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  1. added 2019-10-20
    Quine on the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction.Stefanie Rocknak - 2013 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    An overview of Quine's understanding of the analytic/synthetic distinction, especially as it is conveyed in his paper, "The Two Dogmas of Empiricism.".
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  2. added 2019-10-20
    The Construction of Relations in Hume and Quine, Directed by Jaakko Hintikka (Introduction).Stefanie A. Rocknak - 1999 - Dissertation, Boston University
    Hume and Quine argue that human beings do not have access to general knowledge, that is, to general truths . The arguments of these two philosophers are premised on what Jaakko Hintikka has called the atomistic postulate. In the present work, it is shown that Hume and Quine in fact sanction an extreme version of this postulate, according to which even items of particular knowledge are not directly accessible in so far as they are relational. For according to their fully (...)
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  3. added 2017-08-02
    Rudolf Carnap.Logan Paul Gage - 2017 - In Paul Copan, I. I. I. Tremper Longman, Christopher L. Reese & Michael G. Strauss (eds.), Dictionary of Christianity and Science: The Definitive Reference for the Intersection of Christian Faith and Contemporary Science. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Academic. pp. 79-80.
    A brief introduction to the life and key work of Rudolf Carnap with special attention to his work on inductive logic.
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  4. added 2017-03-13
    Carnap’s Epistemological Critique of Metaphysics.Darren Bradley - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):2247-2265.
    Many who take a dismissive attitude towards metaphysics trace their view back to Carnap’s ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’. But the reason Carnap takes a dismissive attitude to metaphysics is a matter of controversy. I will argue that no reason is given in ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’, and this is because his reason for rejecting metaphysical debates was given in ‘Pseudo-Problems in Philosophy’. The argument there assumes verificationism, but I will argue that his argument survives the rejection of verificationism. The root (...)
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  5. added 2015-03-25
    Carnap’s Conventionalism in Geometry.Stefan Lukits - 2013 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 88 (1):123-138.
    Against Thomas Mormann's argument that differential topology does not support Carnap's conventionalism in geometry we show their compatibility. However, Mormann's emphasis on the entanglement that characterizes topology and its associated metrics is not misplaced. It poses questions about limits of empirical inquiry. For Carnap, to pose a question is to give a statement with the task of deciding its truth. Mormann's point forces us to introduce more clarity to what it means to specify the task that decides between competing hypotheses (...)
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  6. added 2014-05-18
    X - Phi and Carnapian Explication.Joshua Shepherd & James Justus - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (2):381-402.
    The rise of experimental philosophy has placed metaphilosophical questions, particularly those concerning concepts, at the center of philosophical attention. X-phi offers empirically rigorous methods for identifying conceptual content, but what exactly it contributes towards evaluating conceptual content remains unclear. We show how x-phi complements Rudolf Carnap’s underappreciated methodology for concept determination, explication. This clarifies and extends x-phi’s positive philosophical import, and also exhibits explication’s broad appeal. But there is a potential problem: Carnap’s account of explication was limited to empirical and (...)
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  7. added 2013-12-24
    Mathematical Aspects of Similarity and Quasi-Analysis - Order, Topology, and Sheaves.Thomas Mormann - manuscript
    The concept of similarity has had a rather mixed reputation in philosophy and the sciences. On the one hand, philosophers such as Goodman and Quine emphasized the „logically repugnant“ and „insidious“ character of the concept of similarity that allegedly renders it inaccessible for a proper logical analysis. On the other hand, a philosopher such as Carnap assigned a central role to similarity in his constitutional theory. Moreover, the importance and perhaps even indispensibility of the concept of similarity for many empirical (...)
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  8. added 2013-08-27
    Understanding Quine in Terms of the Aufbau: Another Look at Naturalized Epistemology.Stefanie Rocknak - 2010 - In Marcin Milkowski Konrad Talmud-Kaminski (ed.), Beyond Description: Naturalism and Normativity. College Publications.
    I argue that Quine’s rejection of Carnap’s “radical” (FLPV; TDE 39) and “phenomenalistic” (FSS 15-16) reductionism—as it is manifest in the Aufbau—may be understood in terms of a broader historical context. In particular, it may be understood as a rejection of a contemporary variant of the second horn of Meno’s Paradox. As a result, Quine’s motivation to adopt naturalism may be understood independently of his pragmatic concerns. According to Quine, it was simply unreasonable (i.e. paradoxical) to adopt a Carnapian phenomenalistic/mentalistic (...)
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  9. added 2013-08-27
    Verificationist Theory of Meaning.Markus Schrenk - 2008 - In U. Windhorst, M. Binder & N. Hirowaka (eds.), Encyclopaedic Reference of Neuroscience. Springer.
    The verification theory of meaning aims to characterise what it is for a sentence to be meaningful and also what kind of abstract object the meaning of a sentence is. A brief outline is given by Rudolph Carnap, one of the theory's most prominent defenders: If we knew what it would be for a given sentence to be found true then we would know what its meaning is. [...] thus the meaning of a sentence is in a certain sense identical (...)
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  10. added 2013-08-23
    Rudolf Carnap.Thomas Mormann - 2000 - C.H. Beck.
    Einführung in die Philosophie Rudolf Carnaps.
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  11. added 2013-08-23
    Review: Coffa, The Semantic Tradition From Carnap to Kant: To the Vienna Station. [REVIEW]C. Pigden - 1994 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 24 (4):522-525.
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