Related

Contents
4 found
Order:
  1. Stay in Your (Semantic) Lane: Prudence and the Lexical Sovereignty of Social Groups.Benjamin L. S. Nelson - manuscript
    This paper argues that it is prudentially wise to defer to groups about how they are essentially constituted and defined. After a few words situating the paper in my greater research project (§1), I articulate the kind of deference I have in mind (§2). Then I offer two conditional arguments on why it is epistemically desirable to let other people tell you how they ought to be identified (§3). The first argument is that people are owed lexical sovereignty because denying (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Rage Against the Authority Machines: How to Design Artificial Moral Advisors for Moral Enhancement.Ethan Landes, Cristina Voinea & Radu Uszkai - forthcoming - AI and Society.
    This paper aims to clear up the epistemology of learning morality from Artificial Moral Advisors (AMAs). We start with a brief consideration of what counts as moral enhancement and consider the risk of deskilling raised by machines that offer moral advice. We then shift focus to the epistemology of moral advice and show when and under what conditions moral advice can lead to enhancement. We argue that people’s motivational dispositions are enhanced by inspiring people to act morally, instead of merely (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. False Authorities.Christoph Jäger - 2024 - Acta Analytica 39 (4).
    An epistemic agent A is a false epistemic authority for others iff they falsely believe A to be in a position to help them accomplish their epistemic ends. A major divide exists between what I call "epistemic quacks", who falsely believe themselves to be relevantly competent, and "epistemic charlatans", i.e., false authorities who believe or even know that they are incompetent. Both types of false authority do not cover what Lackey (2021) calls "predatory experts": experts who systematically misuse their social-epistemic (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Deference and Ideals of Practical Agency.Jonathan Knutzen - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):17-32.
    This paper develops a moderate pessimist account of moral deference. I argue that while some pessimist explanations of the puzzle of moral deference have been misguided in matters of detail, they nevertheless share an important insight, namely that there is a justified moral agency ideal grounded in pro tanto reasons against moral deference. This thought is unpacked in terms of a set of values associated with the practice of morality. I conclude by suggesting that the solution to the puzzle of (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation