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  1. ‘For Me, In My Present State’: Kant on Judgments of Perception and Mere Subjective Validity.Janum Sethi - 2020 - Journal of Modern Philosophy 2 (9):20.
    Few of Kant’s distinctions have generated as much puzzlement and criticism as the one he draws in the Prolegomena between judgments of experience, which he describes as objectively and universally valid, and judgments of perception, which he says are merely subjectively valid. Yet the distinction between objective and subjective validity is central to Kant’s account of experience and plays a key role in his Transcendental Deduction of the categories. In this paper, I reject a standard interpretation of the distinction, according (...)
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  2. Juicios subjetivos y juicios sobre sujetos. Una distinción a propósito de los juicios de percepción.Stéfano Straulino - 2018 - In Gustavo Leyva, Álvaro Peláez & Pedro Stepanenko (eds.), Los rostros de la razón: Immanuel Kant desde Hispanoamérica. I. Filosofía Teórica. pp. 72-86.
    Subjective judgments and judgments about subjects. A distinction regarding judgments of perception [English] It is well known the number of problems that arise from the distinction between "judgments of perception" and "judgments of experience" delivered in the Prolegomena. This article focuses on the impossibility of assigning truth value to judgments of perception since it seems counterintuitive to indicate that judgments such as "I am cold" or "sugar tastes sweet" cannot be true. To solve this difficulty, it is proposed here to (...)
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  3. Kant on Truth-Aptness.Alberto Vanzo - 2012 - History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (2):109-126.
    Many scholars claimed that, according to Immanuel Kant, some judgements lack a truth-value: analytic judgements, judgements about items of which humans cannot have experience, judgements of perception, and non-assertoric judgements. However, no one has undertaken an extensive examination of the textual evidence for those claims. Based on an analysis of Kant's texts, I argue that: (1) according to Kant, only judgements of perception are not truth-apt. All other judgements are truth-apt, including analytic judgements and judgements about items of which humans (...)
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