Hume: Justice

The task that Hume explicitly sets himself in 3.2 of the Treatise is to identify the motive that renders just actions virtuous and constitutes justice as a virtue. But surprisingly, he never provides a clear account of what this motive is. This is the problem of the missing motive. The goal of this paper is to explain this problem and offer a novel solution. To set up my solution, I analyze a recent proposal from Geoffrey Sayre-McCord and illustrate what it (...) gets right and what it gets wrong. I develop a solution that retains the benefits of his proposal while addressing its defects. The result is a significant advancement in our understanding of Hume’s theory of justice. (shrink)

Hume’s account of the scope of justice, many think, is implausibly narrow, apply- ing almost exclusively to respect for property rights. Such a view would indeed be highly objectionable because it would leave out of the scope of justice altogether requirements to keep our promises, obey the law, and refrain from threats and violence (among many others). I argue that Hume’s theory of justice, properly understood, avoids this objection. And seeing how is instructive because once we understand his account correctly, (...) we can appreciate its resources for offering attractive explanations of why a number of diverse phenomena fall within the scope of justice. Overcoming this challenge is a major step- ping stone on the way to seeing Hume’s theory of justice as a genuine competitor with the other dominant theories of justice in the philosophical literature. (shrink)

Reid argues that Hume’s claim that justice is an artificial virtue is inconsistent with the fact that gratitude is a natural sentiment. This chapter shows that Reid’s argument succeeds only given a philosophy of mind and action that Hume rejects. Among other things, Reid assumes that one can conceive of one of a pair of contradictories only if one can conceive of the other—a claim that Hume denies. So, in the case of justice, the disagreement between Hume and Reid is, (...) at bottom, a disagreement over their respective conceptions of how the human mind works at its most fundamental level. (shrink)

This article argues that the origin of the political principles and categories that Hume sets as essential to the preservation of political power and its effective exercise can be traced into the division of political agent that occurs as a result of the institution of justice and government in the origin of society. Their different roles and different degrees of freedom will determine, since then, and through political action and its irreversibility, the categories and the fundamental problems that Hume´s political (...) philosophy should answer. From that framework, the panoply of political power preservation principles that Hume exposes in the Essays will be analyzed as a reflection of that original event and its particular evolution. (shrink)

In Book III, Part 2 of the Treatise, Hume presents a natural history of justice. Self-interest clearly plays a central role in his account; our ancestors invented justice conventions, he maintains, for the sake of reciprocal advantage. But this is not what makes his approach so novel and attractive. Hume recognizes that prudential considerations are not sufficient to explain how human beings – with our propensities towards temporal discounting and free-riding – could have established conventions for social exchange and collective (...) action in commercial societies. This leads him to develop an innovative account of the role that emotional aversions play in establishing trust between strategically rational agents. (shrink)

This work aims to study a specific part of the ethical and political thought of Scottish philosopher David Hume: his descriptions of the origin of justice and government. Both are analyzed in an attempt to clarify the treatment of inequality that it is offered by them. We describe how the particular process of criminalization of natural inequality begins to occur with the moralization of laws of justice after the first convention and how it is consolidated after the genesis of government. (...) During this particular descriptive process our main goal will be to identify the profile and role of the various players, and the emergence of moral paternalism and dominance in the interaction thereof. Finally, try to offer a credible solution to one of the perennial conflicts in the secondary literature on Hume’s ethic philosophy ─the paradox of motivation─, reinterpreting the meaning of the strategy adopted by the figure of the sensible knave. (shrink)

Until fairly recently it was not uncommon for political theorists to hold the view that people cannot be expected to act in accordance with the public interest without some incentive. Authors such as Marcus Tullius Cicero, John Locke, David Hume and Adam Smith, for instance, held that people often act in accordance with the public interest, but more from a concern for their honour and reputation than from a concern for the greater good. Today, most authors take a more demanding (...) view, maintaining that people are to be just solely from a love for justice, not from a fear of losing face. In this article today's prevailing view, which sees honour as something obsolete and archaic and not as a legitimate motive, is contrasted with the older view that honour is important for both knowing what moral is and acting on it. Subsequently, it is argued that the ethics of honour, especially in the form it took in the works of Hume and Smith, can still be of value, exactly because it is less demanding. (shrink)

The author examines Hobbes and Hume in the light of recent proposals of neo-Hobbesian political theories. Magri concludes that Hobbes and Hume's strategies would be plausible from the point of view of liberal thinking if they succeeded; the difficulty, however, is that both systems fail to overcome the barrier between individual interests and moral and political principles.

It is important in its own right to determine what conception of mutual disinterest Rawls has in mind at the various junctions in the text. Furthermore, disambiguating this notion counters a common objection that there is no reason to accept principles of justice that are chosen by rational egoists. The persons in Rawls' OP are not rational egoists. Rather, in identifying with the token persons in society they make the actual interests of the token persons into their ends and they (...) know that they are choosing principles of justice for a society in which moderate selfishness reigns. But this is very remote from stipulating a selfish disposition for the persons in the OP. Hence, the objection is contingent on a natural misreading of Rawls' notion of mutual disinterest and can be readily dispelled by disambiguating this notion into a motivational and an epistemic constraint on the OP. (shrink)

In this paper I pursue two closely related objectives. First, I articulate and describe the nature and character of Hume's theory of punishment. Second, in light of this account, I offer an assessment of the contem- porary interest and value of Hume's theory. Throughout my discus- sion I emphasize the relevance and importance of Hume's views on moral responsibility to his account of punishment.1 More specifically, I argue that Hume seeks to develop an account of punishment on the foundation of (...) a naturalistic theory of responsibility - that is, a theory which draws our attention to the role of moral sentiment in this sphere.2 Although this naturalistic aspect of Hume's theory of punishment has been largely overlooked by commentators, I maintain that it is, nevertheless, precisely this aspect of Hume's theory that is especially interesting from a contemporary pers. (shrink)