‘Time is not number in the sense in which there is ‘number’ of the same point because it is beginning and end, but rather as the extremities of a line from a number, and not as the parts of the line do so… and further because obviously the ‘now’ is no part of time nor the section any part of the movement, any more than the points are parts of the time- for it is two lines that are parts of one line.’ (Phy., Δ, 11) Aristotle distinguishes two senses of now: i) now in the sense of a boundary and ii) now in the sense of number. It is only the second sense of ‘now’ that is time because it is only the second sense that belongs to other things. The first sense belongs only to that which it bounds. (Phy., Δ, 11) 8) Time and measure ‘Not only do we measure the movement by the time, but also the time by the movement because they define each other. The time marks the movement, since it is the number, and the movement the time. We describe the time as much or little, measuring it by the movement, just as we know the number by what is numbered, e.g. the number of the horses by one horse as the unit. (Phy., Δ, 11) Therefore, ‘time is a measure of motion and of being moved, and it measures the motion by determining a motion which will measure exactly the whole motion, as the cubit does the length by determining an amount which will measure out the whole. (Phy., Δ, 12) . (shrink)

religion, between self realization and desire.

happyness porsued by a robot, realization of futuristic and transcendent dreams of man.