Contents
8 found
Order:
  1. ‘Are mental disorders brain disorders?’ is a question of conceptual choice.Elisabetta Lalumera - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology 1 (3):1-13.
    This contribution focuses on what type of question “Are mental disorders brain disorders?” is and what task Anneli Jefferson performs in her book with the same title. I distinguish between conceptual engineering and conceptual choice, the former involving the individuation of an adequate concept for a specific goal, and the latter involving the normative problem of whether we should employ the concept at hand. I contend that Anneli Jefferson’s book is a work of conceptual engineering, which is valuable in and (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Review of Matthew Homan. Spinoza’s Epistemology through a Geometrical Lens. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021. Pp. xv+256. [REVIEW]Yitzhak Y. Melamed - 2023 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 61 (2):329-31.
    Like most, if not all, of his contemporaries, Spinoza never developed a full-fledged philosophy of mathematics. Still, his numerous remarks about mathematics attest not only to his deep interest in the subject (a point which is also confirmed by the significant presence of mathematical books in his library), but also to his quite elaborate and perhaps unique understanding of the nature of mathematics. At the very center of his thought about mathematics stands a paradox (or, at least, an apparent paradox): (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. (1 other version)Reflective Knowledge.Kristin Primus - 2021 - In Yitzhak Y. Melamed (ed.), Blackwell Companion to Spinoza. Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell. pp. 265-275.
    In this chapter, I first turn to Spinoza’s obscure “ideas of ideas” doctrine and his claim that “as soon as one knows something, one knows that one knows it, and simultaneously knows that one knows that one knows, and so on, to infinity” (E2p21s). On my view, Spinoza, like Descartes, holds that a given idea can be conceived either in terms of what it represents or as an act of thinking: E2p7 (where Spinoza presents his doctrine of the “parallelism” of (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  4. (1 other version)Reflective Knowledge.Kristin Primus - 2021 - In Yitzhak Y. Melamed (ed.), A Companion to Spinoza. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. pp. 265–275.
    This chapter describes Spinoza's obscure “ideas of ideas” doctrine and his claim that “as soon as one knows something, one knows that one knows it, and simultaneously knows that one knows that one knows, and so on, to infinity”. Spinoza holds that the human mind is a representation of the body: the “objectum of the idea constituting the human mind” is the human body. Suppose ideas are essentially self‐reflexive, and that this reflexive awareness, the “idea of the idea,” makes the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  5. The Causes of Our Belief in Free Will: Spinoza on Necessary, ‘Innate,’ yet False Cognition.Yitzhak Y. Melamed - 2017 - In Cambridge Critical Guide to Spinoza’s Ethics. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
    This chapter will discuss Spinoza’s critique of free will, though our brief study of this topic in the first part of the chapter will aim primarily at preparing us to address the main topic of the chapter, which is Spinoza’s explanation of the reasons which force us to believe in free will. At times, Spinoza seems to come very close to asserting the paradoxical claim that we are not free to avoid belief in free will. In the second part of (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  6. Reason and Knowledge in Spinoza.John R. T. Grey - 2015 - In Andre Santos Campos (ed.), Spinoza: Basic Concepts. Burlington, VT, USA: Imprint Academic. pp. 71-83.
    This chapter investigates Spinoza's conception of reason, focusing on (i) the difference between reason and the imagination, and (ii) the difference between reason and intuitive knowledge. The central interpretive debate this chapter considers is about the scope of rational cognition. Some commentators have argued that it is only possible to have rational cognition of properties that are universally shared, whereas intuitive knowledge may grasp the essences of particular individuals. Another prominent interpretation is that reason differs from intuition only in virtue (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Adequate and Inadequate Ideas in Spinoza.Blake McAllister - 2014 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 31 (2):119-136.
    Adequate and inadequate ideas play a central role in Spinoza’s system. A number of recent commentators have suggested that the internality or externality of an idea’s immediate cause is a necessary and sufficient condition of the idea’s adequacy or inadequacy, respectively. I show that this thesis is subject to counterexample and briefly explore the significance of this critique for recent interpretations. I offer an alternative interpretation on which adequate and inadequate ideas are characterized by the manner in which they grasp (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  8. "By Eternity I Understand": Eternity According to Spinoza.Julie R. Klein - 2002 - Iyyun, The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 51 (July):295-324.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations