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  1. Spinoza and the Philosophy of Science: Mathematics, Motion, and Being.Eric Schliesser - 1986, 2002
    This chapter argues that the standard conception of Spinoza as a fellow-travelling mechanical philosopher and proto-scientific naturalist is misleading. It argues, first, that Spinoza’s account of the proper method for the study of nature presented in the Theological-Political Treatise (TTP) points away from the one commonly associated with the mechanical philosophy. Moreover, throughout his works Spinoza’s views on the very possibility of knowledge of nature are decidedly sceptical (as specified below). Third, in the seventeenth-century debates over proper methods in the (...)
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  2. Hasdai Crescas and Spinoza on Actual Infinity and the Infinity of God’s Attributes.Yitzhak Melamed - 2014 - In Steven Nadler (ed.), Spinoza and Jewish Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. pp. 204-215.
    The seventeenth century was an important period in the conceptual development of the notion of the infinite. In 1643, Evangelista Torricelli (1608-1647)—Galileo’s successor in the chair of mathematics in Florence—communicated his proof of a solid of infinite length but finite volume. Many of the leading metaphysicians of the time, notably Spinoza and Leibniz, came out in defense of actual infinity, rejecting the Aristotelian ban on it, which had been almost universally accepted for two millennia. Though it would be another two (...)
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  3. The Differential Point of View of the Infinitesimal Calculus in Spinoza, Leibniz and Deleuze.Simon Duffy - 2006 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 37 (3):286-307.
    In Hegel ou Spinoza,1 Pierre Macherey challenges the influence of Hegel’s reading of Spinoza by stressing the degree to which Spinoza eludes the grasp of the Hegelian dialectical progression of the history of philosophy. He argues that Hegel provides a defensive misreading of Spinoza, and that he had to “misread him” in order to maintain his subjective idealism. The suggestion being that Spinoza’s philosophy represents, not a moment that can simply be sublated and subsumed within the dialectical progression of the (...)
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