After a discussion of the fundamental tropes of Rorty’s philosophy, in and beyond Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, and after describing an imaginary conversation between Rorty, Heidegger, Derrida, and Dewey, the paper- a sort of monography in a nutshell- aims to shed new light on the strategic figure of the ironist as developed by Rorty in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Who really is the Rortyan ironist? A comparison between the ironist and the Platonic character of Callicles clearly shows that (...) Rorty’s irony does not correspond to Socratic or Platonic irony. From a close reading of relevant texts three ideas emerge: first, one can take an ironic stance despite its ability to support divergent metaphysical premises –Callicles is ironic in tone but foundationalist in metaphysics- while Rorty’s pragmatist appears ironic in tone and anti-foundationalist in metaphysics. Second, Callicles is a sort of public ironist; he feels pathos for the demos and the Athenian popular assembly, while the Rorty’s ironist appears as a private ironist looking for a hypothetical and detached conversation. And third, from the theatrical and literary point of view, Rorty’s ironist lacks the Greek character, the Greek mask, and Greek comicality. (shrink)

Richard Rorty’s conception of literature has been criticised more than acclaimed. While Rorty certainly has impacted literary studies, a comprehensive account of his understanding of literature is still lacking. Moreover, while literature is seen as significant to his later work, the philosophical role this plays in Rortyan thought is underexamined and underappreciated. This paper aims to provide an account of the role of literature and the “literary” in Rorty’s philosophy and the functions he assigns to literature and poetry – in (...) a broad and narrow sense – in democratic cultures. Beginning with an account of Rorty’s conceptions of metaphor and “unfamiliar” language, it draws on this to explain Rorty’s parallel view of literature in the “narrower sense” as playing the same role in culture as metaphors do in language. “Stimulating” literature unsettles settled selves and beliefs and expands human imagination. Using Rorty’s readings of Lolita and 1984 as examples, it shows that to him, literature not only plays a part in increasing empathy and solidarity but has a distinct therapeutic epistemological task: it helps individuals and societies adopt a more pluralist, ironist, post-metaphysical outlook. Both are important democratic functions. For these reasons, Rorty recommends that we work to realise a “literary” culture that rejects any ontologically inflected distinctions between kinds of texts, where philosophy becomes comparative “literary” criticism, and we see literature in the “narrower sense” as equally necessary material for making selves, communities and just institutions as any philosophical or political treatise. (shrink)

Just days after the election of Donald Trump to the presidency of the United States, specific passages from American philosopher Richard Rorty’s 1998 book were shared thousands of times on social media. Both and wrote about Rorty’s prophecy and its apparent realization, as within the haze that followed this unexpected victory, Rorty seemed to offer a presciently trenchant analysis of what led to the rise of “strong man” Trump. However, in this paper, Forstenzer points to Rorty’s own potential intellectual responsibility (...) in the unfolding crisis of liberal democracy. -/- This paper seeks to elucidate the relationship between Rorty’s liberal ironism and contemporary post-truth politics. While the paper ultimately concludes that Rorty is not causally responsible and thus not complicit with the rise of post-truth politics, it contends that Rorty’s philosophical project bears some intellectual responsibility for the onset of post-truth politics insofar as it took a complacent attitude towards the dangers associated with over-affirming the contingency of our epistemic practices in public debate. In the last instance, this paper argues that Rorty’s complacency is a pragmatic failure and thus cuts to the heart of his pragmatism. (shrink)

This paper introduces Richard Rorty’s notion of the liberal ironist and his vision of a liberal utopia and explores the implications of these for philosophical questions concerning morality, as well as morality in general. Rorty’s assertions of the contingency of language, society and self are explored. Under the contingency of language, the figure of the ironist is defined, and Rorty’s conception of vocabularies is discussed. Under the contingency of society, Rorty’s definition of liberalism, his opposition of literary culture to materialist (...) and metaphysical culture, and his notions concerning utopian politics are discussed. Under the contingency of self, Rorty’s critique of Kantian and his appropriations of Deweyan and Freudian conceptions of morality are presented. Other key factors discussed are Rorty’s theory of the separation of the private and public spheres of life and his ideas concerning cruelty and human solidarity. In this way, a critical analysis of Rorty’s proposed balance between private, ironic doubt and public, liberal social hope is presented and assessed in terms of its merit as a system of thought suited to the needs of post-metaphysical, liberal societies. (shrink)

This chapter presents David Foster Wallace's views about three positions regarding the good life—ironism, hedonism, and narrative theories. Ironism involves distancing oneself from everything one says or does, and putting on Wallace's so-called “mask of ennui.” Wallace said that the notion appeals to ironists because it insulates them from criticism. However, he reiterated that ironists can be criticized for failing to value anything. Hedonism states that a good life consists in pleasure. Wallace rejected such a notion, doubting that (...) pleasure could play a fundamental role in the good life. Lastly, narrative theories characterize the good life by fidelity to a unified narrative -- a systematic story about one's life, composed of a set of ends or principles according to which one lives. Wallace believed that these theories turn people into spectators, rather than the participants in their own lives. (shrink)

Social and political concepts are indispensable yet historically and culturally variable in a way that poses a challenge: how can we reconcile confident commitment to them with awareness of their contingency? In this article, we argue that available responses to this problem—Foundationalism, Ironism, and Right Wittgensteinianism—are unsatisfactory. Instead, we draw on the work of Bernard Williams to tease out and develop a Left Wittgensteinian response. In present-day pluralistic and historically self-conscious societies, mere confidence in our concepts is not enough. (...) For modern individuals who are ineluctably aware of conceptual change, engaged concept-use requires reasonable confidence, and in the absence of rational foundations, the possibility of reasonable confidence is tied to the possibility of critically discriminating between conceptual practices worth endorsing and those worth rejecting. We show that Left Wittgensteinianism offers such a basis for critical discrimination through point-based explanations of conceptual practices which relate them to the needs of concept-users. We end by considering how Left Wittgensteinianism guides our understanding of how conceptual practices can be revised in the face of new needs. (shrink)

This paper revisits the rhetorics of system and irony in Fichte and Friedrich Schlegel in order to theorize the utopic operation and standpoint that, I argue, system and irony share. Both system and irony transport the speculative speaker to the impossible zero point preceding and suspending the construction of any binary terms or the world itself—an immanent nonplace (of the in-itself, nothingness, or chaos) that cannot be inscribed into the world's regime of comprehensibility and possibility. It is because the philosopher (...) and the ironist articulate their speech immanently from this standpoint that system and irony are positioned as incomprehensible to those framed rhetorically as incapable of occupying it. This standpoint is philosophically important, I maintain, because it allows one to think how the (comprehensibility of the) world is constructed without being bound to the necessity of this construction or having to absolutize the way things are or can be. (shrink)

In his Contingency, Irony, Solidarity, Richard Rorty argues that one can be both a liberal and also an antifoundationalist ironist committed to private self creation. The liberal commitments of Rorty's ironists are likely to be in conflict with his commitment to self creation, since many identities will undercut commitments to reducing suffering. I turn to the antifoundationalist Buddhist Madhyamaka tradition to offer an example of a version of antifoundationalism that escapes this dilemma. The Madhyamaka Buddhist, I argue, because of his (...) careful analysis into the unsatisfactory nature of existence, is motivated to adopt only identities that are committed to eliminating the suffering of self and others. Therefore, his compassion for others is not in tension with a commitment to private self-creation. (shrink)

It might, at first sight, seem objectionable to compare Kant and Rorty in terms of their respective irony, for two reasons. First, usually, irony is not considered to be a striking stylistic feature in Kant, whereas it is a key concept in Rorty´s political philosophy. Second, Rorty's liberal ironist is the prototype of the edified individual in post-modern civil society who has overcome metaphysics of both realms: nature and morals. It just is proposed as a remedy against all forms of (...) political foundationalism. However, in his minor political works of the 90s, Kant´s style is marked by his use of irony. Irony performs several functions: it is a polemic device, a means of persuasion, and a safeguard against those who might otherwise take his critical appreciation of political custom too personal. Moreover, Kant's political foundationalism is intertwined with his philosophy of history. Arguably, Kant treats the contingency of historic events with due regard and, hence, his political outlook must not be considered to be vindicatory. Irony, therefore, might, though seemingly un-Kantian at the outset, be a clue to the differences, and, perhaps, in contrast with Rorty´s distancing himself from Kant, similarities between their respective political philosophies. A comparison of Kantian with Rortian irony might thus reveal continuities and discontinuities in political thought between the European Enlightment and American post-modernism. It, therefore, might help to better understand our time. In my paper, I perform a contrastive analysis of these two faces of irony. The analysis starts with an interpretation of these two faces as different ways to cope intellectually with the vicissitudes of the human condition. Next, I relate their irony to the way both philosophers deal with the split between the private and the public spheres, which is, in different ways, central to their political philosophies. This analysis will provide the material for an assessment of whether or not their irony can be considered as an evasive move, which allows for a safe distance from the contingent needs of mankind, and thus prohibits or supports solidarity with its fate. (shrink)

Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, Alastair Hannay, Bruce H Kirmmse, David D Possen, Joel D S Rasmussen, and Vanessa Rumble working with the Princeton University Press and the Søren Kierkegaard Research Center at the University of Copenhagen have produced this huge work with facsimiles etc. The review comments on Kierkegaard's shrewd observations which are applicable today in the New Media World of information skews in a COVID 19 world. Further; Kierkegaard's attack against mediocrity is commented on. This review finds Kierkegaard on St (...) Augustine of Hippo as immature. It is another thing that Kierkegaard's observations and this reviewer's extrapolations from them are not yet part of the New Media Studies's mostly platitude-filled webinars. How long will we go on about Marshall McLuhan? At least let us now learn from that most sharp of ironists: that the Press will be the Press and its mostly about optics. One wonders still how, Kierkegaard misread so much Augustine? Well, no man is an island and Kierkegaard tried to be an anonymous Christian. An impossibility. (shrink)